


For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2023 with funding from
University of Alberta Library

<https://archive.org/details/Singh1972>

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

PARTY COHESION IN THE BIHAR
PRADESH CONGRESS

by



MAHENDRA P. SINGH

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1972

Thesis
72F-211

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Party Cohesion in the Bihar Pradesh Congress," submitted by Mahendra P. Singh in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the problem of party cohesion in a pragmatic, success-oriented, dominant, branch-type mass party operating in a heterogeneous society.

The study begins with an examination of the Indian National Congress in the state of Bihar against a wide range of conceptual and theoretical models, delineating its principal characteristics as a party and putting it within the context of its sociopolitical milieu. It analyses the conceptual and theoretical considerations pertaining to party cohesion and consequences for it of some important party-specific and ecological variables. In general, it is suggested that the panoply of these factors, some of which tend to operate in convergent fashion while others seem to cut across each other, ought to have a mixed impact on the prospects of cohesion in the Bihar Pradesh Congress.

Apart from the polity- and the party-level factors, the study also concerned itself with the micro-level factors involved in the phenomenon of party cohesion. In particular, the theoretical relevance to party cohesion of such factors as party member's incentive system; the extent of his dependence on personal, non-party or party political

resources; his participatory and organizational involvement within the party; his intraparty and extraparty status; his length of party membership and legislative seniority; and the nature of his socioeconomic environment were considered.

With the available data, the defection /loyalty of Congress MLAs (Members of Legislative Assembly) during 1967-1970 was examined in the light of the electoral margin in the preceding election and the caste of the MLA (used as indicators of his greater or less reliance on personal political resources independent of the party, or on the party's political resources); his legislative seniority; and his cabinet status.

The findings supported the hypothesis that the greater the degree of dependence of a party member on his personal political resources independent of the party, the greater the likelihood of his defection from the party.

The hypothesized negative effects of legislative seniority and of cabinet status in the past on defection was not confirmed by the 1967-1969 defection patterns, but was strongly supported by the 1969-1970 patterns. The inconsistent findings for the two periods regarding the above hypotheses make one wonder whether the same factors may have different effects in different periods, depending on prevailing circumstances. Or perhaps the whole theoretical underpinning of the hypotheses that legislative seniority

necessarily carries better prospects for members' socialization into group norms or party loyalty, and that cabinet status is always given out to members as rewards for loyalty to the party is tenuous. Alternate routes of reasoning and explanation are suggested.

The study concludes with theoretical implications of its findings and suggestions for further research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the course of this study I have incurred obligations of several institutions and persons.

The Magadh University, Bodh Gaya (Bihar), granted me a study leave and the University of Alberta a Graduate Teaching Assistanceship, without which I would not have been able to carry out this work.

I owe a great deal to my supervisors, Dr. Saleem M. M. Qureshi and Dr. Robert Raymond Gilsdorf, for their valuable advice and help. Both of them offered extensive comments and criticisms on the drafts of the thesis. Dr. Gilsdorf not only performed the ultimate scholarly favor of reading and criticising the chapters in detail, but was also helpful in obtaining some useful data on Bihar from Dr. Paul R. Brass of the Washington State University. He guided me into the fascinating field of political party literature and helped inculcate in me an abiding interest in the phenomenon of party cohesion and factionalism. He also helped me in the use of computer. I express my sincerest thanks to both of them.

My thanks are also due to Dr. J. Peter Meekison and Dr. (Mrs.) Roberta E. Mapp for their constant encouragement and help, and to Professor J. Paul Johnston and Professor James F. Reynolds for sharpening my logical and

methodological awareness. I also thank Dr. S. P. Singh of the Business Administration Department, the external member of my thesis committee.

Many friends and relatives in Bihar generously complied with my requests for informations of various kinds. My colleague Dr. R. C. Prasad, the chairman of the Magadh University Political Science Department, carried his entire file of newspaper clippings on Bihar politics to the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in the summer of 1971 and mailed it to me from there. My brother Shri Kumar Jogendra P. Singh and my friends Sarvashri Ranjit Kumar Singh, Shoaib Ahmad, Yashwant Kumar Jain, and Bhagwan Dass Dua were helpful at various stages either in data collection or in some other way.

I also wish to thank Mrs. Marilyn Wahl who cheerfully typed and retyped the manuscripts.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	PARTY COHESION AND THE BIHAR PRADESH CONGRESS:	
	A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE	1
	Introduction	1
	A Comparative Perspective on Party Cohesion and the Bihar Pradesh Congress	2
	The Organization of the Study	26
II	BIHAR: SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE	28
	Area and Population	28
	The Economy	33
	The Society	36
	Geographical Distribution of Castes . . .	40
	Caste and Politics	42
III	BIHAR: POLITICAL PROFILE	50
	Introduction	50
	Growth of Political Parties	50
	Appeal and Program	63
	Electoral and Legislative Strength of Parties	66
	Geographical Distribution of Support . .	69
	Political Participation in Bihar	71
	Social Composition of Parties	72

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV	FACTIONAL POLITICS IN THE BIHAR PRADESH
	CONGRESS (1937 - 1967) 80
	Introduction 80
	One-Party Dominant System 81
	Factional Politics in Bihar Congress 84
	The 1967 Elections 100
V	POLITICS OF COALITIONS AND DEFECTIONS
	(1967 - 1970) 104
	Introduction 104
	The Post-1967 Party System 105
	Coalitions, Factions, and Defections 107
VI	PARTY COHESION, DEVIANCE, AND DEFECTION 135
	Deviance and Defection: A Conceptual Framework 135
	Defections from the Bihar Congress, 1967 - 1970 147
VII	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 168
	BIBLIOGRAPHY 186
	APPENDICES 198

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
I	Regional Distribution of Population, Urbanization, Literacy, and Industrial Employment in Bihar	30
II	Distribution of Castes and Communities in Bihar by Region and District	41
III	Bihar Vidhan Sabha Election Results, 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967 and 1969	52
IV	Patterns of Electoral Support by Region for Parties in Bihar.	55
V	Membership of Bihar Vidhan Sabha by Party and Caste 1967	73
VI	Ethnic Composition of Congress Members of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha, 1957-1967	77
VII	Ethnic Composition of the Pradesh Executive of the Bihar Congress	78
VIII	Defection by Electoral Margin in Preceding Election	151
IX	Defection by Caste	153
X	Defection by Community	156
XI	Defection by Legislative Seniority	157
XII	Defection by Cabinet Status	160
XIII	Summary of Associations Between Defection and Independent Variables, 1967-69 and 1969-70. .	163
XIV	Defection by Caste, Legislative Seniority, Cabinet Status, and Electoral Margin, 1967-1969	165
XV	Defection by Caste, Legislative Seniority, Cabinet Status, and Electoral Margin, 1969-1970	166

CHAPTER I

PARTY COHESION AND THE BIHAR PRADESH CONGRESS:

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

While studies of political parties have proliferated, neither any general theory of party has emerged nor is one offered here. What I set out to do in this study is to describe and explain the problem of party cohesion in the Indian National Congress in the state of Bihar.

The Bihar Pradesh (state) Congress remained for long the dominant political party¹ in a multiparty system; from the transfer-of-power elections in British India in 1946 until the 1967 elections in independent India it dominated Bihar politics, setting the style and idiom of the "Congress epoch" in that state.² And though the party lost its majority in 1967 (and failed to regain it in 1969), it still maintained its plurality, and, despite a split in 1969, seems not wholly

¹For elaboration of the concept of a dominant party see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organizations and Activity in the Modern State. Translated from the original French by Barbara and Robert North, (New York: John Wiley, 1963), pp. 307-312.

²The Congress, indeed, dominated the agitational and electoral politics even in colonial Bihar during the last four decades of the British rule. But for obvious reasons that period cannot be regarded as the "Congress epoch." For the electoral performance of the Congress during the British period see Appendix I.

lacking in recuperative capability.³

Like most dominant parties, the Congress has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for accommodation of diverse social elements, and consequently has developed into a highly complex system of conflict and consensus. It is to the understanding of this phenomenon of conflict and consensus in the Congress party in Bihar that this study is addressed.

In the present chapter I wish to deal with some conceptual and theoretical considerations pertaining to party cohesion and the impact on it of some important party-structural and environmental variables. Throughout the discussion would develop in terms of examining how the Congress party sticks in this comparative framework and what ought to be the possible impact on the prospects for party cohesion in it. In general, the discussion would suggest that the various factors examined in this chapter ought to have a mixed impact on the prospects of cohesion in the Congress.

PARTY COHESION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The conceptual imagery of cohesion is variously stated by such terms as coherence, unity, harmony, consensus, and homogeneity meaning, in general, the similarity, on the

³Indicated first by the 1971 mid-term federal elections, this trend actually consummated in the 1972 mid-term state elections in Bihar. See Appendix II.

part of individuals or collectivities, in properties or orientations toward something. In sociological and political theory this idea is often expressed by the concept of "integration," which refers to the harmonious interaction of the parts or units of a system, with system being conceptualized as a set of elements interacting interdependently within a more or less specifiable boundary.

The adjectival part of the phrase "harmonious interaction" in the preceding sentence is significant. For in more cautious models of system the fact of interdependence of parts is never overemphasized and construed as an automatically produced harmony among the basic elements of the system; it is acknowledged that parts of a system may vary among themselves in terms of degree and proportion of their dependence on each other for the satisfaction of their needs, and that some parts may even survive separation from others.⁴

This perspective clearly brings us face to face with the problem of maintaining coherence and harmony among the interacting parts of a system and of managing tensions resulting from their autonomy strivings and strategies. In a conceptualization of a social system developed by Talcott Parsons "integration" is, indeed, postulated as one of the four "functional requisites" of the system, the other three

⁴See Alvin W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory," in L. Gross (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1958), pp. 241-270.

being "patterns maintenance," "goal attainment," and "adaptation." To quote Parsons:

Whatever the units which interact in a system-process, be they the motivational units of personality (need-disposition) or the roles of collectivities in more macroscopic social systems the actions of significant units may be such as to be mutually supportive in the functioning of the system, or to some degree mutually obstructive and conflictful. There is, then, the problem of "maintaining solidarity" in the relations between the units, in the interest of effective functioning. This I call the functional imperative of system-integration.⁵

Thus in order that actions of the various parts of a system may not work at cross-purposes to the extent of subverting the grand systemic goal, a certain measure of harmony of action and goals among them must be maintained. Otherwise the system would be threatened with disruption.

The system with which this study is concerned is, as already mentioned, the Congress party in Bihar. We are speaking here of the Congress party as though it were a discrete system. A party, no doubt, is often viewed as a subsystem in the more inclusive political system. As Samuel J. Eldersveld observes, parties owe their very existence and basic form to the need of performance of certain "critical functions" for the respective political systems of which they are a part.⁶ However, it appears empirically relevant and systematically fruitful to think of

⁵Talcott Parsons, "Some Highlights of the General Theory of Action," in Roland Yound (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1962), p. 294.

⁶Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 2.

the party as a more or less self-contained system embedded in the environmental milieu of the larger political system, i.e., a more or less boundaried pattern of behavioral interaction with a set of its own rules and mechanism of control directed toward the accomplishment of some specific goals.

As a goal directed system, the party brings together individuals and social groups weaving and integrating them into the framework of its organization in a bid to transform social forces into political power. The preeminent goal of the party, then, is the winning or capture of political power with such other concomitant goals as mobilization of the public for effective or ornamental participation, interest articulation and aggregation for providing the people with platforms and policies, and recruitment of personnel for various political roles within the party and the polity.

However, beyond this broad consensus on the desirability of winning governmental power, there are usually considerable differences of opinion and clash of interests among the individuals and social groups that opt to work under the common label of a party. For the various social groups and individuals support a party for a variety of interests and motives not necessarily in perfect harmony with each other. The party thus must aggregate and reconcile the multiple interests competing within itself in such a manner as to evolve and maintain a jointly advantageous relationship among them, on the one hand, and the party as a corporate group, on the other. As Eldersveld succinctly puts it:

The party is a mutually exploitative relationship - it is joined by those who would use it; it mobilizes for the sake of power those who would join it.⁷

Given this unique feature as an organization, intraparty conflicts make their appearance in almost all parties with varying degrees of intensity, and one frequently finds identifiable subgroups of party members with variable extent of interaction and formal organization. These subgroups emerge either for a limited duration of an electoral or policy controversy or are endowed with impressive continuity. The authoritative party elite often lend a certain amount of indirect recognition and legitimacy to such subgroups by bargaining with and mediating and arbitrating among them.

These subgroups within political parties are most commonly referred to as party "factions."⁸ Raphael Zariski defines party factions in terms of three basic properties: (1) a "cognitive element" or party member's awareness of some fundamental differences between him and his like-minded colleagues, on the one hand, and other members of the party, on the other; (2) a certain degree of the interaction and

⁷Eldersveld, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸It is important to note here another usage of the term "faction" in the literature. Faction in this sense refers to political groups of the past or the present, which according to the modern political scientific conceptualization of political party do not deserve that label, and are, from a developmental perspective, considered a pre-party phenomenon. See Ferdinand A. Hermens, The Representative Republic (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958), pp. 159-162; and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 412-415.

consultation among the members of a faction through formal or informal procedures; and (3) a modicum of continuity of the faction on the time dimension.⁹ Factions are thus distinguished from parties in that they are an intraparty, rather than interparty phenomenon. In other words, factions seek to control power and authority within a party, rather than within the polity.

The differences which lead to intraparty conflicts and faction formations may arise in a variety of ways. Factions may, for example, emerge in a party on the basis of differences among the party leaders on overall ideology, e.g., the right wing and the left wing of a party. Even when the party leaders generally agree on the ideology, factional groupings may still emerge on the basis of disagreements on strategy and tactics to be used to achieve the ideological objectives of the party such, for example, as reformist and radical, and moderate and extremist elements in some parties. And yet another form of party factionalism may flourish on specific issues such as during an election or the passage of a legislation. Moreover, sometimes factional conflicts may draw their rationale from and get intertwined with socioeconomic cleavages, regional disparities, or estate interests. Further, intraparty politics may also revolve around personality conflicts among the leaders with little or

⁹Raphael Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations", Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4 (February, 1960), 27-51 at 34.

no ideological or policy contents, though the leaders involved almost always endeavour to cover issueless factional feuds with the mantle of theory so that "personal dislike and personal hostility pompously masquerade as differences of views and tactics."¹⁰ Finally, factional politics may also make its appearance on the basis of horizontal and vertical stratifications within the party allowing conflicts and tensions to occur between the leaders in, say, the organizational and the parliamentary wings of the party, or between the leaders at one stratum of the party and those at another, say, the national and local.¹¹

Since factional conflicts almost by definition impinge upon the capacity of a party to operate cohesively and therefore effectively toward the achievement of its goal, all parties usually provide rules and norms emphasizing the solidarity theme and sanctions against divisive factionalism. Parties, however, vary a great deal in the extent of factionalism within them and their ability to control it.

A great many factors seem to affect a party's capability of operating cohesively. Broadly, these factors can be grouped into two categories: (1) those concerning the

¹⁰Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover Publications, first published in 1915), p. 168.

¹¹See Ibid., pp. 164-184; Zariski, op. cit., pp. 34-36; and Kenneth Janada, "A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties", in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Comparative Politics Series, 1-2 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970), pp. 110-111.

party itself; and (2) those relating to the structural and cultural aspects of the environmental context in which the party must function. To begin with the second category of factors, two of them appear to be particularly relevant here: the type of the constitutional system at the systemic level, and the nature of the social and political environment in which the party operates.

Many writers have concerned themselves with the impact of constitutional factors on party cohesion. Leon D. Epstein, for example, provides impressive evidence as to the differential effect of the institutional variations in the system of legislative management under the parliamentary and the presidential forms of government on legislative party cohesion, operationalized in terms of party voting.¹² In his comprehensive survey of legislative party cohesion in Western democracies he notes that a parliamentary form of government, rather than the presidential one, appears to have a greater association with legislative party cohesion. The only deviant case among the parliamentary systems that Epstein encounters is France under the Third and the Fourth Republics, which is largely left unexplained except for a

¹²Leon D. Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties", in J. C. Wahlke and H. Eulau (eds.), Legislative Behavior (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 132-143; Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 315-350. See also Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962).

casual reference to "something special in the national circumstances."¹³

Turning to the presidential or separation of powers systems at the national and state levels in the United States, Epstein finds that though greater party cohesion is found in some of these cases than others, "nothing like the regularity of parliamentary party voting" is to be found in any of them.¹⁴

The above relationship is explained primarily in terms of the greater functional need for cohesive parties in a parliamentary system for stabilizing the executive authority, perpetually dependent for its life on the will of the legislature than in a separation of powers system with an executive having a fixed tenure.

Epstein's cautious conclusion is that while one cannot argue that either the parliamentary system or the separation of powers system necessarily produces cohesive or incohesive parties, available evidence suggests that the presence of parliamentary government seems to be decisive:

With it cohesive parties have regularly developed except in France. Without it, cohesive parties might still be possible, but they are not necessary.¹⁵

The foregoing would seem to enhance the prospects of cohesion in the Congress party in Bihar because it operates in the context of a parliamentary system consciously patterned

¹³Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, op. cit., p. 339.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 340.

after the Westminster model. In point of fact, however, this prospect seems to have only partially materialized for the Congress party. Although up to the 1967 elections, the Congress Legislature Party, despite a marked proliferation of factions within it, managed to maintain a precarious unity in the sense of party voting, after 1967 several coalition governments directly led or indirectly supported by the Congress fell on account of sizeable defections from the Congress and other constituent parties in the coalitions.¹⁶ Thus in the light of the experience of parliamentary government in Bihar and some other North Indian states,¹⁷ as well as the deviant case of the Third and Fourth Republics of France referred to above, one should presumably add that while the existence of parliamentary regime may well increase the probability of cohesive parties, it does not fully determine such a development. Many factors other than the nature of government are involved in such relationships.

The impact on party cohesion of two other constitutional factors at the systemic level, i.e., federalism/unitarism and electoral system, does not appear to be very clear and marked. While true to its nature, federalism does seem to promote decentralizing tendency in the national parties, as in the United States, for example, the cases of Canada, Australia,

¹⁶ See Ch. 4 and 5.

¹⁷ Paul Brass, "Coalition Politics in North India", American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1174-1191.

and West Germany indicate that it does not necessarily produce noncohesive parties.¹⁸

As to the effect of the electoral system it is argued that the proportional representation, by placing maximal intraparty authority in the hands of the authoritative party elite and by helping create in the mind of the voter the collective image of the party more distinctly than that of an individual candidate, tends to favor cohesive legislative parties. By contrast, election by plurality in single-member districts, it is argued, favors decentralized party organization.¹⁹ Though the relationships suggested by the above propositions have not been subjected to systematic empirical analysis,²⁰ offhand examples of the United States and the Fourth French Republic after World War I, the former using the single-member plurality system and the latter the proportional system, seem to go counter to them.

Needless to say that the Congress party operates under a federal system. However, insofar as we are here concerned with the Bihar state unit of the party, the effect of the

¹⁸Ergum Ozbudun, "Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis", Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Comparative Politics Series, Vol. 1.6 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970), pp. 354-355.

¹⁹John D. May, "Democracy, Party "Evolution", Duverger", Comparative Political Studies, 2 (July, 1969), 228.

²⁰The effect of the electoral system on the party system - an interparty, rather than an intraparty phenomenon - has, of course, received much treatment. See Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967).

federal/unitary factor is obviously controlled. So far as the electoral system is concerned, its effect, if any, should be in the negative direction, as the Indian political system works through an electoral system based on election by plurality in single - and double - member districts.

Another contextual variable of significance determining party cohesion (or lack of it) is the social and cultural dimension of the environment in which the party operates. To be sure more pronounced forms of such cleavages get translated into rival party formations, in which case one would expect each of the rival parties to be pretty homogeneous and cohesive. But not all social and cultural cleavages prove to be party forming; logical permutations and combinations of these cleavages always outnumber the actual incidence of parties in democracies.²¹ Thus more often than not parties in democracies seek to appeal to and win support of more than one social group and typically emerge as aggregators of interests.²² In general, then, other things being equal, the more fragmented a society the more the likelihood of intraparty conflicts in any party that mobilizes support across such lines

²¹See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage, Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments", in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

²²"Interest aggregation", emerges as the most important function of parties in Gabriel A. Almond's Structural-functional framework of political analysis. See G. A. Almond and B. G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), Ch. 5.

of cleavage.

This would suggest that the highly cleavaged society of Bihar ought to maximize the likelihood of conflicts within the Congress party, which in trying to adapt to its environment has come to draw diverse social groups into its fold.²³

Another environmental factor relevant to party unity and cohesion is the closeness of interparty competition. A positive correlation between "external threat" and "pressure for conformity" is a well established generalization in the study of groups and collectivities.²⁴ This proposition easily leads to the prediction that the higher the degree of interparty competition, the greater the compulsions for conformity within the party, assuming, of course, that there are rules as well as established norms within the party favoring conforming behavior in the first place. This association can be explained by the fact that the element of "enemy-threatenedness" tends to induce the authoritative party elite to demand and the rank and file to close their ranks against a common enemy. In a less competitive party system the dominant party can afford to be lax in discipline and allow a measure of open intraparty conflicts as in the case of the multifactional and bifactional one-party southern states in the United States. In such systems the dominant party becomes

²³See ch. 3 and 4.

²⁴Stein Rokkan et. al., Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: David McKay Company, 1970), pp. 314-333.

the holding company of competing factions, which, in turn, become the principal political infrastructures, shaping the political process.²⁵ Similar conclusions have been reached by students of factional politics within the dominant Christian Democratic Party in Italy and the Congress party in India.²⁶ On the other hand, studies of some competitive two-party northern states in the United States reveal that parties operate there with considerable internal cohesion, which is accountable, at least in part, in terms of the competitiveness of the party system.²⁷ Similarly, Paul Brass finds some evidence in India that "factional politics [in the Congress Party] declines in intensity as external competition increases."²⁸

Given that the Congress party in Bihar operated till 1967 with very little external competition, it should be expected that within the party factional conflicts should

²⁵ See V. O. Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1949); Allan P. Sindler, Political Parties in the United States (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), ch. 2; and Fred I. Greenstein, The American Party System and the American People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 2nd edition), pp. 70-77.

²⁶ See Raphael Zariski, "Intraparty Conflict in a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy" Journal of Politics, 27 (February, 1965), 3-34; Robert R. Gilsdorf, Factionalism in the Christian Democratic Party, 1958-1963 (Yale University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1970); Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); and Ramashray Roy, "Intraparty Conflict in Bihar Congress," in Rajni Kothari (ed.), Party System and Election Studies (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967), pp. 99-113.

²⁷ See Duane Lockard, New England State Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); and Greenstein, op. cit., pp. 78-83.

²⁸ Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State, op.

flourish. This expectation seems to be confirmed by the fact that before 1967 the Congress party in Bihar remained preoccupied with maintenance of internal party cohesion, rather than dealing with external opposition.²⁹

The intriguing fact, however, is that even under increased interparty competition, following the first crack in Congress monopoly of power in 1967 factional feuds showed no signs of abatement; if anything, they became more disintegrative. For the first time since independence, the factional conflicts within the party over the pre-election nomination of candidates and post-election formation of ministries threatened to turn dissidence within the party into defection from the party.³⁰ This clearly suggests that the external competition factor has only a partial relevance in explaining party cohesion and that the influence of this factor should be considered under different sets of conditions. One such condition, for example, appears to be whether or not the party is perceived or continues to be perceived as an effective dispenser of rewards or punishments. Thus one may argue that an almost exclusive control of the Congress over power and patronage before 1967 had presumably served as a strong disincentive against defection from the party by the dissident factions. In other words, under the conditions of one-party dominance, the Congress was able both to discourage defection

²⁹See Ch. 4.

³⁰See Ch. 5.

and to sanction deviance more effectively by the threat of or actual recourse to expulsion. For defection or expulsion from the party often meant going into the political wilderness. With the loss of dominance by the party these restraining factors became assets of diminishing effectiveness.

Another cluster of factors affecting party cohesion relates to the party itself. These factors may, in turn, be subdivided into three interrelated variables: (1) the style of appeal of the party; (2) homogeneity of its membership; and (3) its organizational structure.

In terms of their style of appeal, parties have generally been classified into two categories: ideological and pragmatic.³¹ For the former, ideology assumes the form of a religion and provides an absolute value-oriented framework to which everything else in the party must conform. Considered as something beyond compromise, ideology thus becomes the main instrument of legitimization. A pragmatic party, on the other hand, is not primarily concerned with ideological purity and acts as a broker of interests. It tends to subordinate its policies and programs to the

³¹Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties", in Weiner and LaPalombara (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 3-42. Comparable with this classification is that of Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties", in Neumann (ed.), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 400, which classifies parties in terms of those emphasizing day-to-day "expediency interests" and those turning themselves into all-inclusive "faith movements."

considerations of maximizing its appeal for winning electoral success. Pragmatic accommodation of diverse interests, rather than doctrinaire militancy, is then the hallmark of such parties.

This classification partly coincides with Duverger's celebrated categories of "totalitarian" and "restricted" parties, based on the degree of material and spiritual participation by their members in party life.³² By providing ancillary organizations and a complete philosophy of life for its members, a totalitarian party succeeds in getting access to and control of the "total" - public as well as private - life of its members. In the case of a restricted party, on the other hand, the party's access to its members' life and thoughts is of a limited nature; usually it does not extend beyond the political sphere. Such a party is "composed of members whose points of view are not absolutely identical in all their details."³³ The important way in which this totalitarian/restricted classification coincides with the earlier ideological/pragmatic distinction is that the totalitarian parties happen to be, as a rule, ideological, whereas the restricted parties are pragmatic in their philosophical orientation.

Now, the place of a political party on the ideological/pragmatic and totalitarian/restricted dimensions is a significant factor in determining its cohesive or incohesive

³²Duverger, op. cit., pp. 116-124.

³³Ibid., p. 120.

performance. By virtue of the characteristics peculiar to them, the ideological and totalitarian parties succeed in creating some sort of homogeneous esoteric political subculture within the party to a degree never approximated in pragmatic and restricted parties. In the case of the latter, indeed, pragmatic ideology and the restricted nature of participation in party life combine to create conditions under which diverse groups and individuals with divergent orientations come to join the party, enhancing the prospects of intraparty conflicts.

In terms of classifications examined above the Congress party appears to fit the pragmatic-restricted type. It professes its commitment to the triple goals of nationalism, democratic socialism, and secularism. More specifically, the party stands for the unity and national integrity of India, an open and secular polity, constitutional and parliamentary means of political action, equitable distribution of wealth by ceiling on urban and rural properties, economic development through democratic planning, "mixed" economy permitting both the public (state) and private enterprise, organization of industry and agriculture on a cooperative basis, labor's participation in management, expansion of educational and employment opportunities, and determination and provision of a minimum standard of necessities of life for every citizen.³⁴ These formal policy declarations are,

³⁴See Chunav Ghoshana Patra 1967 (Election Manifesto 1967) (New Delhi: All-Indian Congress Committee, n.d.). See also P.D. Kaushik, The Congress Ideology and Programme 1920-1947: Ideological Foundations of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964)

however, considerably moderated in practice because of the need for balancing the often divergent interests of a wide variety of social groups. Commenting on the pragmatism of the Congress party, Myron Weiner observes:

"Keeping in mind the range of interests that Congress encompasses, we can now perhaps understand why the Congress party at the state level passes land reform legislation but incorporates provisions in the legislation to protect the rights of the numerous and influential medium-sized landowners. We can understand why the state Congress leaders have endorsed the national Congress party proposal for cooperative farming but have prudently moved toward service cooperatives rather than programs of collective ownership and management of the land. We can understand too why in principle the party opposes casteism and communalism but at the local level calculatingly engages in ethnic arithmetic."³⁵

In line with its pragmatism, the Congress party does not constitute a material and spiritual community encompassing the "total" life of its members. Though the party does try to organize some ancillary organizations such as youth Congress, women's wing, etc., the loose and pragmatic ideology of the party does not provide an absolute value-oriented and complete philosophy of life. Thus one would expect the Congress party to be tolerant of internal conflicts and diversity of views to a certain extent.

Another related factor having bearing on party cohesion is the social composition of the party and the process of recruitment of membership and leadership employed by it. Duverger has distinguished two kinds of recruitment systems

³⁵Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 475.

that parties use: open, and restricted.³⁶ Parties using the open recruitment system do not lay down any conditions other than the evident wish of the person concerned to join the party and his willingness to pay the subscription. Parties using the restricted enrolment system, on the other hand, strictly supervise the recruitment of their members through such methods as requiring one or two referees from amongst party members who "must stand warrant for the political and moral qualities of the applicant."³⁷ Parties such as the socialist parties in their early days and the communist and the fascist parties, which value the quality of membership more than its size, prefer restricted recruitment, whereas the mass "catch-all" parties, aiming at maximizing numbers of members, lean heavily on the process of open recruitment. The two systems of recruitment, it would seem, have significant consequences for the prospects of party cohesion. All other things being equal, a party recruiting its members and leaders restrictively should have fewer problems of cohesion-maintenance than one recruiting its members openly.

The Congress party is not a closed system; it operates as an open system wherein diverse social elements seek and actually get entry. Moreover, being the dominant party in the state and thereby enjoying the virtual monopoly of political power for about two decades following independence,

³⁶Duverger, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁷Ibid., p. 72.

the Congress attracted almost all politically conscious groups in the society. A condition such as this would seem to be very conducive to the development of intraparty conflicts and tensions.

Finally there are factors concerning the organizational structure of the party which appear to affect party cohesion. For example, it is suggested that a "branch-type" party is relatively more cohesive than a "caucus-type" party because the former is more tightly organized and centralized than the latter.³⁸

However, Zariski suggests a modifier here, such that when a branch-type party in a multi-party system attains an electoral strength of about 40 or 50 percent, factional tendencies do get accentuated.³⁹

Another aspect of party structure relevant to intra-party cohesion relates to what Duverger has referred to as the "articulation" of the party.⁴⁰ It seems reasonable to think that a party with weak articulation - a party which does not lay down precise rules governing the internal structure of its basic elements and units and their integration with the party - will be able to operate less cohesively than a strongly articulated party. Duverger attributes this state

³⁸See Duverger, op. cit., pp. 47-50 and 121-122; and Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics", op. cit., pp. 43-45.

³⁹Zariski, "Party Faction and Comparative Politics", op. cit., p. 45.

⁴⁰Duverger, op. cit., pp. 41-47.

of affairs largely to two structural features of the strongly articulated parties: (1) more tightly knit relationship between the party and its basic elements and units, and (2) more reliance on "vertical" rather than "horizontal" linkage among them.⁴¹ These two characteristics of parties of strong articulation, according to Duverger, help the central party leadership to check or effectively deal with the development of dissidence, factionalism, or opposition within the party units.

Another structural factor affecting party unity is the distribution of power among the different levels of leadership. Two models of party authority structure can be identified in the literature. One model, suggested by Robert Michels, describes all parties, irrespective of their formal structure, as reflecting what he calls "the iron law of oligarchy."⁴² According to this model, authority structures in parties follow the inexorable law of centralization of power in the handful of leaders at the top, who control and direct the lower echelons of the party as they wish. On the other hand, we have the model of party "stratarchy" advanced by Eldersveld, which assumes that "although authority to speak for the organization may remain in the hands of the top elite nucleus, there is a great autonomy in operations at the lower "strata"

⁴¹For elaboration of the concepts of "vertical" and "horizontal" linkage, see Ibid., pp. 47-52.

⁴²Michels, op. cit., pp. 377-392.

or echelons of the hierarchy, and that control from the top is minimal and formal."⁴³

It appears that both these models tend, to a certain extent, to reify the situation they intend to describe, the former perhaps even more than the latter. Even though Michels was analysing the European Socialist parties and Eldersveld setting up a framework for the analysis of American parties, a mistaken view that these models seem to convey is that all parties conform to the respective images of reality captured by these models. As a matter of fact, actual distributions of power differ from party to party, some reflecting a more pronounced tendency toward centralization or decentralization than others.

Duverger has distinguished four kinds of decentralization in parties: local, ideological, social, and federal.⁴⁴ It would appear that all these varieties of decentralization would introduce divisions into the party with the possible danger of producing schisms. A centralized party, by the same token, would seem to be better off from this standpoint and could be expected to operate in a more cohesive fashion than a decentralized party.

Where do we place the Congress party in Bihar on the three dimensions of party structure just discussed i.e., branch/caucus, articulation/inarticulation, and centralization/decentralization? The Congress party appears to have grown

⁴³Eldersveld, op. cit., pp. 90-100.

⁴⁴See Duverger, op. cit., pp. 52-56.

into a branch-type party with considerable degree of articulation of its organization. It is a mass party with its primary and active membership running into millions. It has a well-defined three-tier structure consisting of the Mandal Congress Committees at the base, the District Congress Committees in the middle, and the Pradesh Congress Committees at the top. These primary units of the party and their organization are clearly specified and integrated through vertical linkages.⁴⁵

All these facts would seem to enhance the Congress party's prospects for cohesive performance. However, there are two factors to be noted here which would appear to operate in the opposite direction. First, although the formal distribution of power among the different levels of leaders within the party reflects an unmistakable tendency toward centralization, in actual practice the lower strata have come to enjoy more power and autonomy than was intended in the constitution of the party. Lower echelons of party organization operate under the general supervision and control of the upper echelons, but at times the former manage to defy or usurp the authority of the latter. Thus in practice the distribution of powers within the Congress party in Bihar does not fully fit the oligarchical model of Michels. It tends to approximate the Eldersveld model of "stratarchy" with patterns

⁴⁵For an outline of the organizational structure of the Congress party, see Appendix III.

of both inter- and intra- level factionalism.⁴⁶ Second, it is important to remember Zariski's modifier to the generalization positing positive relationship between branch-type parties and factionalism, i.e., when a branch-type party in a multi-party system comes to acquire electoral strength nearing about 40 percent or more, factional tendencies in the party tend to get pronounced. Thus, insofar as the Congress party of Bihar enjoyed a dominant position in the politics of the state for three decades (1937-1967) and even now happens to be the largest single party,⁴⁷ one would expect it to manifest a pronounced tendency toward factionalization.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The present study is organized into seven chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 present social and political profiles of Bihar, i.e., the environment in which the Congress party in the state must function. In Chapters 4 and 5 the focus shifts to the Congress party, the former analysing the factional politics in the party during 1937-1967 and the latter during 1967-1970 with an added focus on the politics of coalition and defection in the state. The periodization here implied is obviously based on the structural transformation of the state's party system in 1967 from a one-party dominant system presided

⁴⁶See on this point, Ramashray Roy, "Factionalism and 'Stratarchy': The Experience of the Congress Party", Asian Survey, 7 (December, 1967), 896-908.

⁴⁷For detailed account of Congress party's electoral and legislative strength, See Chapter 3.

over by the Congress to a highly fragmented multiparty system without a clear majority for any party. Chapter 6 concerns itself with the problem of party cohesion at the micro level (rather than at the macro level considered in the present Chapter), i.e., individual member's conformity to or deviance from his party and the various factors associated with the one or the other type of behavior. A number of hypotheses are framed, and some of them relating to one particular type of deviant behavior, i.e., defection from the party, are tested on the Congress members of the Bihar Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly). Finally, Chapter 7 presents the summary and conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER II

BIHAR: SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE

The province of Bihar came into existence in British India in 1936 when the old province of Bihar and Orissa (created in 1912, separating it from the Bengal Presidency) was divided into two separate provinces, Bihar and Orissa. Since then Bihar has remained one administrative and political unit except for some minor boundary adjustments after independence and when the Indian states were reorganized along linguistic lines in 1956.

AREA AND POPULATION

A landlocked state bounded by Nepal on the north, Orissa on the south, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh on the west, and West Bengal on the east, Bihar has an area of 67,196 square miles or 5.7 percent of the total land area of the Indian Union.

Geographically, Bihar is divided into three physical units: the Gangetic plains, divided into two parts north and south by the Ganga; and the Chota Nagpur plateau covering

¹See V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (New York: Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 173; and States' Reorganization Commission, The States' Reorganization Commission Report (New Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1956), pp. 175-181.

the southern half of the state.² These regional divisions, as will be later shown, are in some measure reinforced by social cleavages and economic disparities leading to an intensification of political conflicts.

With 47 million inhabitants, Bihar has 10.6 percent of the total Indian population and ranks second among the 21 states of the Union. Its population density of 694 persons per square mile is nearly twice as high as that of India as a whole (358 per square mile) and third in rank among the states after Kerala and West Bengal (1127 and 1021 per square mile, respectively).³

In terms of regional distribution of the population within the state the north Bihar plain is the most heavily populated region with a density of 1058 persons per square mile, followed by the south Bihar plain and the Chota Nagpur plateau (see Table I).

The population of Bihar is overwhelmingly rural. Less than 9 percent of the state's population is urban.⁴ The figure is about one-third of that of the state having the

²See O. H. K. Spate and A. T. A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography (London: Mithuen and Company, 1957), pp. 563-569 and 632-639.

³Government of India, Census of India 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar, Part I-A (2), General Report on the Census (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1967), pp. 49-50.

⁴"Urban" is defined in terms of (1) a population not less than 5,000; (2) density not less than 1,000 persons per square mile; and (3) at least three fourths of the adult male population engaged in non-agricultural livelihood. See Ibid., p. 116.

TABLE I
Regional Distribution of Population, Urbanization,
Literacy and Industrial Employment in Bihar

Region	% of		Population		<u>Population Density</u>	
	Total	No (millions)	% of total	No. per square mile		
	Area					
North Bihar Plain	30.5	22	46.5	1058		
South Bihar Plain	23.7	13	28.5	836		
Chota Nagpur Plateau	48.8	12	25.0	378		
Bihar	100.0	47	100.0	694		

TABLE I (Continued)

Region	<u>Urban Population</u>		<u>Literacy</u>		<u>% of Work Force</u>
	% of	% of	Regional	Range in	Employed in
	Total	Urban	%	the Districts	Industries
	Population	Population	of the Region		
North Bihar Plain	4.8	26.5	18.8	15.5 to 21.5	20.3
South Bihar Plain	11.6	39.4	25.7	22.4 to 33.8	25.4
Chota Nagpur Plateau	11.5	34.1	21.7	16.4 to 29.4	54.3
Bihar	8.4	100.0	21.8		7.7

Source: Government of India, Census of India 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar, Part I-A(2),
General Report on the Census (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1967),
 pp. 48-49, 141, 399-400.

highest proportion of urban population (Maharashtra with 28.2 percent) and less than half of the all-India average (18 percent).⁵

Among the 153 towns and cities in the state, there are seven with a population of 100,000 or more. These seven cities account for one-third of the urban population, that is, a relatively small proportion of the urban population lives in large urban centers. This fact further underlines the essentially rural character of the state.⁶

As had been the case with population density, so too with urbanization, there is regional disparity in the distribution of urban population, but with a slight change in rank-ordering. Thus the north Bihar plain, though it has the highest population density in the state, has the lowest level of urbanization, i.e., 26.5 percent. The south Bihar plain, which is the second most populous region in the state, has the highest percentage of urban population, i.e., 39.4 percent, followed closely by the Chota Nagpur plateau, i.e., 34.1 percent (See Table I).

The population of Bihar is largely illiterate. Bihar's literacy rate of 21.8 percent is about 25 percent lower than the national average and only four states (Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir) are lower

⁵Ibid., p. 140.

⁶Ibid., p. 117-140. Three of the seven cities (Patna, Gaya, and Bhagalpur) are in south Bihar plain, two (Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga) in north Bihar plain, and two (Jamshedpur and Ranchi) in Chota Nagpur plateau.

in rank than Bihar in this regard. There is, however, a great difference between the rural and urban literacy rates in Bihar: 16 percent in rural and 43 percent in urban areas.⁷

As one would expect, the regional distribution of literacy rate in the state correlates with the regional distribution of urbanization, i.e., the rank-ordering of the three regions on the literacy scale is consistent with their rank-ordering on the urbanization scale noted earlier. Thus throughout the south Bihar plain the literacy rate is nowhere below the state average and rises up to 33.8 percent in Patna district, whereas the Chota Nagpur plateau is but slightly below and the north Bihar plain is far behind the state average (See Table I).

THE ECONOMY

Bihar is one of the poorest states of India. With a percapita income of Rs.144 in 1961, it stands at the bottom of the ranking of states. The figure is only a little over half of the national average of Rs.232 and less than half of the percapita income of West Bengal (Rs.319), the highest in India.⁸

Bihar is a predominantly agricultural state. In 1964-1965, 58.1 percent of the state income was derived from the agricultural sector, a percentage among the highest in

⁷Ibid., pp. 391-392.

⁸Ibid., pp. 416-17. One \$ Can. = Rs. 7.30.

in India.⁹ However, even agriculture in Bihar is characterized by low productivity on account of the uneconomic size of average land holding (4.1 acres), inadequate irrigation facilities making much of agriculture dependent on the vagaries of the monsoon, and primitive methods of farming.¹⁰

In terms of its land tenure system, Bihar was a permanently settled Zamindari area. Under this system permanent settlement of land was made by the British Government to Zamindars or barons who functioned as intermediaries between the government and the tenants, collecting the rent on behalf of the government. The Zamindars, who numbered over 450 thousand, controlled vast areas of land and had considerable influence and control over their tenants and managed their estates in many ways arbitrarily, taking recourse to such practices as arbitrary fixation of rents, illegal eviction of undertenants and so on.

Following independence, two important land reform measures were enacted by the Congress Government. In 1950 the Bihar Land Reforms Act abolished the Zamindari system and in 1961 the Bihar Land Reforms (Ceiling) Act put a ceiling on land holding. Most of the Zamindars, however, managed to

⁹ Government of Bihar, Finance Department, Estimates of State Income 1948-49 to 1964-65 (Patna: Secretariat Branch Press, 1967), pp. 12-12.

¹⁰ See Kedarnath Prasad, The Economics of a Backward Region in a Backward Economy: A Case Study of Bihar in Relation to Other States of India, Vol. 1 (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1967), pp. 146-216.

retain a considerable amount of Khudkhast land and the implementation of the latter act, passed under pressure from the All-India Congress Committee, was postponed on account of stiff opposition within the Bihar state Congress party.

The predominantly agricultural nature of Bihar's economy is also reflected in its slow growth of industrialization. In 1961, the industrial sector contributed only 17.4 percent to the state income and only 7.7 percent of the working population of the state was accounted for by industrial employment.¹¹

Coupled with this general picture of the low level of industrial growth in Bihar, is the regional disparity in terms of industrialization. Among the three regions, the minerally rich Chota Nagpur region has, of course, the highest concentration of heavy industries based on minerals. They provide employment for 54.3 percent of the total work force there. The other two regions - south Bihar and north Bihar plains - have, on the other hand, very low levels of industrialization. Based on agricultural raw materials, their industries give employment to only 20.3 percent, respectively, of the total working population (See Table I).

¹¹National Council of Applied Economic Research, India, Distribution of National Income by States 1960-61, p. 98; and Census of India 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar, Part I-A(2), op. cit., pp. 15-16.

THE SOCIETY

Bihar is a highly cleavaged society with multiple lines of reinforcing linguistic, religious, and caste divisions. Linguistically, it is a predominantly Hindi-speaking state (84 percent). Urdu, spoken by Muslims, is the largest minority language (7 percent), followed by some very small linguistic minorities (together constituting 19 percent)¹² The rivalry between Hindi and Urdu is pretty old. As a matter of fact, as one student of linguistic politics in India has observed, "In North India one of the first open rivalries between Hindus and Muslims during the late nineteenth century found a political expression in the rivalry between Hindi and Urdu."¹³

Religion-wise, Bihar has 84.7 percent Hindus, 12.8 percent Muslims, and 2.8 percent Adivasis, Christians, and others.¹⁴

¹²Government of India, Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960).

¹³Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Politics in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 101.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 482-490. The Adivasis or the scheduled tribes living mostly in secluded hilly and forested tracts are supposed to be the original inhabitants of India predating Aryan invasion of c. 1500 B.C. See Narmadeshwar Prasad, Land and People in Tribal Bihar (Ranchi: Bihar Tribal Research Institute, 1961). Religion among the Adivasis has been in the melting pot under the dual impact of Hinduism and Christianity. In 1961, 72.1 percent of them were returned as Hindu, 10.6

The caste system is the most salient feature of the Hindu social structure. It is a type of social stratification system based on hierarchical gradation of endogamous kinship groups with certain considerations of ritual "purity" reflected in restrictions on commensality and pollution and associated with the traditional occupational specialization of the jajmani system. Thus the caste system divides and stratifies the Hindu society into a large number of subgroups, separate yet integrated. The separate identities of the various castes are nourished by strict prohibitions on marrying outside the subgroup and sanctions against mobility from one caste to the other. Integration among the various castes is maintained by hierarchical gradation and functional interdependence among them in a complex system of exchange of services and obligations known as the jajmani system.¹⁵

The number of castes and subcastes in Bihar, or for that matter in India, is very large and perplexing. But the various castes may be broadly fitted into the four basic varnas (colors) of the traditional Hindu society: Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), and Shudras (workers). In terms of ritual status, the caste system forms a hierarchy with the Brahmins at the top and the

percent as Christian, and the rest as the followers of various primitive tribal religions. See Census of India 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar, Part I-A(2), General Report on the Census, op. cit., pp. 486-487.

¹⁵See Oscar Lewis, "Caste and the Jajmini System", in his Village Life in Northern India (New York: Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, 1958), pp. 55-84.

Shudras at the bottom, with the Kshatriyas and Vaishyas - in that order - in the middle. The first three Varnas jointly constitute the elite Dwija ("twice-born") category, and can be conveniently referred to as the "upper castes," whereas the Shudras or the "backward castes" and the lower Shudras or the "scheduled castes") can be characterized as the "lower castes."¹⁶

A notable fact about the castes in Bihar is the numerical weakness of the upper castes vis-a-vis the lower castes. The former, consisting of the Brahmans, the Rajputs, the Kayasthas, and the Banias, constitute only 14.6 percent of the total population of the state, whereas the latter's percentage is 63.4, 49.3 percent for the backward castes and 14.1 percent for the scheduled castes.¹⁷

The numerical weakness of the upper castes is, however, compensated to a large extent by their higher ritual status which we have already mentioned, economic power, and modern skills and knowledge. In a predominantly rural and agrarian society land is the most important source of economic power.

¹⁶In view of the extreme backwardness of the lower Shudras and the Adivasis, the constitution of India provides for their listing in special schedules as "scheduled castes" and scheduled tribes" respectively for favored treatment for some specified time to help them catch up with the upper castes. See Part XVI, Articles 330-342 of the constitution. The Scheduled castes are also referred to as Harijans, a word coined for them by Mahatma Gandhi, meaning the "children of God."

¹⁷For the list of important caste groups and religious communities in Bihar and their percentage in the total population of the state, see Appendix IV.

The percentages in the text above refer to the Hindu, rather than the total, population.

In Bihar the ownership of land, is, to a very great extent, concentrated in the hands of the upper castes, while the lower castes are, more often than not, tenants or agricultural workers, as was revealed by a sample survey conducted in 1951 by the All-India Labor Enquiry Commission.¹⁸ In terms of the equipment of modern skills and knowledge, too, the upper castes happened to be the earliest recipients of the modern Western education, with the result that they predominate even in the high status modern professions.¹⁹

Thus the concentration of superior ritual status, economic resources, and educational and other modern skills in the hands of the upper castes creates a condition of cumulative inequality and seriously restricts the avenues of status mobility for the lower castes. It is true that with the onset of the social and political change under the impact of the British rule alternate avenues of status mobility were created. But even these new opportunities did not benefit all the castes evenly; the traditionally privileged upper castes had a better initial start in exploiting them, for diffusion of skills and knowledge throughout the society is a slow process.

¹⁸For more details, see Appendix V.

¹⁹See on this point, R. C. Prasad, "Educational Development [in Bihar]," Seminar (July 1968), especially pp. 26-29.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CASTES

Table II gives a general picture of the geographical distribution of the various caste groups in Bihar.²⁰ Several facts immediately emerge from an inspection of the table. First, the various Hindu castes are largely (but not wholly) concentrated in the north Bihar and the south Bihar plains. Among them the upper castes have a slightly higher concentration in the districts of the south Bihar plain, the lower castes (excluding the scheduled castes) have above average population in the districts of the north Bihar plain, and the scheduled castes are more or less equally spread over both the south Bihar and the north Bihar plains. Thirdly, the Muslims are scattered throughout the state with a little over average concentration in the north Bihar plain. Finally, the scheduled tribes, or the Adivasis, are almost wholly concentrated in the Chota Nagpur plateau, their percentage in Ranchi district reaching as high as 61.6 percent.

Thus, the trend of population settlement reveals one pattern for the various Hindu castes and Muslims, and another pattern for the Adivasis or the scheduled tribes. The former are more or less distributed across regional divisions, whereas the latter reinforce the regional diversity by a clear

²⁰ Muslims are, of course, not a caste but a religious community. Similarly, the scheduled tribes are not strictly a part of the Hindu caste system, though of late many of them, at any rate the non-Christian scheduled tribes, have started to identify themselves with Hinduism. Nonetheless, the Muslims and the Christians have acted like any other caste group in the politics of the state.

TABLE II

Distribution of Castes and Communities in Bihar
by Region and District

Regions and Districts	Upper Castes	Lower Castes (excluding Scheduled Castes)	Scheduled Castes	Scheduled Tribes	Muslims
<u>North Bihar Plain</u>	13.8	56.3	14.0	7.3	15.3
Saran	22.7	55.0	10.3	-	12.0
Champaran	11.8	57.8	14.6	0.1	15.8
Muzaffarpur	16.9	59.6	14.9	-	8.7
Darbhanga	15.8	56.3	14.7	-	13.2
Saharsa	10.0	66.1	17.2	0.4	6.3
Purnea	5.3	42.4	12.2	3.9	36.2
<u>South Bihar Plain</u>	18.4	55.6	16.8	1.2	9.7
Patna	15.2	59.5	16.1	0.05	9.2
Gaya	16.6	49.1	24.5	0.02	9.7
Shahabad	26.6	49.8	16.0	0.7	9.9
Monghyr	22.9	53.2	15.8	1.4	8.3
Bhagalpur	10.7	66.6	11.6	3.8	11.4
<u>Chota Nagpur Plateau</u>	7.7	48.4	11.9	31.5	8.0
Ranchi	2.6	25.9	4.6	61.6	5.3
Hazaribagh	7.0	58.1	12.6	11.3	11.0
Santhal Praganas	4.2	40.6	7.6	38.2	9.4
Palamu	9.2	36.1	25.9	19.2	9.5
Dhanbad	20.3	41.1	17.9	11.1	9.7
Singhbhum	2.9	43.6	3.0	47.3	3.2
All Bihar	13.2	52.2	14.1	9.1	11.5

Source: Census of India, 1931, 1951, and 1961.

concentration in one region. The political significance of this is that while there are no regional identifications associated with the various Hindu castes and Muslims, the Adivasis have given expression to their regional and cultural identifications in the demand for an autonomous Jharkhand state with the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar as its nucleus.

CASTE AND POLITICS

Several studies of Indian politics have pointed out the significance of caste as a key factor in explaining the dynamics of political conflicts and cooperation. Implicitly or explicitly, such studies have argued that caste solidarity or loyalty manipulates politics displacing political commitments to class and ideology as the basis for political behavior to a very large extent.²¹

Some of the recent studies have, however, rejected the earlier view which assigned paramount importance to caste as a determinant of political behavior. They have suggested instead that (1) caste is only one of the several factors at work in politics; (2) that it (caste) gradually decreases in salience as one moves from village-level politics through the constituency and the state to the nation; and (3) that, rather

²¹See, for example, Selig Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); M. N. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962), pp. 23-41; C. von Furer-Haimendorf, "Caste and Politics in South Asia", in C. H. Philips (ed.), Politics and Society in India (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), p. 53.

than caste manipulating politics, politics uses caste as a material for its articulation and even changes it in the process.²²

With this caveat stated, there is no denying the fact, however, that caste and politics have a very complex relationship, whose awareness should, hopefully, sensitize the investigator and aid him in understanding the tangled web of panoply of forces that shape and color politics in India.

Politicization of caste groups is a byproduct of the general process of social and political change in India that started following the imposition of the British rule in the eighteenth century. The introduction and spread of Western-type education following Macaulay's celebrated Minute of 1835, the growth of the modern professions and the emergence of the new middle class, the expansion of a market economy, and the gradual extension of franchise beginning with the Indian Councils Act 1861 and culminating in the introduction of universal adult suffrage after independence slowly but surely affected the traditional caste system.

For whereas the basis of the caste system was an institutionalized inequality based on ascription, the underlying principle behind all the developments summarily mentioned

²²See, for example, Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State, op. cit.; Rajni Kothari and Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Orientation of Political Factions", The Economic Weekly, (July, 1963), p. 1178; and Duncan B. Forrester, "Electoral Politics and Social Change", The Economic and Political Weekly (July, 1968), pp. 1075-1094.

above was equalitarianism based on achievement inasmuch as they offered new opportunities which were open, in theory at least to all irrespective of caste, race, and religion. To be sure some changes in the caste system such, for example as positional caste mobility - upward or downward - were not absolutely impossible or unknown even in pre-British India, such changes became relatively more common during the British and the post-British periods. Thus the upper castes pioneered in taking to the Western-type education and modern professions, subtly adopting some aspects of Western life style and adding in the process still another element of high status to their armory. The lower castes, on the other hand, first sought upward social mobility by demanding to be recorded in the census (first started in 1867-1871) as belonging to a higher Varna than previously accorded to them, and by "sanskritizing" their rituals and life style to bring them closer to those of the upper castes.²³

However, caste mobility by census recording and sanskritization, though successful in some cases of Vaishyas and upper Shudras, was not always very successful, and proved to be almost impossible for the lower Shudras, on account of reactions of the upper castes. These traditional ways of seeking caste mobility also seem to have now suffered partial or total eclipse for two more reasons. First, the government

²³See M. N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1969), chs. 1, 2, and 3.

discontinued the practice of recording caste figures in the census after independence, except for the scheduled castes and tribes. Secondly, and probably more importantly, the Indian Constitution of 1950 has adopted provisions for some benefits in education and employment for the backward and scheduled castes, so that these castes, though they may still seek mobility by sanskritization to some degree, have in general developed a vested interest in continuing to be listed as backward or scheduled castes. The result is that now even for the lower castes acquiring educational skills, joining modern professions, and earning wealth seem to have become the most important avenues for upward mobility.

In this process of social change caste became available as a basis for political mobilization. Three factors seem to have significantly contributed to this development. First, in the absence of well developed political infrastructure of secondary groups, the ready-made primary caste groups emerged as the principal contenders for power and divisible benefits, turning themselves into important instruments of interest articulation in the wake of democratic politics.²⁴ Second, politicians, in their bid to mobilize support for themselves, have naturally sought to exploit the feelings within the various caste groups that, despite the existence of great

²⁴Harry W. Blair, "Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India: Caste as a Differential Mobilizer in Bihar" (Unpublished paper, 1970?), pp. 2-3.

class differences among their members, they constitute one community. Third, with avenues for their upward social mobility limited in the traditional social structure, the lower castes found in politics a novel opportunity for status mobility, and therefore emulated the upper castes in the articulation of caste consciousness and identities for political use. For the introduction of democratic politics, as Duncan Forrester aptly points out, slowly but profoundly affects the traditional society and its hierarchy by helping create a hierarchy of elected political authority. Possibly the two hierarchies may for a time overlap to a considerable extent, but the basic norms and principles on which the two are based are contradictory: the former being ascriptive and the latter primarily achievement-oriented.²⁵

Rajni Kothari has identified three stages in the politicization of caste groups.²⁶ In the first stage the political conflicts over power and divisible benefits were confined to the "entrenched castes" in the society, i.e., the castes which in the traditional system happened usually to be numerically smaller but economically and politically dominant.²⁷ In the initial stages of limited politics in

²⁵Forrester, op. cit., p. 1083.

²⁶Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), pp. 233-240.

²⁷Kothari's concept of "entrenched caste" is different from the concept of "dominant caste" suggested by Srinivas, op. cit., pp. 151-152. A dominant caste is defined in terms not only of its preponderant ritual, economic and political influence but also of its numerical superiority over other

British India the leaders and contenders for governmental patronage came disproportionately from these entrenched castes. However, wherever this happened, especially if it occurred under the leadership of one upper caste, other upper castes soon emulated the example and there emerged one or more "ascendant" castes" which challenged the dominance of the entrenched castes.²⁸

In the second stage competition among the entrenched and the ascendant castes assumed a further dimension in that they were forced to develop more numerous bases of support, which they did by a process of cooptation from other less politically conscious, but still largely upper, castes. This gave rise to multi-caste and multi-factional alignments crosscutting antecedent boundaries, "involving such other bases of support as economic patronage, patron-client loyalties, bond groups, and new organizations such as caste associations and caste federations".²⁹

During the second stage itself the process of political mobilization superficially reached the lower castes in politica. For the purpose of strengthening their respective factionalized support base, the rival entrenched and ascendant caste leaders felt compelled by growing competition

castes in the village or local area. An entrenched caste on the other hand, while it meets the chief criterion of high ritual status and economic and political power, may be numerically small, and more often than not it is.

²⁸Kothari, Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 234-235.

²⁹Ibid., p. 235.

among themselves either to coopt lieutenants from the lower castes and to provide them with junior positions of power and patronage or to enter into wider coalitions of caste groups and appeal to wider identities and animosities.³⁰

In the third stage, a still greater diversification of the social base of politics took place and factors other than caste entered into the political arena. To quote Kothari:

A widening base of institutional organization now occurs in which, on the one hand, caste identities take on new forms of articulation, thus changing the very ethics of the social system and diminishing the importance of its ritualistic and ascriptive bases; and, on the other hand, more diverse forms of organization and interest identification enter the political system and give rise to a highly mobile and crosscutting loyalty structure in politics.³¹

Thus electoral politics leads both to the fragmentation and federation of castes into common organizations. Increasingly, the process appears to be one of secularization, which tends to diminish the importance of caste as an exclusive political support base and makes it available for integration into a broader network of relationships. As the reader will note in Chapter IV, the political mobilization of caste groups in Bihar and factional politics within the state Congress party broadly fits into this general pattern.

To sum up, Bihar is a poor and backward state even by Indian standards. Like many another Indian state it is moreover marked by tremendous social, economic and regional

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 235-237.

³¹ Ibid., p. 239.

diversities that more often than not superimpose upon each other. Scarcity and diversity are, thus, the two principal environmental components of Bihar's political system, both of which would indicate a maximization of political conflicts.

It is in this broad context that the Congress party in Bihar functions as an open organization trying to adapt itself to its highly heterogeneous environmental milieu.

CHAPTER III

BIHAR: POLITICAL PROFILE

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the evolution and the salient characteristics of the party system in Bihar, i.e., the political dimensions of the environmental context in which the Congress party in the state operates. The chapter takes off from a summary presentation in the following section of the growth of political parties in the state, and then goes on in the succeeding sections to analyse the ideology and appeal, the electoral and legislative strength, and the support structure and social composition of the Congress and some other main political parties.

GROWTH OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The point of departure for the evolution of the party system in Bihar was the development of the national movement and the growth of minority communal politics in the wake of the limited extension of franchise during the terminal colonial phase. It was in this context that the three main political organizations of colonial Bihar, i.e., the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Adivasi Mahasabha,¹ made their first appearances

¹Mahasabha means association or organization.

between the first and the third decades of the twentieth century. A fourth political group of lesser significance, namely, the United Party (formed in 1929), may also be related in a way to the national movement and the Congress inasmuch as it was born as a result of the Zamindars' (landlords'), reaction to the socialistic professions of the Congress. The party was also egged on by the British Governor of Bihar to rebuff and checkmate the Congress.

The Bihar branch of the Indian National Congress,² organized in 1908, emerged as a grand coalitional or national consensual "umbrella" organization, accommodating individuals and groups with diverse social backgrounds and ideological tendencies in the service of the overriding goal of national independence. Its social base thus tended to approximate almost the whole of the politically relevant public with the possible exception of the Muslims, the Adivasis, and the big landlords, though even among these groups its failure to win support appears to be only relative rather than absolute (See Tables III and IV). Also, such political groups as the Hindu Mahasabha organized in 1915, the Kisan Sabha (Peasants Association) formed in 1929, the Congress Socialist Party founded in 1934, and the Bihar Communist Party established in 1938 - all started, and for a certain period operated, as subgroups within the Congress.

²The Indian National Congress was organized in 1885.

TABLE III
Bihar Vidhan Sabha Elections
1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1969

Party and Year of Election	Contested	Seats Won	% of Seat	% of Vote
<u>1952</u>				
Congress	318	235		41.9
Socialist	264	23		18.8
Jharkhand	51	32		8.3
Janata	35	11		3.1
KMPP	97	1		2.9
Jana Sangh	46	0		1.2
CPI	22	0		1.1
Other Parties	94	3		3.3
Independents (618)	255	13		19.5
Total	(1537) 318	318		
<u>1957</u>				
Congress	312	210		42.2
PSP	220	31		16.0
Janata	120	23		7.9
Jharkhand	69	30		6.9
CPI	60	7		4.9
Jana Sangh	30	0		1.2
Independents (527)	250	17		20.9
Total	(1338) 318	318		

TABLE III (Continued)

Party and Year of Election	Contested	Seats Won	% of Seat	% of Vote
<u>1962</u>				
Congress	318	185	58.2	41.3
Swatantra	259	50	15.7	17.3
PSP	199	29	14.2	14.2
CPI	84	12	3.8	6.2
Socialist (Lohia)	132	7	2.2	5.2
Jharkhand	75	20	6.3	4.4
Jana Sangh	75	3	0.9	2.8
Other Parties	20	0	0.0	0.5
Independents (367)	186	12	3.8	8.4
Total	(1529)	318	318	100.0
<u>1967</u>				
Congress	318	128	40.3	33.1
SSP	199	68	21.4	17.6
Jana Sangh	270	26	8.2	10.4
PSP	182	18	5.7	7.0
CPI	98	24	7.6	6.9
JKD	59	13	4.1	3.3
Swatantra	126	3	0.9	2.3
CP (M)	31	4	1.3	1.3
Other Parties	2	1	0.3	0.2
Independents (740)	276	33	10.4	17.9
Total	(2025)	318	318	100.0

TABLE III (Continued)

Party and Year of Election	Contested	Seats Won	% of Seat	% of Vote
<u>1969</u>				
Congress	318	118	37.1	30.4
Jana Sangh	303	34	10.7	15.7
SSP	191	52	16.4	13.7
CPI	163	25	7.7	10.1
PSP	98	18	5.7	5.7
LCD	107	9	2.8	3.9
Shoshit Dal	123	6	1.9	3.6
Janata	134	13	4.1	3.1
BKD	112	5	1.6	2.1
CP (M)	29	3	0.9	1.2
Hul Jharkhand	32	7	2.2	0.9
Swatantra	42	3	0.9	0.9
Jharkhand	19	6	1.9	0.7
Other Parties	140	3	0.9	1.5
Independents (342)	196	16	5.0	6.8
Total	(2153)	318	318	100.0
			100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in India: A Research Tool (New York: Southern Asian Institute School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1969), pp. 40-41.

N.B. For Independents figure in Contested column in number of seats contested while figure preceding in parentheses is total number of independent candidates.

For party abbreviations see the text.

TABLE IV
Patterns of Electoral Support by Regions
for Parties in Bihar

Region	% of Vote by Party			
	1952	1957	1962	1967
	<u>Congress</u>			
North Bihar Plain	47.7	46.4	43.3	33.8
South Bihar Plain	41.8	44.6	45.6	34.6
Chota Nagpur Plateau	28.8	32.2	43.6	31.4
All Bihar	41.9	42.2	41.3	33.1
	<u>Socialist</u>			
North Bihar Plain	28.4	19.3	26.4	29.3
South Bihar Plain	25.3	18.7	19.1	25.2
Chota Nagpur Plateau	7.9	5.0	4.3	7.9
All Bihar	21.7	16.0	14.3	24.6
	<u>Communist</u>			
North Bihar Plain	0.7	3.8	4.8	7.4
South Bihar Plain	2.0	8.0	8.8	10.8
Chota Nagpur Plateau	0.6	3.3	5.8	6.3
All Bihar	1.1	4.9	6.2	8.2

TABLE IV (Continued)

Region	% of Vote by Party			
	1952	1957	1962	1967
<u>Jana Sangh</u>				
North Bihar Plain	1.2	1.5	2.3	8.6
South Bihar Plain	1.8	1.5	4.8	11.8
Chota Nagpur Plateau	1.1	0.3	0.6	18.2
All Bihar	1.2	1.2	2.8	10.4
<u>Jharkhand</u>				
North Bihar Plain	-	-	-	-
South Bihar Plain	1.2	2.2	0.5	-
Chota Nagpur Plateau	25.9	24.4	17.9	-
All Bihar	8.3	6.9	4.4	-
<u>Janata-Swatantra-J.K.D.</u>				
North Bihar Plain	-	4.7	15.3	3.8
South Bihar Plain	-	6.4	13.8	5.8
Chota Nagpur Plateau	12.8	18.2	31.3	10.3
All Bihar	3.1	7.9	17.3	5.6

SOURCE: Adapted from Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in India, op. cit., pp. 40-62.

The Bihar Muslim League³ and the Adivasi Mahasabha, formed in 1909 and 1938 respectively, on the other hand, emerged outside the Congress as exclusive sectarian organizations of the Muslim and Adivasi minorities. They owed their origins to the fears, on the part of the Muslims and the Adivasis, of Hindu and Diku⁴ "domination". Both the League and the Mahasabha opposed the Congress as a Hindu- and Diku-dominated organization, and, until the British withdrawal in 1947, remained active vehicles of aggressive minority politics, the former endorsing the demand of its all-India body first for a separate electorate and finally for a separate state for the Muslims, and the latter working for the social uplift of the Adivasis and for reserved seats for them in the legislative assembly.

Following independence in 1947 some important developments having significant bearing on the subsequent patterns of party politics in Bihar occurred. First, the Muslim League, which had up to this time been the principal opposition to the Congress in the province, disappeared with the partition of India in 1947. Some prominent Muslim Leaguers migrated to Pakistan and many among those who stayed

³The Bihar League's national organization, All-India Muslim League, was formed in 1906.

⁴Used by the Adivasis of Chota Nagpur region to refer to the non-Adivasis, whose alleged dominance in that region they resent, the word "Diku" has a strong connotation of antipathy. See S. C. Sinha *et al.*, "The Concept of Diku Among the Tribes of Chota Nagpur", Man in India, 49 (April-June, 1969), pp. 121-138.

on in India later joined the Congress.

Second, the Adivasi Mahasbha, after independence decided to alter its communal character by opening its membership to non-Adivasis, presumably in a bid to broaden its base for pressing more effectively its new demand for a separate state of Jharkhand⁵ for the Adivasis within the union. The Mahasabha rechristened itself as the Jharkhand Party and agitated vigorously for the state of Jharkhand throughout the 1950's, but without success. Having failed in its central objective, the party merged with the ruling Congress in June 1963. The merger only partially succeeded, however, as two small factions within the erstwhile Jharkhand Party subsequently broke away from the Congress on the eve of the elections of 1967 and 1969, calling themselves the Jharkhand and Hul Jharkhand parties respectively.

Third, with the overriding goal of independence achieved, the Congress appeared undergoing a transformation from a national movement to a political party. In the process of this transformation some groups were forced to leave the Congress. This trend had, as a matter of fact, started earlier and was visible even during the pre-independence period.

"Jharkhand" refers to some medieval kingdom of that name in what is now the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar. See on this point the Jharkhand Party manifesto and the summary of the memorandum submitted by the Bihar Legislature Jharkhand Party to the States' Reorganization Commission (SRC) in The Indian Nation, April 23, 1953, and June 4, 1954, respectively. On the SRC's response to the party's demand see States' Reorganization Commission Report, op. cit., pp. 168-170.

For example the Hindu Mahasabha had been expelled from the Congress in the 1930's on the charge of practising communalism. Similarly, the Communists were asked to leave the Congress during World War II when, on the Soviet Union's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, they opposed the "Quit India Resolution" of the Congress. Moreover, the Kisan Sabha had broken away in 1942 from the Congress and moved closer to the Communist Party after having felt dissatisfied with the cautious measures of land reforms initiated by the Congress during its brief spell of office in 1937-1939, operating under the Government of India Act of 1935.

An organized subgroup which remained within the Congress until after independence was the Congress Socialist Party. In 1948 the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress passed a resolution prohibiting the continuance within the Congress of any group which had a separate membership, constitution, or program. The Congress Socialists in Bihar and other provinces were thus obliged to leave the Congress. They formed the Socialist Party in 1948.

Another addition to the socialist forces in Bihar came in 1951 when a group of Gandhians separated from the Congress in 1951 and founded the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP, Peasant Worker People's Party). A year later the KMPP merged with the Socialist Party giving birth to the Praja Socialist Party (PSP).

In the mid-1950's the Congress and the PSP opened informal discussions and found wide areas of agreement.

Following this, the PSP general secretary, Asoka Mehta, put forward the thesis of "political compulsions of backward economy" calling for a modification in the traditional role of the opposition in a democracy in the context of the developing countries. In pursuance of this thesis Mehta advocated increased cooperation of the PSP with the Congress in national reconstruction so long as the latter's policies did not conflict with those of the former.

The PSP's national convention in 1953 rejected the Mehta thesis in favor of Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia's line of PSP's "equidistance" from both the Congress and the Communists. The resolution by the Congress for establishing a "socialistic pattern of society" at its Avadi Session in 1955 seemed, however, to vindicate the Mehta thesis, but Lohia took an even more radically leftist stance to distinguish himself from the Congress brand of socialism. His attempt to organize a militant wing in the PSP soon led to his expulsion and formation of a separate Socialist Party in 1955.

The Lohia split did not fully resolve the issue of PSP's relation with the Congress, Mehta continuing to push for the PSP's closer cooperation with the Congress and some other leaders emphasizing its separate identity. In 1963 Mehta and his followers left the PSP to join and strengthen the Congress left wing.

Following Mehta's departure, the PSP accepted in 1964 Lohia Socialists' proposal for merger and formation of the Samyukta (United) Socialist Party (SSP). Within a year,

however, the disaffected PSP leaders split from the SSP, charging Lohia and his followers with promoting a personality cult and advocating a united front with communal and anti-democratic parties. Following Lohia's death in 1968 and poor electoral performance of both the Socialist parties in the federal elections of 1971, the SSP and PSP merged once again in 1971 to form a single Socialist Party.

The transition of the Congress from a movement to a political party climaxed in 1969 when a major split in the national party⁶ vertically divided the Bihar Congress into two splinter parties: one following Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the other supporting the so-called "Syndicate" of oldguards in the national party organization.⁷

Fourthly, just prior to the first general elections in 1952 two new political parties emerged in opposition to the Congress: the Akhil Bharatiya Jana Sangh (All-India People's Party) and the Bihar Janata (Public) Party. The formation of the Jana Sangh at the national level in 1951 was the product partly of the estrangement of the Rashtriya Syamsewak Sangh (RSS, National Volunteers' Association)⁸ from the Hindu Mahasabha and partly of the Congress acquiescence in the partition of India which many Hindus regarded as

⁶The split in the national party is described in Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Congress in India: Crisis and Split", Asian Survey, 10 (March, 1970), pp. 256-262.

⁷Hereafter the former is referred to as the New Congress and the latter as the Old Congress.

⁸The RSS is a Militant Hindu cultural organization formed in 1925. See J. A. Curran, Jr., Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the R.S.S. (New York: Institute of Public Relations, 1951).

appeasement of Muslims at the cost of the disintegration of Bharat Mata (Mother India).⁹

The formation of the Janata Party in 1950 by the Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Narayan Singh of Ramgarh represents an effort on the part of the remnants of feudal interests in Bihar to build up a traditionalist opposition to the Congress. When the all-India Swatantra (Freedom) Party was formed in 1959, the Raja immediately merged his Janata Party with it and became the national vice-president of the new party. The Swatantra-Janata merger did not, however, prove to be a happy one. Following a bitter clash between the Swatantra national executive and the Raja, the latter was finally expelled from the party in 1964. The Raja revived his Janata Party virtually eliminating the Swatantra Party from Bihar.¹⁰

In the pre-election year of 1966 the Raja merged his Janata Party with the Congress. Failing, however, to secure Congress tickets for a good number of his followers for the ensuing general elections, the Raja defected from the Congress in December 1966, and along with some other rebel Congressmen formed a new party, i.e., the Jana Kranti Dal (JKD, People's Revolutionary Party). After the elections the JKD affiliated itself with the all-India Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD, Indian

⁹See Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: Development of a Multi Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 177-192; and Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political Party (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969), pp. 54-80.

¹⁰See Howard L. Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 165-171.

Revolutionary Party), a party formed in 1967 by rebel Congressmen from several northern and central states. In early 1968 the Raja and the BKD chairman Mahamaya Prasad Sinha developed serious differences on the issue of joining the second non-Congress coalition government, the former wishing to join it and the latter opposing. The Raja finally broke away from the BKD and again revived his Janata Party.

APPEAL AND PROGRAM

Political parties in Bihar cover a wide spectrum of the style of appeal ranging from an absolute value-oriented ideological one to a pragmatic one. The parties also vary considerably along the right-left dimension. If one moves from the rightist Swatantra, Jana Sangh, Janata Party and BKD, through the slightly right-of-center Old Congress, through the slightly left-of-center New Congress, through the leftist Socialist Party, to the extreme leftist Communist parties, one finds a sort of gradient of the style of appeal in which the ideological gives way to the pragmatic toward the middle of the spectrum and again assumes predominance toward the other end. Thus, broadly speaking, the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra Party, the Janata Party, the BKD, the Socialist Party and the Communist parties can be characterized as ideological, and the two Congress parties as pragmatic.

The parties also differ along the secular-communal dimension, the two Congress parties, the Socialist Party, the Communist parties, the Swatantra Party, the Janata Party, and

the BKD being secular, and the Jana Sangh, the Jharkhand Party, and the Muslim League of the pre-independence period being communal.

In terms of their policies, too, the political parties in Bihar offer a wide range of alternatives. The two Congress parties profess to stand for nationalism, secularism, and democratic-socialism.¹¹

The Socialist Party, like the Congress, stands for nationalism, secularism, and democratic socialism, but the former is more radically leftist than the latter. It proposes the nationalization of all means of production employing paid workers, planning of the entire economic life, and redistribution of wealth according to some "uniform principle."¹²

The two Communist parties - CPI and CP(M) - believe in the establishment of proletarian statehood of Marxist-Leninist conception, but the CPI is closer to the Soviet Communist Party line on principles and strategy and the CP(M) nearer the Maoist or Peking line.¹³

¹¹For more details see Ch. 1, pp. 19-20.

¹²Policy Statement: a Praja Socialist Publication (adopted at the second national conference, Gaya, December 1955) (New Delhi: Praja Socialist Party, 1956, reprinted 1967); and Samyukta Socialist Party: Sidhanta, Vaktavya, aur Karyakrama (adopted at the second national conference, Kota, April, 1966) (New Delhi: Samyukta Socialist Party, n.d.).

¹³Ralph Retzlaff, "Revisionists and Sectarians: India's Two Communist Parties," in Robert A Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2nd edition, 1969), pp. 329-362.

The Jana Sangh puts great emphasis on national unity and national strength. The party is aggressively ultra-nationalist and conservative. It summarizes its stand on the subject of national unity in four "ones": one country, one people, one culture, and one nation. The economic conservatism of the Jana Sangh is reflected in its opposition to "indiscriminate" nationalization and to "doctrinaire" approach to land reforms without regard to fragmentation of land holdings "below the economic levels."¹⁴

The central plank of the Swatantra Party is "free enterprize": opposition to the "growing statism" in business, and to collective and cooperative farming in agriculture. The party believes in "democratic planning by persuasion such as is practised in countries like France, Britain, and Scandinavian countries, and is opposed to the Soviet-type coercive planning which has failed so miserably . . . wherever it has been tried."¹⁵

The rest of the parties may be characterized more summarily than those mentioned above. The Jharkhand Party is regional and Adivasi communal; the Janata Party is conservative, secular, personality-oriented, and regional; and the BKD is conservative and secular.

¹⁴See Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Principles and Policy (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jana Sangh, n.d.); and Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Elections Manifesto (New Delhi: Bharatiya Jana Sangh, 1967).

¹⁵Swatantra Party Election Manifesto 1967, reprinted in R. Chandidas et al., (eds.), India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections (New York Humanities Press, 1968), p. 15.

ELECTORAL AND LEGISLATIVE STRENGTH OF PARTIES

Table III gives a summary of the Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) elections in Bihar through the last five elections. An examination of the table brings out a number of salient features of the party system of the state. First, beginning with a one-party dominant legislative party system, Bihar came to have a highly fractionalized multi-party system by the 1967 and the 1969 elections. The Congress party, which accounted for 73.9 percent of the legislative seats in 1952, dropped to 37.1 percent in 1969. The rest of the 62.9 percent of the legislative seats in 1969 were shared by 14 other parties and 16 independents. However, as the 1971 federal elections and the 1972 state elections indicate, the trend at the present appears to be one of return to the earlier situation of Congress dominance in the legislative party system of the state (See Appendix II).

In terms of the electoral party system of the state, we find that the Congress actually never enjoyed a majority on the basis of the popular vote share. Even during its heyday in the 1950's it secured only 41-42 percent of the popular vote. Nevertheless, it maintained a wide plurality and towered over its nearest rivals, the Socialists, who never exceeded 19 percent. The Congress, however, has shown a secular decline in its popular vote share until at least the 1972 elections, when this process seems to have been arrested and even reversed. But the decline in the Congress electoral strength has not benefited a single party on the non-Congress side. The main

beneficiaries here appear to be the Socialists and the Communists on the left and the Jana Sangh on the right, a trend that may well portend an increase both in leftist radicalization and rightist reaction. It appears, moreover, that the support for the Congress has more or less frozen with the groups mobilized either during the national movement or the early post-independence period. As the masses on the periphery are getting increasingly mobilized, a sizeable part of them, including the new literates, small peasantry, and agricultural workers, are being won over by parties other than the Congress.¹⁶ But here, again, the evidence seems to indicate that the support of the newly mobilized groups has gone to a wide variety of parties, thus failing to concentrate electoral strength in a fewer number of parties. The net result has been that the electoral party system of the state has shown a tendency toward fractionalization, which reached a climax in 1969 when the vote share of the Congress dropped to 30.4 percent and the remaining 69.6 percent went to 17 parties and 342 independent candidates. The present trend, however, as already mentioned, seems to presage a restoration of the pre-1967 party system of the state (See Appendix II).

¹⁶ This trend has been suggested by the analysis of two sets of data based on national samples by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi. See Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, op. cit., pp. 191-192. In her studies in Uttar Pradesh, Angela S. Burger finds support for a similar hypothesis. See her Opposition in a Dominant Party System (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 270-271.

Finally, the party system of Bihar appears to be still in the formative phase, reflecting as it does, in part, the features of a "structured party system", and, in part, tendencies toward "party atomization".¹⁷ Thus, on the one hand, it contains a number of major political parties, i.e., the Congress Party, the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Jana Sangh, which appear to have acquired continuity through successive elections, a considerable measure of electoral support, an identifiable platform, and some stable organization at the national and state and local levels, so that they may generally be perceived as viable channels of political participation. On the other hand, however, there is a marked tendency toward party atomization as reflected in proliferation of parties which are mostly "a facade covering loose and shifting coalitions" of politicians and which have "no real platform, hardly a . . . [state-wide] spread, no centralized or coordinated organization, and even less anything resembling a stable organization."¹⁸ The tendency toward party atomization is also manifest in fluidity and looseness of party allegiance, all too frequent fission and fusion among the parties, and the presence of a large number of non-party, independent candidates winning a considerable number of seats and securing a sizeable percentage of the popular vote.

¹⁷For elaboration of the concepts of "structured" and "atomizing" party systems see Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism", in Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara (eds.) op. cit., pp. 167-168.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 168.

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT

Table IV gives a regional breakdown of the average percentage of electoral support for the principal political parties in Bihar. One fact that immediately becomes apparent is that, more than any other party, the Congress seems to have succeeded in building up a relatively balanced distribution of support for itself throughout the state. For even in the Chota Nahpur region, where it is weaker than in the other two regions, it has consistently polled the highest percentage of the vote. Relatively, however, the Congress is strongest in the north Bihar plain, where its electroal support has never fallen below its state average.

Another interesting point made clear by the table is that the Jharkhand Party and the Janata-Swatantra-J.K.D. group are basically regional parties in that their support is, for the most part, confined to one region. Outside the Chota Nagpur region these two parties are virtually non-existent. This phenomenon is attributable to the fact that both these groups have either aspirationally or effectively remained tied up with the interests of a community or a personality based in this region. The Jharkhand Party, and its predecessor, the Adivasi Mahasabha, it might be recalled, have since the late 1930's been the political vehicles of the Adivasis or the scheduled tribes, who are heavily concentrated in the Chota Nagpur plateau. The sudden disappearance of the party in 1967 and its marginal reappearance in 1969 are the reflections

of the 1963 Congress-Jharkhand merger and the split of a small Jharkhand faction from the Congress in 1969.

The success of the Janata-Swatantra-J.K.D. in the Chota Nagpur region can be accounted for by the fact that the Raja of Ramgarh, the patron of this "personality-oriented" group, belongs to this region and has been able to maintain a pocket of influence in his former Rangarh estate.

In view of the strong regional base of the Jharkhand and the Janata parties in the Chota Nagpur plateau, it becomes easy to understand why all other parties appear to be stronger in the two plains regions than in the Chota Nagpur plateau.

The Socialists and the Communists seem to have their strongholds in north and south Bihar plains, with the former being a little stronger in the north and the latter in the south. Communist strength is thus roughly correlated with the region ranking first on urbanization and literacy and second on population density and industrialization, whereas socialist strength is associated with the region of highest population density and lowest urbanization, literacy, and industrialization.

The Jana Sangh is stronger in the Chota Nagpur region and the south Bihar plain and somewhat weaker in north Bihar. If to this one adds the strong position of the Janata-Swatantra-J.K.D. group in the Chota Nagpur region one may suggest that the north and south Bihar plains are more receptive to the centrist Congress and the leftist parties such as the Communists and the Socialists, whereas the rightist Jana Sangh

and the Janata-Swatantra-B.K.D. and the non-ideological Jharkhand Party are the significant forces in the Chota Nagpur plateau.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN BIHAR

In many of the new nations there has been a tendency toward concentration of political authority in one-party systems and in military oligarchies, which have tended to emphasize the mobilization of popular support for the policies of the ruling elite rather than meaningful participation as an act of electing and influencing the government.¹⁹ In contrast, Bihar, like other Indian states, has had five free and regular elections since independence, each successive election becoming increasingly more competitive than the previous one. Usually a very large number of parties and independent candidates have entered the electoral arena, and the voting turnout has shown a consistent upward trend: 40.6 percent in 1952, 40.7 percent in 1957, 46.6 percent in 1962, 51.2 percent in 1967.

The high level of mass participation in elections can be expected to have important consequences for the social composition of the political elite. The growing pace of political mobilization should produce an increasing

¹⁹See Myron Weiner, "Political Developments in the Indian States," in Myron Weiner (ed.), State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 31-32.

differentiation among the elite, thus making the political system more representative of the social system. This, indeed, seems to have been the case in Bihar, as my remarks in the succeeding section and more elaborately in the following chapter would indicate. Put briefly, political mobilization of newer social groups coupled with intra-elite competition has compelled the existing elite to try to win support among the new political participants by bringing them into elite status.

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF PARTIES

With very few exceptions, parties in Bihar appeal to and recruit members and leaders from almost all social groups in the state. Table V gives the ethnic breakdown for the political parties in the fourth Vidhan Sabha elected in 1967. True to its self-image as the party of and for the "exploited and backward classes",²⁰ the SSP returned 37 backward class MLAs, or 56 percent of its Vidhan Sabha membership. It would be a mistake, however, to write it off as a backward class party, inasmuch as 44 percent of its legislative membership comes from the "forward classes".

The Jana Sangh has the public image of being a "Hindu communal" party, a label that the party leaders hotly deny.

²⁰The 1967 SSP election manifesto declared that for the "backward classes" (which according to the party include the lower caste Hindus, Adivasis, Muslims, and women), "60 percent of the high positions will be reserved in various sectors of life". See Samyukta Socialist Party, Election Manifesto 1967 (Delhi: Ram Sewak Yadava, n.d.), p. 11.

TABLE V

Membership of Bihar Vidhan Sabha by

Party and Caste, 1967

	Congress		SSP		Jana Sangh		CPI		JKD	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Upper Castes	59	46.1	30	44.1	8	30.8	10	41.7	21	80.8
Lower Castes (excluding Scheduled Castes)	24	18.8	26	38.2	4	15.4	7	29.2	1	3.8
Scheduled										
Castes (Harijans)	23	18.0	8	11.7	5	19.2	2	8.3	3	11.6
Muslims	8	6.2	1	1.5	-	-	4	16.6	1	3.8
Scheduled										
Tribes (Adivasis)	14	10.9	1	1.5	5	19.2	1	4.2	-	-
Bengalis	-	-	1	1.5	4	15.4	-	-	-	-
Not Available	-	-	1	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	128	100	68	100	26	100	24	100	26	100

TABLE V (Continued)

	PSP		Swatantra		CP (M)		Independents	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Upper Castes	10	58.8	2	66.7	1	25.0	4	19.1
Lower Castes (excluding Scheduled Castes)	4	23.5	-	-	-	-	5	23.8
Scheduled								
Castes (Harijans)	1	5.9	-	-	2	50.0	1	4.8
Muslims	2	11.8	-	-	-	-	2	9.5
Scheduled								
Tribes (Adivasis)	-	-	1	33.3	-	-	8	38.0
Bengalis	-	-	-	-	1	25.0	1	4.8
Not Available	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	17	100	3	100	4	100	4	100

SOURCE: Harry W. Blair, *Caste, Politics, and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The Elections of 1967* (Duke University, Ph.D. Dissertation, 1969), p. 327.

However, the fact that not a single Muslim is represented in the Jana Sangh's legislative contingent seems to confirm the public image of the party. One astounding fact about the Jana Sangh is its success in recruiting about a third of its total MLA's - 10 out of 26 - from the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes (5 from each). Being a right wing party, one would not expect it to do so well among these poorest sections of the society. However, Jana Sangh's success among them could possibly be explained by the communally-oriented appeal of the party cutting across class divisions.

We encounter another surprise when we come to the Communist Party of India (CPI). Being the party of the "Proletariat", one would expect the CPI to be more representative of the poorer lower castes than the better off upper castes. The facts do not bear out this expectation, however. An equal number of upper and lower caste M.L.A.s are matched in the C.P.I. legislative contingent (10 to 10), and the "top" leadership of the party is upper caste.²¹ The evidence seems to confirm the theory that in the main the C.P.I. is the political vehicle of the intellectual sons of the Indian middle and upper classes.²²

²¹Navneeth, "Congress Debacle in Bihar: Voting Patterns in 1967", The Economic and Political Weekly, III, 34 (August 25, 1968), 1311-1317 at 1311.

²²See Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 362-364; and Selig S. Harrison, India: The Most Dangerous Decades (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 180-200.

The Congress party is the aggregator par excellence - an image that fits well with its lingering grand coalitional features, carried on from its nationalist movement past. Tables VI and VII give the ethnic composition of the Congress party in the Bihar Vidhan Sabha from 1957 to 1967 and the Pradesh executive committee from 1934 to 1960. Several interesting facts emerge from an examination of the tables. First, the Congress party was dominated for a pretty long period by the upper castes, but it is becoming increasingly more representative over the years. Thus, the average combined share of the upper castes in the Pradesh executive committee seats was 63.2 percent during 1934-1946 and 67 percent during 1946-1960 as against that of the lower castes which was 3 percent and 18.5 percent respectively during the same periods. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that political consciousness among the lower castes was late in developing than among the upper castes on account of their social and economic backwardness even though they had the advantage of larger numbers. However, following the introduction of universal adult suffrage after independence the political mobilization of the lower castes has made substantial headway and a significant portion of their support seems to have gone to the Congress. Thus the combined strength of the backward and scheduled castes in the legislative wing of the party increased from 37.7 percent in 1962 to 42.2 percent in 1967.

Second, the relative strength of various ethnic groups in the Congress has waxed and waned in accordance with the

TABLE VI

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CONGRESS MEMBERS OF THE
BIHAR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 1957 - 1967

Ethnic Group	1957		1962		1967	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Brahman	20	9.5	26	14.1	17	13.3
Bhumihar	34	16.2	23	12.4	15	11.7
Rajput	30	14.3	27	14.6	14	10.9
Kayastha	9	4.3	11	5.9	7	5.5
(Total Upper Castes)	(93)	(44.3)	(87)	(47.0)	(53)	(41.4)
Backward Castes or Upper Shudras	48	22.9	46	24.9	30	23.4
Muslim	24	11.4	15	8.1	8	6.3
Bengali	3	1.4	2	1.1	0	
Scheduled Tribes or Adivasis and Christians	6	2.9	3	1.6	13	10.2
Scheduled Castes or Harijans	31	14.8	32	17.3	24	18.8
N. A.	5	2.3	0	0		
Grand Total	210	100.0	185	100.0	0	100.0

SOURCE: Harry W. Blair, Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The Elections of 1967, op. cit., p. 323.

TABLE VII

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE PRADESH EXECUTIVE OF THE

BIHAR CONGRESS PARTY, 1934 - 1960

	Before Independence 1934 - 46	After Independence 1946 - 60
Upper Castes	63.2%	67.0%
Lower Castes	3.0	18.5
Backward Castes	(1.5)	(14.0)
Scheduled Castes	(1.5)	(4.5)
Scheduled Tribes	0.7	2.8
Muslims	18.5	8.7
Not Known and Others	6.5	2.9

SOURCE: Summarized from Ramashray Roy, "The Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State", Asian Survey, VIII, 7 (July 1968), p. 570.

factional politics in the party as well as interparty conflicts. For example, the death of the Bhumihar Chief Minister Shri Krishna Sinha in 1961 and his succession by the Brahman Binodanand Jha is clearly reflected in the decline of the Bhumihar MLAs by 11 and the rise of the Brahmins by six in 1962. The Rajputs managed to remain at about the same MLA strength in 1962 as in 1957 by aligning with the new Chief Minister. The impact of the changes in interparty competition on the social composition of the Congress is illustrated by the sudden increase in the percentage of the Adivasis in the Congress Legislature Party in 1967 - from 1.6 in 1962 to 10.2 in 1967. This was the direct result of the merger of the Jharkhand Party of the Adivasis with the Congress in 1963.

Finally, though the Muslims strength in the Congress has shown a declining trend, it is nonetheless noteworthy that Muslim representation in the Congress continues to be more than in any other party (See Table VI in conjunction with Table VII).

The Congress has thus mobilized support across all social cleavages and geographical regions. Inasmuch as the adaptation of the Congress with the heterogeneous society in which it operates seems to be maximal, the prospects for conflicts and tensions within the party would also appear to be maximized.

CHAPTER IV

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN A DOMINANT PARTY: THE BIHAR PRADESH CONGRESS (1937-1967)

INTRODUCTION

For two decades following independence the centerpiece of the dynamics of Bihar's political system was the Congress party. It successfully aggregated and wove into the framework of its organization almost all politically significant social groups and emerged as a "catch-all" party par excellence. For if the necessity of putting up a united front to the colonial power was no longer there for the Congress, the imperative of maintaining itself in power by winning elections dictated a more or less similar strategy. Thus in consolidating its power after independence the Congress sought to retain and even expand its composite character by promiscuous accommodation of diverse social groups having local power and influence. Many social groups which had, by and large, either kept aloof or had been only marginally mobilized by the national movement, such, for example, as various rural communities, lower castes, landlords, businessmen, etc., now made their way into the Congress.

In the present chapter I wish first to analyse the one-party dominant system which operated in Bihar during 1937-1967 and still continues to operate at the center and in some other states. I will then summarize the factional politics in the Bihar Pradesh Congress during the same period. In a final section I will briefly describe the 1967 elections in Bihar and note their impact on the politics of the state.

ONE PARTY DOMINANT SYSTEM

India's one party dominant system is neither a variant of the competitive Western party systems nor of one-party states in communist countries and in some new states of Africa. Like the former it is competitive, but one in which the different parts of the system play unequal competitive roles. Like the latter it is "hegemonic" rather than "turnover", but the party in power is neither monolithic nor oppressive of the opposition.¹ It is system in which a single "party of consensus" (i.e., the Congress party) occupies the dominant, central position, with the minor opposition parties acting upon it from the margin as "parties of pressure" without providing an alternation of power.² The usual functions of

¹For elaboration of the concepts of "hegemonic" and "turnover" systems, see LaPalombara and Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties", in LaPalombara and Weiner (eds.), op. cit., pp. 35-36.

²Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India", in Rajni Kothari (ed.) Party System and Election Studies, op. cit., pp. 1-18.

the opposition in a democracy are shared in this system between these parties of pressure and the dissident factions within the party of consensus.

The Indian party system thus presents a striking case of dominance coexisting with open competition. The nature of both the dominant and the opposition parties contributes to this "openness" of the system. The stable and continuous authority of the government party flowing from its comfortable majority has contributed to this openness in two main ways. First, it has helped the dominant Congress party to allow an unusually high degree of open intraparty competition and even elite turnovers in the form of alternation of power among the shifting subcoalitions of its factions.³ Second, it has made the dominant party more tolerant of the opposition than probably would have been the case if the margin of its preponderance were either very small or unstable, particularly in the initial stages of weak democratic institutionalization, as the experience of many new states of Asia and Africa suggests.⁴ Thus the opposition parties have been remarkably free to operate and have been made to suffer no legal disabilities and unfairness (except possibly in the marginal cases of some overtly antisystemic leftist and sessionist groups).

³See on this point W. H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System", Government and Opposition, 1 (August, 1966) pp. 451-466.

⁴See Edward Shils, "Opposition in the New States of Asia and Africa", Government and Opposition, 1 (February, 1966),

The nature of the opposition too, of course, contributes to this openness. Since the major opposition parties are prosystemic, ideological divergence among the parties, though quite wide and pronounced, do not play a rigidifying role to an extent of precluding meaningful dialogue and cooperation among them.

The system is, indeed, marked by a complex pattern of interactions between the dominant and the opposition parties. Not merely is there an absence of attempt by the dominant party to legally repress the opposition, on the contrary, there is a positive communication between them. The opposition parties converse with factions or ideological tendencies in the dominant party closer to their own interests and points of view. They are able to affect the factional politics in the dominant party either indirectly through ideological or primordial ties crosscutting party lines or directly by joining the dominant party, and thereby strengthening a particular factional or ideological tendency therein.

Likewise, the strength and influence of the opposition parties varies in accordance with the merger of some opposition group with the dominant party or the defection of some important factions and personalities from the dominant to the opposition parties.

Mergers and splits among the parties and the movement of men from one party to another have been a rather common occurrence in this system. Whereas the Congress has, on the

one hand, shown an inveterate tendency to seek to absorb numerous opposition groups within its fold, the opposition has, on the other, demonstrated a remarkable capacity to hold on to its support, even to reemerge in an almost phoenix-like manner. For, in seeking to maintain its dominance the Congress strives to be porous and accommodative, which, however, conflicts with its own cohesiveness as an organization. This is of course, the dilemma of dominance which any such party in a democracy must face. As Morris-Jones succinctly puts it:

To dominate, the Congress must accommodate; yet accommodation encourages incoherence which destroys the capacity to dominate.⁵

FACTIONAL POLITICS IN BIHAR CONGRESS

Factionalism has always been a part of the Congress in pre- as well as post- independence period. It was only during the first decade of its existence (1908-1918) that overt factionalism in the Bihar Congress was restrained and limited because the party leadership then was drawn mainly from the upper class, English educated, urban elites. Consequently the leadership was socially pretty homogeneous. Its leadership primarily came from the Kayasthas, who had received English education earlier and in larger numbers than other castes in the state.⁶

⁵Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent", op. cit., p. 451.

⁶Ramashray Roy, "Politics of Fragmentation: The Case of Congress Party in Bihar", in Iqbal Narain et al. (eds.), State Politics in India (Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967), p. 418.

Beginning in the 1920's, the social and economic background of the Congress leadership began to get diversified with increasing political mobilization of other sections of the society. The Kayastha dominance in the Congress came to be challenged by Bhumihar Brahmans, Rajputs, and Brahmans, who also followed suit in taking to English education and modern professions and came to realize the advantages of political participation.

By the 1930s three principal politically articulate caste groups had emerged in the Congress: the Kayasthas, the Bhumihar Brahmans, and the Rajputs.⁷ The Bhumihar Brahmans, more wealthy in terms of land ownership and more numerous than the Kayasthas, challenged the Kayastha dominance leading to the latter's alliance with the Rajputs, an even larger and wealthy rural upper caste.⁸

In this context of political mobilization of caste groups in the Congress politics, the process of selection of Congress candidates for election to the legislature, local selfgoverning institutions, and party bodies at different levels aroused intense intraparty conflicts, because "many Congress workers . . . [had] started assessing their services in terms of rewards in the form of membership of a legislative assembly, municipal or district board or at least

⁷Jha, "Caste in Bihar Congress Politics," in Narain et. al., (eds.), op. cit., pp. 575-587.

⁸Ibid., pp. 575-576; Ramashray Roy, "Bihar," Seminar, 95 (July, 1967), 35-41; and R. C. Prasad, "Educational Development," Seminar, 107 (July, 1968), 26-31 at 26-28.

a place of honour and power in a Congress Committee".⁹

Claims to office were pressed and considered on grounds of caste, geographical, religious and personal bases.¹⁰

By the time the first Congress ministry was formed in Bihar in 1937, under the Government of India Act of 1935, two major factions had crystallized in the Congress. One was organized under the personal fief of S. K. Sinha, a Bhumihaar Brahman from Monghyr district, and the other under that of A. N. Sinha, a Rajput from Gaya district¹¹ (see Chart I). A contest between the two factional leaders for chief Ministership seemed imminent, but A. N. Sinha finally opted out of the contest facilitating the unanimous election of S. K. Sinha.¹² A. N. Sinha became the deputy leader of the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) and held the key portfolio of finance in the S. K. Sinha ministry.

After the 1946 elections, conflicts over the leadership of the newly elected CLP again developed between the "ministerialist" S. K. Sinha and the "dissident" A. N. Sinha factions. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, sent by the Congress High command to mediate between the two leaders, managed to secure unanimous election of S. K. Sinha and A. N. Sinha as leader

⁹ Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 431. See also Anugrah Narayan Sinha, Mere Samsaran (My Memoirs) (Patna: Kusum Prakashan, 1961), p. 319.

¹⁰ Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., pp. 436-444.

¹¹ Jha, op. cit.

¹² For the role played by Rajendra Prasad in the unanimous election of S. K. Sinha see the former's Autobiography, op. cit., pp. 437-438.

CHART I

Congress Factions with the Date of Their Emergence (the caste of the leader appears within the brackets)

- 1937: (a) S. K. Sinha's faction (Bhumihar Brahman).
 (b) A. N. Sinha's faction (Rajput).
- 1953: "Centrist" faction (no recognized single leader).
- 1957 (a) S. K. Sinha's faction as of 1937
 (a) above.
 (b) Binodanand Jha's faction (Brahman).
 (c) S. N. Sinha's faction (Rajput).
- 1961: (a) B. N. Jha's faction as of 1957
 (b) above.
 (b) S. N. Sinha's faction as of 1957
 (c) above.
 (c) M. P. Sinha's faction (Bhumihar).
 (d) K. B. Sahay's faction (Kayastha).

deputy leader respectively.¹³

This arrangement was, however, shortlived for after the 1952 elections the two Sinhas again fell out. The High Command intervened by sending three central ministers from Bihar to patch up differences, but they failed and it was only the intervention of the Prime Minister and national Congress President Jawaharlal Nehru which led to the same unanimous elections as in 1946.¹⁴

In 1953 a slight departure from this bifactional system took place with the emergence of a small "centrist" group in the party, which was primarily the product of dissatisfaction among some followers of the Bhumihar Brahman Chief Minister S. K. Sinha at their exclusion from his ministries of 1946 and 1952.¹⁵

However, interestingly enough, only the non-Bhumihar followers of the Chief Minister deserted him and formed the centrist group; his Bhumihar followers, by and large, stuck by him even in cases where they failed to get rewarded by ministerial positions presumably because they derived the psychological benefits of belonging to the "ruling caste."

The defection of the non-Bhumihar followers of S. K. Sinha was accelerated by the inclusion of M. P. Sinha, a

¹³Maulana Abul Kalam Azad India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959), pp. 113-114.

¹⁴The Indian Nation, March 11 and 12, 1952.

¹⁵Ramashray Roy, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State", Asian Survey, 8 (July, 1968), 564.

casteman and close relation of the Chief Minister, in the 1952 ministry. M. P. Sinha's rise to power particularly piqued K. B. Sahay, a Kayastha lieutenant of S. K. Sinha, whom the latter had earlier weaned away from the Rajput-Kayastha alliance and who aspired to be Chief Minister. Following this development the members of the centrist group openly and Sahay and his followers furtively started a campaign of denigration and character assassination against M. P. Sinha.¹⁶ The adverse effects of these factional feuds surfaced in the 1957 elections. Most members of the centrist group broke away from the Congress when they failed to get renominated because of the cold attitude toward them of both the major factional leaders.¹⁷ The climax of Sinha-Sahay rivalry came when both, having worked against each other, were defeated in the general elections.¹⁸

Following the 1957 general elections a direct contest between S. K. Sinha and A. N. Sinha for the CLP leadership could not be avoided for neither was willing to accept any compromise arrangement. A. N. Sinha decided to stick to his guns this time, presumably because his position seemed considerably strengthened as K. B. Sahay and the remnants of centrist group openly joined his camp. In this first trial

¹⁶ See Ramashray Roy, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance", op. cit., p. 564.

¹⁷ The defectors formed a separate Jana (People's) Congress, which later merged with the Swatantra Party in 1959. See Erdman, op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁸ Roy, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance", op. cit., p. 564.

of strength A. N. Sinha lost and subsequently accepted the deputy leadership of the party.¹⁹

The death of A. N. Sinha and S. K. Sinha in 1957 and 1961 respectively finally marked the end of the bifactional pattern in the party and its replacement by a multifactional system. In 1957 the dissident A. N. Sinha faction further broke into two distinct factions broadly on the basis of Sinha's Rajput and non-Rajput following. The former now rallied around S. N. Sinha (A.N. Sinha's son), and the latter, belonging to many different castes, organized under the leadership of Binodanand Jha, a Maithil Brahman. Likewise, after S. K. Sinha's demise the ministerialist faction also fragmented in spite of the efforts of M. P. Sinha to keep it intact under his leadership.²⁰

In the contest for the CLP leadership following S. K. Sinha's death two broad subgroups emerged in the party. The first was a subcoalition of factions led by Jha, Sahay, and S. N. Sinha drawing support mainly from the Brahman, the Kayastha, the Rajput, the majority of lower caste Hindus and the Muslim MLAs. The other was not so much a subcoalition of factions but primarily the Bhumihar faction of M. P. Sinha, with some limited following among the lower castes, which found itself isolated. As the leader of the majority group, Jha became the second chief Minister of Bihar.²¹

¹⁹Ibid., p. 564.

²⁰Jha, op. cit.

²¹Ibid., p. 579.

Tensions within the ministerialist subcoalition developed from the start as Sahay grew apprehensive of the growing influence of S. N. Sinha, the leader of the Congress Rajputs, in the government. Thus when the Pradesh Election Committee (PEC) met in late 1961 to nominate Congress candidates for the 1962 general elections, Sahay fell out with the ministerialist subcoalition and joined M. P. Sinha in the dissident camp.²²

A trial of strength between the ministerialists and the dissidents took place following the 1962 general elections over the CLP leadership. This time the dissidents put up Sahay against Jha, but again failed to capture the leadership of the legislature party.²³

In 1963 Chief Minister Jha was retired under the Kamaraj Plan²⁴ to take up organizational work in the party and a fresh contest for Chief Ministership occurred despite the High Command's efforts to patch up the feuds.²⁵

²²Roy, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance", op. cit.,

²³Jha, op. cit., p. 579.

²⁴Proposed by K. Kamaraj, the Congress Chief Minister of Madras (now Tamil Nadu) and subsequently President of the Indian National Congress, the Kamaraj Plan was intended to "revitalize" the Congress organization. It suggested that leading Congressmen in government should voluntarily step down from their ministerial posts and offer themselves for full-time organizational work. All Congress Chief Ministers and all Union ministers resigned in response to the Congress High Command. Six Chief Ministers and six Union Ministers were relieved to do organizational work. See Stanley Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 77-80.

²⁵The Indian Nation, September 12, 13, and 14, 1963.

In this contest S. N. Sinha and his followers deserted the Jha camp and joined hands with the dissidents in the Sahay - M. P. Sinha subcoalition. The Jha faction was thus isolated, and Birchand Patel, a backward (Kurmi) caste lieutenant of Jha, lost the contest to Sahay, who became the third Chief Minister of Bihar.²⁶ An earlier attempt by Jha to build up an entirely new base of support through the merger of the Jharkhand Party with the Congress in the summer of 1963 did not fully succeed; finding himself out of office soon after the merger, Jha could not keep a good many of his newly acquired Jharkhand followers from defecting to the new Chief Minister's faction willing and eager to oblige them with patronage.

Conscious of his limitations as leader of the numerically smaller Kayastha caste as compared to his Brahman, Rajput, and Bhumihar rivals - Chief Minister Sahay proceeded, in a bid to make up for this deficiency, to woo the numerically larger members of lower castes by catering to their cause. He appointed the Yadava caste politician Ram Lakhan Yadava as a full-fledged minister in his government and gave him the portfolio of Public Works Department (PWD), a position of obvious importance for patronage purposes.²⁷ Sahay also won over the influential Kurmi leader Deo Sharan Singh, the chairman of the Vidhan Parishad (the upper house

²⁶ Ibid., September 25, 1963.

²⁷ A jocular translation of PWD is generally given as Plunder Without Danger!

of Bihar Legislature).

Sahay could not, however, keep the ministerialist subcoalition united under his leadership. He failed to prevent the mutually hostile M. P. Sinha and S. N. Sinha factions from falling apart. In June 1966, when forming the PEC for nominating party candidates for the 1967 elections, M. P. Sinha and his followers defected from the ministerialist subcoalition and joined forces with Jha in the dissident camp. Sahay did, nonetheless, succeed in keeping the ministerialist subcoalition in power for the time being by retaining the support of a section of the M. P. Sinha faction by patronising a Young Turk group led by Shiva Shanker Sinha, son of the former Chief Minister S. K. Sinha.

Attempts by the Congress High Command to forestall open struggle over the PEC elections failed and a contest took place at the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC) meeting on June 19. The ministerialists carried the majority of the BPCC delegates, capturing six seats in the PEC against four bagged by the dissidents.²⁸

When the PEC started its deliberations to select 318 party candidates from among 3337 applicants, it immediately got bogged down in factional conflicts, the factional leaders vying with each other to grab the largest number of party

²⁸The Indian Nation, June 17, 19, and 20, 1966. In addition to the 10 elected members, the PEC had two ex-officio members: Chief Minister Sahay, and the BPCC President Rajendra Mishra, a protege of Sahay.

nominations for their own followers. Sahay and his lieutenant Yadava, for example, demanded a minimum of 100 party tickets for the backward castes on the plea that they were under-represented in the party. Not only the dissident group leader M. P. Sinha, but also Sahay's ally, S. N. Sinha, reportedly opposed this Sahay-Yadava tactic of challenging the dominance of the upper castes in the party.²⁹ S. N. Sinha finally deserted the ministerialist camp to join the dissidents in the M. P. Sinha-Jha camp, leaving the former in a minority of 5 to 7.³⁰

The High Command tried to mediate in order to bring about unity in the PEC, but without success. After several attempts the PEC found that except for an agreement on 94 candidates no further compromise was possible, and the "majority" and the "minority" groups submitted separate recommendations to the Central Election Committee (CEC).³¹ The CEC finally laid down some uniform principles such as, for example, as granting nomination to "non-controversial" and "sitting" MLAs except those facing charges for misuse of power or violation of party discipline, and completed the selection of candidates with remarkable speed.³²

²⁹The Searchlight, November 19, 1966; and The Statesman, December 12 and 13, 1966.

³⁰The Searchlight, November 20, 1966.

³¹Ibid., December 11, 1966; and The Indian Nation, December 11, 1966.

³²See Ramashray Roy, "Election Studies: Selection of Congress Candidates", Economic and Political Weekly, 1 and 2 (December 31, 1966-February 18, 1967), 833-840, 17-24, 61-76, 371-376, 407-416 (a five-part series). Roy's analysis is based on data from Bihar and Rajasthan.

No group was fully satisfied with the CEC decision. However, two of the four groups felt more dissatisfied with the outcome, as the CEC failed in their view to give them their "due" share of Congress nominations. The first was the erstwhile Janata Party led by the Raja of Ramgarh which had only recently joined the Congress. The second group was the Jha faction which had remained in the dissident camp since Jha's "resignation" as Chief Minister in 1963 under the Kamaraj Plan.

A week after the CEC decision the Raja left the Congress along with his followers, and in collaboration with some other disgruntled Congressmen, such as Mahamaya Prasad Sinha and Thakur Girija Nandan Singh, formed a new party, i.e., the Jana Kranti Dal (JKD).³³

The Jha faction's happiness over the CEC decision stemmed from the fact that only 11 of his 47 supporters in the last Vidhan Sabha managed to get renominated.³⁴ Unlike the Raja, however, Jha did not desert the party on the election eve, though he minced no words in expressing his resentment with the CEC decision.

Several conclusions emerge from this summary of factional politics in the Bihar Congress party during 1937-1967. First, we have noticed that the Congress party enjoyed a dominant position in Bihar during this period with the inevitable result that competition among factions within this party assumed greater salience as compared to competition

³³See Ch. 3, p. 62.

³⁴R. C. Prasad, "The Fourth General Elections in Bihar" (unpublished paper, September, 1967), p. 26.

between various parties in the state. Second, we have observed a marked proliferation over the years of factions struggling to control the dominant Congress party. These factions characteristically have not originated and proliferated on the basis of any differences on ideology or program.

It must, however, be parenthetically mentioned here that aside from this preeminent pattern of "issueless" factionalism there was a rather shortlived sidelight of ideological factionalism in the Bihar Congress epitomized by the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha and the Cpngress Socialist Party, organized as subgroups within the Congress in 1929 and 1934 respectively. However, first the Kisan Sabhaists (in 1942), and then the Congress Socialists (in 1948), were forced to break away from the Congress on account of its unwillingness to approve their "radical," "nongradualist" approach to social and economic reforms.³⁵ With their departure from the Congress, ideological conflict ceased to be a factor in the Bihar Congress politics.

One feels tempted to characterize caste unities and diversities as the real driving force behind factional politics in the Bihar Congress. This seems, however, to be too simplistic an explanation of a complex phenomenon. For no Congress party faction has been based on a single caste. Factional leaders are, as a matter of fact, forced to seek

³⁵See Ch. 3, pp. 58-59.

support across caste lines for two important and interrelated reasons. First, an unalterable fact of the social life of Bihar is that no caste by itself enjoys an absolute majority in the state - a situation that clearly precludes the possibility of the emergence of an "exclusive" one-caste faction as the majority group in the Congress capable of forming government. If it were so, such a faction would tend to transform itself into a separate party rather than to continue as a faction within the Congress.

Second, the positing of a direct causal link between the motive to advance personal and caste interests and faction formation fails to take account of another factor, i.e., the democratic institutional arrangements that require a party or a faction to carry a majority with it in order to be able to control the government, the machinery of dispensing rewards and deprivations. And as we have already mentioned above, democratic control over the government in Bihar is not possible through a party or faction based on a single caste. Hence the necessity of forging a democratic majority around them forces the factional leaders to seek support cutting across caste lines.

Third, it is obvious from our account that even though factionalism proliferated and thoroughly pervaded the Bihar Congress, its cohesion and organizational viability were not seriously threatened at least until 1967. Needless to say, the Congress did encounter indiscipline and even defections because of divisive factionalism during the period. But no

major defections from the party affecting its fortunes in some vital manner occurred. The good offices and the authority of the High Command of the Indian National Congress acting primarily through its two subcommittees - the Congress Parliamentary Board and the Central Election Committee - was generally effective in intervening in the affairs of the Bihar Pradesh Congress and resolving and managing factional conflicts in it. Two important factors seem to have contributed to this success. In the first place, the central party leadership consisted of such "tall" men as Nehru, Patel, Azad, Rajendra Prasad and others whose impartiality and exalted status vis-a-vis the state party leaders eminently qualified them to successfully mediate and arbitrate in factional conflicts in the state party. Secondly, by virtue of its dominant position in the state, the Congress exercised almost full control over patronage with the result that individuals and groups aspiring to power and divisible benefits were in a way obliged to seek their goals within the organizational framework of the Congress party. Defection or expulsion from the party often carried the implications of going into the political wilderness.

Fourth, the upper castes - Bhumihars, Rajputs, Brahmans, and Kayasthas - played the dominant role in factional politics in the Congress party during 1937-1967 despite the numerical superiority of the lower castes in the state. This phenomenon can be accounted for if we recall that political mobilization of the economically better off and educationally

forward upper castes occurred much earlier than that of the economically depressed and educationally backward lower castes.

Finally, the factional character of the dominant Congress party has helped it to maintain an "open" elite system facilitating the absorption within the ruling party elite of newly mobilized and aspiring social groups. In political systems where the existing elites resist and successfully block the admission of newly mobilized groups into meaningful political participation, the latter either transfer their allegiance to the extant opposition parties and protest movements or create new parties of opposition. In Bihar, however, the opposition parties have been rather slow in their growth, and factionalism within the Congress, during the period of its dominance at any rate, seems to have served as the principal instrument of mobilization of erstwhile politically dormant social groups and channelization of their political participation. Thus the upper castes, which constituted the effective elite of the Bihar Congress in the initial stages of political mobilization, were forced by growing political competition among themselves to seek and mobilize additional bases of support. This they did by recruiting lieutenants from among the lower castes and raising them to the elite status who subsequently became leaders in their own right.

The political career of Ram Lakhan Yadava, a backward caste politician from Patna district, nicely illustrates this

point. Recruited first as a lieutenant by the Bhumihar Brahman Chief Minister S. K. Sinha (1937-1939 and 1946-1961), Yadava was later picked up and patronized by the Kayastha Chief Minister K. B. Sahay (1963-1967), who gave him a position in his government next only to his own in importance. Following the 1967 elections Yadava emerged as a powerful backward caste leader challenging the position of his own guru³⁶ Sahay.

THE 1967 ELECTIONS

As the elections of 1967 approached, few observers could expect the Congress to lose its dominance, let alone its majority, in Bihar. For factional conflicts notwithstanding, the Congress party seemed, if any thing, to have strengthened its position in Bihar after the 1962 elections by the merger with itself of the Jharkhand Party of the Adivasis and the Christians in 1963, and of the Janata Party of the Raja of Ramgarh in 1966. Both these parties had enjoyed persistent strongholds in the Chota Nagpur region of Bihar where the Congress had traditionally been the weakest in comparison to the other two regions of the state, i.e., the north Bihar plains and the south Bihar plains.

However, as the elections drew closer circumstances tended to turn swiftly against the Congress. The unity of the party seemed seriously threatened by factional dissension and wrangling over distribution of Congress tickets for elections

³⁶Teacher, in the teacher/mentor - disciple sense.

at a time when the opposition parties appeared heading toward greater unity among themselves, and fresh grounds for public discontent against the Congress were added.

Weakened by the preelection defections by about 3,000 disgruntled applicants for Congress tickets³⁷ and riven by bitter factional rivalries, the Congress party went to the polls in a great disarray. The party found its capacity to organize its election campaign in a coordinated and effective manner greatly diminished, with the four factional leaders hoping "to become the Chief Minister after the 1967 elections by defeating during the elections as many as possible of the Congress candidates supporting their rivals".³⁸

Moreover, for the first time some important opposition parties demonstrated resilience and ability to forge a united front against the Congress. The archpriest of this new strategy of "non-Congressism" was the Samyukta Socialist Party leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, who in an obvious bid to match the "catch-all" character of the Congress put forward the thesis of "catch-all" opposition, i.e., the Congress cannot be dislodged from power unless all the opposition parties united against it irrespective of ideologies and policies.

In pursuance of this strategy the SSP, the CPI, the CP(M), the RSP and the Socialist Unity Center formed a United

³⁷Navneeth, "Congress Debacle in Bihar: Voting Pattern in 1967", Economic and Political Weekly, 3 (August 25, 1968), 1311.

³⁸Paul R. Brass, "Coalition Politics in North India", op. cit., p. 1176.

Opposition Front (UOF) to make adjustments to avoid electoral contests among themselves and to coordinate their campaign resources. The result was that multi-cornered contests, which had benefited the Congress party in the previous elections by fragmenting the opposition vote, were in 1967 considerably reduced.³⁹

Finally, the mounting economic problems and some other preelection incidents combined to create an anti-Congress "wave" on the election eve in Bihar which seriously damaged the Congress poll prospects. The worsening economic situation in the country following the wars with China in 1962 and Pakistan in 1965 was further aggravated in Bihar by the worst famine in a century in 1966-1967, creating great hardships and miseries for the people. Stories of corruption in the state Congress leadership and the government combined with this factor to produce outbursts of popular resentment against the Congress government in the urban and rural areas alike.⁴⁰

To top this all came the police firings on allegedly violent mobs of students and demonstrators in some college campuses and in front of the Chief Minister's official residence in Patna between December 1966 and January 1967 - a period sensitively close to the elections to be held next month - resulting in more than a dozen dead and many more

³⁹R. C. Prasad, "The Fourth General Elections in Bihar", op. cit.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 18-22.

wounded. This triggered off a spate of angry demonstrations and even disruptions of Congress election meetings in many parts of the state. Particularly, the students, with the universities, colleges and schools throughout the state having been closed "indefinitely" on account of "disturbances", fanned out of the educational centers, and "turned themselves into the vanguard of the 'Defeat the Congress and Save the Country' campaign of the opposition parties."⁴¹

In sum, a combination of intraparty conflicts, opposition unity, and some immediate preelection incidents brought about the Congress debacle in 1967. The 1967 elections thus "deviated" from the "maintaining" pattern of the first three general elections in Bihar and even seem likely to become a "realigning" elections leading to a structural transformation in the party system of the state on a durable basis.⁴² This trend seems to have been confirmed by the mid-term elections held in 1969. In both these elections, though the Congress party retained the largest number of seats in the Vidhan Sabha, no party, including the Congress, won a majority. The one party dominant system, under which the arena of meaningful competition had remained confined to the factions within the Congress legislature Party, gave way to a multi-party system of considerable fragmentation.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 21

⁴²For elaboration of the concepts of "maintaining", "deviating", and "realigning" elections, see Angus Campbell, "A Classification of Election", in Angus Campbell et al. (eds.), Elections and Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), pp. 9-39.

CHAPTER V

POLITICS OF COALITIONS AND DEFECTIONS 1967-1970

INTRODUCTION

The one-party dominant system with the Congress party enjoying an hegemonic majority and the dissident Congress factions and the opposition parties essentially playing the role of legislative pressure groups was replaced in Bihar in 1967 by a highly fractionated multiparty system. The new system got off to an extremely unstable start with quick turnovers of coalition governments on account of frequent defections and floor-crossings on the part of a sizeable number of legislators. In about four years (March 1967 - December 1970) Bihar had eight governments - six coalitions and two interregnums of federal takeover of the state administration¹ to ensure stability - with an average life of 5.7 months (ranging from ten days to ten months).

In this chapter I wish first to briefly analyse Bihar's new party system introduced by the 1967 elections, and then to summarize the politics of coalitions and defections in the

¹Under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution the President of India may suspend or dissolve a state legislature temporarily assuming to himself the governance of the state if he "is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the state cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this constitution".

post-election period up to 1970. This chapter will thus set the stage for the analysis of Congress defectors in the following chapter.

THE POST-1967 PARTY SYSTEM

As mentioned in Chapter III, the post-1967 party system of Bihar was characterized by a high degree of fractionation in terms of legislative seat share among parties and an excessive multipolar pluralism along left-right, secular-communal, and, to a lesser extent, prosystem-anti-system dimensions. Though no party enjoyed a clear majority (until the 1972 elections, when the Congress was returned to power once again), there emerged two "pivot" parties - the Congress and the SSP, around which other smaller parties and independents coalesced in the formation of rival coalitions. The pattern of coalition formation indicated that ideological divergence among the parties was (except possibly during the first non-Congress coalition government) no inhibiting factor, as the two pivot parties sought coalition partners from every side irrespective of ideology.

The pattern of coalition disintegration too belied the widely expressed fear about the promise of stability of a coalition among parties having divergent ideologies. The experience of coalition politics in Bihar suggests that the conflicts arising out of ideological and programmatic differences among coalescing parties may not prove to be as formidable as they could be expected to be.

Conflicts stemming from this source were, by and large, successfully resolved through the methods of exculsion of controversial issues by agreeing in advance upon a common minimum program, shelving of any new or unforeseen issues with a potential for conflict aggravation, and moving cautiously by consensus.

The main challenges to the maintenance of the coalition governments primarily came from sources other than ideological intractability. Two major factors appear to have played the crucial role in this matter: (1) lack of coherence and cohesion in the pivot parties often leading to sizeable defections; and (2) the process of continuous fission and fusion characterizing the smaller parties and transitory groupings and alliances of careerists and political entrepreneurs. The result was a quick turnover of Congress-led and non-Congress coalition governments in which almost all parties in the system freely participated.

In its structural aspects the party system of Bihar (and some other north Indian states) during 1967-1972 resembled fairly closely Giovanni Sartori's model of a pluralized, multipolar and centrifugal party system based on the experience of European party systems of contemporary Italy, the French Fourth Republic, and Weimar Germany.² Like their

²See Paul R. Brass, "Coalition Politics in North India", American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1174-1191. Sartori's model is outlined in his "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism", in Weiner and LaPalombara (eds.), op. cit., pp. 137-176.

European counterparts, the north Indian party systems were characterized by a multipolar pluralism, and a huge center occupied by a single party (i.e., the Congress party). In dynamic aspects, however, they differed from the European systems in at least two important respects. First, though ideological differences did exist among the parties, ideology did not seem to play the same rigidifying role in the north Indian party systems as it does in European systems. That is, ideological differences among the parties in north India did not prevent interparty cooperation in coalition formation and maintenance. As Paul Brass observes:

Interparty conflicts on matters of principle were more easily reconciled . . . [in coalition governments in north India] than intraparty conflicts which related to party power in the government and in the districts.³

Second, the north Indian party systems evince a lower degree of party identification and partisanship institutionalization in the legislature parties than their European counterparts so that party defectors and independents play a decisive balancing role in coalition formation and disintegration.⁴

COALITIONS, FACTIONS, AND DEFECTIONS

THE SINHA SVD COALITION GOVERNMENT

After the 1967 elections the Congress party, despite

³Ibid., p. 1190.

⁴See Ibid.; and Subhash Kashyap, The Politics of Defection (Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969)

its plurality in the Bihar Vidhan Sabha, failed to form a coalition government under its leadership for two main reasons: (1) bitter intraparty conflicts; and (2) the operation at a high key of the opposition strategy of "non-Congressism".

A post-election realignment among the four factional leaders in the Congress - Binodanand Jha, K. B. Sahay, M. P. Sinha, and S. N. Sinha - produced two subcoalitions on the eve of the contest for the Congress Legislature Party (CLP) leadership. The Sahay faction supported M. P. Sinha for the party leadership, who along with his followers had, since the elections, broken away from the Jha - S. N. Sinha camp. S. N. Sinha continued his allegiance to Jha and backed him against M. P. Sinha. M. P. Sinha won by a single vote (97 to 96)⁵ and proceeded to negotiate for a Congress-led coalition government.⁶ Jha and 34 of his followers, however, publicly opposed the move, arguing that the party should avoid the impression that it was in a big hurry to come back to power so soon after a popular verdict against its rule, and that the party should keep out of power for the time being for "self-purification" in order to refurbish its "lost image".⁷

This indeed might have been true to a certain extent. What Jha and his followers did not, however, mention was that

⁵The Searchlight, March 4, 1967. The voting figure includes the Congress members of both the houses of the legislature.

⁶Ibid., and The Indian Nation, March 4, 1967.

⁷The Indian Nation, March 5 and 7, 1967.

their move was primarily designed to deny the opportunity of forming a coalition government to the Sinha-Sahay sub-coalition which would naturally be the largest beneficiary in such a government. This provides a nice illustration of what may be called "negative factionalism", i.e., the development of factional conflicts to such an extent that cooperation among the factions becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Whatever the motive of Jha, his step forced M. P. Sinha to decline the Governor's invitation to form a government.⁸

Even if the Congress factions were to cooperate among themselves, a Congress-led coalition government did not seem to be in the realm of practical politics. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the major opposition parties had fought the election on the basis of a united opposition electoral front against the Congress, and the substantial opposition gains were largely a by-product of an "anti-Congress wave" that had swept Bihar on the election eve. The opposition parties were thus publicly committed to a non-Congress coalition as well as inclined to interpret the election results as a "people's verdict" against the Congress. They naturally feared that any truck with the Congress, and thereby facilitating its return to power, would turn the popular wrath against them.⁹ Hence

⁸The Statesman, March 5, 1967.

⁹Several leaders of the non-Congress parties in separate interviews said that any alignment with the Congress at this moment would be committing "political harakiri" in view of the prevailing anti-Congress feelings in the larger part of the electorate. See The Statesman, February 25, 1967.

the news of Congress reverses pouring into the capital from all parts of the state brought the leaders of the opposition parties, ranging from the extremes of right-left, secular-communal, and national-regional dimensions, to a single platform to declare at a mammoth public rally on February 23 not only their firm opposition to a Congress-led coalition government but also their agreement to institute a commission of inquiry to investigate into the "misdeeds of corrupt Congress ministers" after the formation of a non-Congress coalition government.¹⁰

With remarkable speed the non-Congress parties coalesced into what they called the Samyukta Vidhayak Dal (SVD), the United Legislators' Party)¹¹ based on a 33-point common minimum program and a 21-man cabinet headed by Mahamaya Prasad Sinha¹² was sworn in on March 5.

The SVD ministry remained in office for about ten months. During its stay in office, it faced mainly two kinds of problems in maintaining itself as a winning coalition: conflicts arising out of the policy differences among the coalescing parties, and tensions stemming from personal ambition and opportunistic careerism on the part of some of

¹⁰Ibid., February 25, 1967.

¹¹The SVD with a combined strength of 169 in a house of 318 consisted of the SSP, the Jana Sangh, the CPI, the JKD, the PSP, the Jharkhand Party, the Swatantra and the CP(M). It was later joined by three Congress defectors.

¹²A former President of the Bihar Pradesh Congress, Sinha had defected from the party in December 1966 to lead the rebel Congressmen, denied nominations, who formed the JKD. See Ch. 3.

its members.

The policy differences that threatened the stability of the SVD related to language, land reforms, and food policies of the government, each of which produced serious disagreement among the SVD partners. The language controversy centered around the status of Urdu; the SSP and some other constituents of the SVD, in an obvious bid to woo the Muslim vote, had promised during their campaign to make it, along with Hindi, another official language of the state, but the Jana Sangh, not bound by any such election promise, strongly opposed this policy as "a surrender to communalism."¹³

The conflicts over land reforms and food policy stemmed from the CPI Revenue Minister's attempt to amend the Bihar Tenancy Act to give more legal "protection" to the bataidars (share croppers), and from the SSP Food and Supply Minister's proposal for a compulsory food grain levy obliging the farmers to sell a certain quota of their produce to the government usually at a price lower than in the open market to help meet scarcities caused by the recent famine and to control black-marketing in food grains. Both these proposals were likely to be unpopular among the farmers and were strongly opposed by the rightist parties in the SVD, i.e., the Jana Sangh, the BKD, and the Swatantra Party.

These conflicts did not, however, wreck the SVD and were successfully managed or resolved by putting the language and land reform measures in the cold storage, and by the

¹³The Statesman, August 4, 1967.

rightist parties finally agreeing to the food grain levy proposal under the euphemistic expression of "surplus procurement".

The problem that finally brought about the collapse of the SVD had nothing to do with matters of policy or program; it related to the personal ambition of an SSP Minister in the SVD cabinet, B. P. Mandal, leading to a sizeable defection from its ranks and reducing it to a minority.

Mandal, a prominent Yadava politician from Saharsa district, had before the 1967 elections defected from the Congress to the SSP and successfully contested a Lok Sabha seat. When after the elections the SSP-dominated SVD government was formed, he managed to get himself appointed as a minister in it, and decided to vacate his Lok Sabha seat in New Delhi, a move that incurred strong opposition by the SSP national leader Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. Lohia publicly chastised Mandal for indecent lust for office, demanding his resignation from the SVD cabinet and taking his Lok Sabha seat.

After a bitter clash between Lohia and Mandal, the latter finally resigned from the SVD government on August 28, 1967. But simultaneously he defected from the SSP as well, charging that the party had failed to implement its own policy of 60 percent reservation for the backward classes in all high positions. He promptly announced the defection of 25 other MLAs from the SVD along with him and the formation of a new party, namely, the Shoshit Dal (Party of the

Exploited), wedded to the 'backward classes' uplift.¹⁴

The Shoshit Dal sent word to the Congress opposition that it was willing to cooperate in toppling the SVD government. The executive of the Congress Legislature Party hurriedly announced the formation of the Congress Shoshit Dal alliance to replace the SVD "minority" government. When the matter came to the Congress Legislature Party for its approval, however, a small but vocal minority took strong exception to the step saying that the time was not yet "ripe" for toppling the SVD government, and that the Congress' alliance with a party of "unprincipled defectors" would irreparably damage its image.¹⁵

This opposition primarily came from the Jha faction, which becomes meaningful if we recall its frustrations over the pre-election distribution of party tickets for 1967 and the failure of Jha to capture the Congress Legislature Party leadership following the elections. In addition, the Jha faction's insistence on the "unripeness" of time for toppling the SVD government also assumes significance in the context of the fact that the government had announced, and was hurriedly following up, the setting up of a commission of inquiry into the charges of corruption and misuse of power against five former Congress ministers,¹⁶ none of whom belonged

¹⁴The Searchlight, August 29, 1967.

¹⁵The Searchlight, September 16, 1967; and The Indian Nation, October 7, 1967.

¹⁶They included K. B. Sahay, M. P. Sinha, S. N. Sinha, R. L. Yadava, and Ambika S. Singh. Yadava was a supporter of Sahay and Singh of S. N. Sinha.

to the Jha faction and three of whom happened to be the leaders of the rival factions. Presumably therefore the Jha faction wanted to give the SVD government enough time to complete the institution of the inquiry commission. For charges against the leaders of other factions, if proved, would automatically strengthen the position of the Jha faction within the party.¹⁷

The Congress, despite the opposition of Jha and his followers, however, proceeded with the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance and succeeded in persuading the High Command to approve such a step. Nevertheless, partly to avoid the impression that the Congress was an "office-chaser" and partly to assuage the hard feelings of the critics of the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance in the Bihar Congress, the High Command evolved a compromise formula by instructing the Bihar Congress leaders to seek the support of the Shoshit Dal in toppling the anti-Congress SVD but without trying to install a Congress-led coalition in its place. Instead, the Congress should let the Shoshit Dal form an alternate government, the High Command felt.¹⁸ In effect, thus, the strategy of the Congress was that of propping up a Shoshit Dal minority government from outside without directly joining it.

The SVD reacted sharply to the threat from the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance and tried desperately to keep

¹⁷ See Jha's letter to M. P. Sinha on this point reported in The Statesman, September 14, 1967.

¹⁸ The Statesman, August 29, 1967; and The Times of India, January 20 and 29, 1968.

itself in power. To restrain further defections from its ranks it held out the threat that if the stability of the SVD government was threatened it would advise the Governor to dissolve the Vidhan Sabha and order a mid-term election.¹⁹ Simultaneously, the SVD also tried to retain its support intact and to make up for the depletion of its ranks by making lavish promises of ministerial positions to the potential defectors both from its own side to the Congress and vice versa. On September 7, 11 new ministers were added to the cabinet with an indication of a further cabinet expansion shortly.²⁰ Five of these new ministers were defectors from the Congress who had announced the formation of a "counter-Shoshit Dal" under the leadership of B. P. Jawahar, a backward caste politician from Patna district, claiming that they, rather than Mandal's Shoshit Dal, were the "true" representatives of the backward classes.²¹

The SVD government was, nevertheless, voted out on a non-confidence motion sponsored by the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance. The SVD Chief Minister tendered the resignation of his ministry advising the Governor to dissolve the Vidhan Sabha and to hold fresh elections to provide a stable government "on the basis of a clear verdict of the electorate."²²

¹⁹ The Statesman, September 4, 1967.

²⁰ Ibid., September 8, 1967.

²¹ Ibid., September 5, 1967.

²² The motion was moved on January 26, 1968, by 163 to 150. The voting indicated that 38 MLAs had defected from the SVD to the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance. Of these 38 defectors,

THE SHOSHIT DAL GOVERNMENT

The Governor rejected the advice of the outgoing Chief Minister and instead decided to give the Congress-Shoshit Dal alliance a chance to form an alterante government. On February 1 a five member Shoshit Dal ministry headed by Mandal was sworn in. Within ten days the strength of the ministry rose to 38, making it the largest ministry in the history of the state. It was an all-defector government and everyone who defected to the Shoshit Dal was rewarded with a cabinet position.

In less than seven weeks the Shoshit Dal government was outvoted on a SVD-sponsored non-confidence motion. Defying the party whip, 17 Congress MLAs voted in favor of the motion "to uphold the cause of democracy in the larger interests of the people."²³

Though the Congress Legislature Party leadership as well as the High Command tried to woo the rebels back into the party, the defectors established a new party, namely, the Congress Loktantrik Dal (LCD, Democratic Congress Party), and joined with the SVD in forming a second non-Congress SVD government.

9 belonged to the SSP, 7 to the JKD, 6 to the Jharkhand Party, 2 to the Jana Sangh, and one each to the CPI, the PSP, and the Swatantra. The Searchlight, January 27, 1968.

²³The Times of India, March 19, 1968. The motion was carried by 165 votes to 142 on March 18. The list of Congress defectors was published in The Indian Nation, March 20, 1968.

As might be expected, all the Congress defectors belonged to the Jha factoin, which had been veering toward deviation from the party line ever since its frustrations over the distribution of Congress tickets for the 1967 elections and its defeat in the Contest for the Congress Legislature Party leadership following the general elections.

One intriguing feature of the episode was, however, that not all the members of the Jha faction defected with Jha on March 18. Because of the constantly shifting nature of factional allegiance of the rank and file members, it is well nigh impossible to determine the precise strength of the Jha faction, or for that matter any other faction. However, from newspaper accounts it seems plausible to assume that during the period between the spring of 1967 and the winter of 1968, the faction may have had a strength of 28 to 35 MLAs.²⁴ In the light of this fact it seems surprising that only 17 of them defected with Jha on March 18.

The caste composition of the defectors seems to be revealing in this context. In addition to his following among his own Brahman castemen and some other upper castes, Jha had also built up a good following among the lower castes, particularly since 1967 when he supported B. C. Patel, a backward caste leader, for Chief Ministership against

²⁴See The Searchlight, March 5, 1967, and September 16, 1968; and The Indian Nation, March 20, 1968.

K. B. Sahay.²⁵ Just as Deo Sharan Singh (Kurmi) and Ram Lakhan Yadava (Yadava) were prominent lower caste lieutenants of K. B. Sahay, Daroga Prasad Rai (Yadava) and Bhola Paswan (Scheduled Caste) were important lower caste leaders in the Jha faction. Along with other leaders in the Jha camp Paswan and Rai were frequently mentioned as potential defectors during the autumn of 1967 when Jha carried on his campaign within the Congress against the party's proposed alliance with Mandal's Shoshit Dal, even though Rai was less vocal than Paswan in public pronouncements against the Dal.

On the day of the non-confidence motion against the Shoshit Dal government on March 18, though Paswan went along with the defecting Congress MLAs of the Jha faction, Rai surprisingly did not join them. Not only did Rai refuse to support the non-confidence motion, but presumably he also exercised influence over other Shudra caste members of the Jha faction, for only three of them defected with Jha. A disproportionately large number of defectors - 11 out of 17 or 65 percent came from upper castes.²⁶ A few days after the fall of the Shoshit Dal government Rai lashed out against his erstwhile leader Jha in a speech in the Vidhan Sabha charging that the upper castes in the Jha faction could not reconcile themselves with a government in which 85 percent

²⁵Patel died in December, 1966.

²⁶Of the 17 defectors, 5 were Brahmans, 4 Bhumihar Brahmans, 2 Rajputs, 1 Kurmi, 2 Scheduled castes, and 2 Adivasis.

of the ministers belonged to the lower castes and hence voted it out, even by taking the extreme step of severing an almost life-long association with the Congress party.²⁷

THE PASWAN SVD GOVERNMENT

Following the fall of the Shoshit Dal government, the SVD opposition promptly coaxed the Congress defectors in the newly formed LCD by offering them, despite their relatively small number, the prize position of Chief Ministership in the coming SVD government.²⁸ The LCD leader Jha, on his part, offered the Chief Ministership to his scheduled caste lieutenant Bhola Paswan, presumably acting under an injured conscience for having been charged by his erstwhile backward caste lieutenant Rai with being instrumental in toppling the backward-caste-dominated Shoshit Dal government.

Thus on March 22, 1968, the second SVD government headed by Paswan assumed office on the basis of a 17- point common minimum program, largely consisting of non-controversial broad policy objectives. The issues of land reforms and language which had bedevilled the unity of the previous SVD government were carefully left out.

²⁷The Indian Nation, March, 27, 1968.

²⁸The SVD now had a strength of 169 in a house of 318: the SSP (57), the CPI (24), the Jana Sangh (23), the BKD (20), the LCD (20), the PSP (16), the CP(M) (4), the Swatantra (3), and the independents (2). It is noticeable that the strength of the LCD had by now risen to 20 since its formation in mid-March with 17 members. The identities of these three new members could not be ascertained.

The Paswan SVD government lasted barely three months, Chief Minister Paswan suddenly resigning on June 25 under pressure from the Janata Party, one of the constituents of the SVD.

As a partner in the SVD, the Janata Party was entitled to some ministerial positions. Its leader, Kamakhya Narayan Singh, the Raja of Ramgarh, demanded for himself the portfolio of mines and minerals, an area in which he obviously had a vested interest as he happened to be nearly the largest mine-owner in the state. The Raja also had a number of chronic law suits pending against him filed by the previous Congress governments concerning unpaid taxes and disputed proprietary rights. Taking advantage of his participation in the Paswan government, dependent in part upon his own support, the Raja tried to pressure the Chief Minister into making "special arrangements . . . for conducting the court cases against him" and appointing a lawyer of his (Raja's) own choice for the purpose.²⁹

Failing to persuade the Raja to drop these demands, considered "unreasonable" by some constituent parties in the SVD, Chief Minister Paswan tendered the resignation of his government to the Governor advising him to dissolve the Vidhan Sabha and to hold a mid-term election "to ensure a stable government."³⁰

²⁹Paswan's statement at a press conference following his resignation. The Indian Nation, June 26, 1968.

³⁰For the full text of the Chief Minister's letter of resignation to the Governor, see The Indian Nation, June 26, 1968.

The Governor accepted the advice of the outgoing Chief Minister, as he was himself personally convinced that in the existing Vidhan Sabha no stable alternative government was possible, even though the Congress opposition had staked the claim for forming a Congress-led coalition government. The Governor therefore recommended to the central government the dissolution of the Assembly and the imposition of President's rule pending mid-term elections.

THE 1969 MID-TERM ELECTIONS

The mid-term elections held in early 1969 differed significantly from the 1967 elections in that the strategy of concerted "non-Congressism" appeared to be at a comparatively low ebb. Except for a half-hearted united front of the SSP, the PSP, and the LCD, all other non-Congress parties adopted the strategy of going it alone, presumably because, encouraged by their successes in the previous election, they became ambitious and sought to maximize their strength by individually contesting as many seats as they could. Moreover, the entry of at least three new parties into the electoral fray in 1969 - the LCD, the Shoshit Dal, and the Janata Party - reflected further fragmentation of the non-Congress opposition.

Yet the Congress party could not benefit much from this low key "non-Congressism" on account of the usual intraparty conflicts. Following the defection of Binodanand Jha in March 1968, the number of effective aspirants to the leadership of the legislative wing of the party was reduced

to three factional leaders: K. B. Sahay, M. P. Sinha, and S. N. Sinha. In addition to the Big Three, however, a section of younger Congressmen led by D. P. Rai, L. N. Jha, Dharmavir Sinha, Kedar Pandey, and so on, most of whom were lieutenants of Binodanand Jha before he defected to form another party, had emerged as a motley group of mutinous "young Turks", held together by their common aversion to the party's domination by the Big Three. At the time of the pre-election distribution of Congress tickets for the mid-term elections the Young Turks made a great hue and cry which impressed the Congress High Command of the desirability of refusing renomination to the Big Three and two of their lieutenants on the grounds that they were at that time facing inquiry into charges of corruption and misuse of power as former Congress ministers. The step, it was thought, would refurbish the party's image.

In retrospect, however, the refusal of nominations to the Big Three by the party's High Command seems to have backfired. For one thing, the party entered the elections almost "leaderless", and without any clear indications about the post-election patterns of party leadership in the Vidhan Sabha.³¹ For another, the party's electoral campaign suffered both organizationally and financially, as the party stalwarts

³¹See R. C. Prasad, "Politics of Leaderlessness in Bihar", The Searchlight, January, 9 and 11, 1969, p. 4.

became indifferent to the campaign.³²

In sum, then, both the non-Congress parties as well as the Congress entered the mid-term poll in a spirit of gambling. At any rate, the fragmentation of the non-Congress opposition and disorganization within the Congress suggested continuing instability.

In its final outcome the mid-term poll failed to bring about a significant change in the party position in the Vidhan Sabha. Once again the voters failed to give a clear majority to any party. Insofar as it had been expected that the mid-term poll would create conditions for governmental stability, it, in reality, turned out to be a futile exercise.³³

THE SINGH (CONGRESS-LED) COALITION GOVERNMENT

Following the mid-term elections, a Congress-led coalition government consisting, in addition to the Congress, of the Janata Party, the Jharkhand Party, and the Shoshit Dal assumed office on February 26, 1969.³⁴ Mainly two important sources of conflict and tension jeopardized the stability of this coalition: intra-party dissensions within the Congress, and wrangles over ministerial positions among the smaller coalescing parties.

³²See R. C. Prasad, "The Mid-Term Poll in Bihar", unpublished paper, June 1969, p. 10.

³³See Ibid., pp. 15-18; and Ramashray Roy, "Two Patterns of India's Mid-Term Elections", Asian Review, 2 July, 1969), 298-299 and 300-302.

³⁴The coalition was later joined by two more parties, i.e., the Shoshit Dal and the Hul Jharkhand Party.

The intra-party conflicts within the Congress centered around the issues of the Congress Legislature Party leadership and the inclusion of Kamakhya Narayan Singh, the Raja of Ramgarh and the de facto leader of the Janata Party, in the cabinet. The Big Three, though not members of the newly elected Congress Legislature Party, still held a great deal of influence with it, which became obvious when their common nominee Harihar Singh (a 70 year old and relatively obscure MLA from Shahabad district) was elected the party leader in spite of firm opposition by the Young Turks. Resentful of the "bossism" of the Big Three, the Young Turks never reconciled themselves with Singh's leadership and kept up a running battle against him, trying either to muster enough support to outvote him or to persuade the High Command of the desirability of his replacement by an "young and dynamic" leader committed to the "socialistic objectives" of the party. They also clamored about their "inadequate" representation in the Singh government, demanding at least 40 percent of the Congress share in the total coalition cabinet posts.³⁵

To embarrass the Chief Minister the Young Turks also picked up the issue of Congress party's "collaboration" with the "feudal" and "reactionary" Janata Party and of the inclusion in the cabinet of its leader, the Raja of Ramgarh, against whom the Supreme Court had passed a severe stricture

³⁵The Times of India, March 5 and 8, April 14, June 16, 1969.

in a recent judgement.³⁶ Much against his will, the Chief Minister was finally forced, at the instance of the High Command, to sacrifice the Raja and replace him by another Janata Party nominee.³⁷

The crucial factor that ultimately brought down the Congress-led coalition government was the behavior of the members of the smaller parties and the independents in it. The Chief Minister during his entire occupancy of office seemed almost wholly preoccupied with meeting their threats of withdrawal of support if they were not appointed ministers with important portfolios; he kept on periodically expanding his cabinet in "the interests of stability"³⁸ and without any regard to the needs of administration so much so that, when the government was voted out, 12 out of 25 cabinet ministers and all eight ministers of state had no portfolio at all. In spite of this free-for-all and excessive patronage, the Chief Minister was unable to stabilize the coalition because the inclusion of the leaders of the various smaller parties alone in the cabinet was not enough to keep the pot boiling. The groups had a tendency to go on splintering and producing new claimants to ministerial posts as a price for thier support. The process culminated in the fall of the government on June 20, 1969, when the Shoshit Dal, parts of the Jharkhand and

³⁶ Ibid., March 7, 1969.

³⁷ Ibid., March 29, 1969.

³⁸ Ibid., April 14, 1969.

Hul Jharkhand Parties, and three independents crossed the floor during the voting in the Vidhan Sabha on the budget demand for the Animal Husbandry Department.³⁹

THE PASWAN S.V.D. COALITION GOVERNMENT

Following the fall of the Congress-led coalition, another non-Congress SVD coalition government under the Chief Ministership of the LCD leader Bhola Paswan⁴⁰ was installed in office on June 22, 1969. The parties directly represented in the government were the LCD, the Jharkhand Party, the Shoshit Dal, and the BKD, in addition to a bloc of independents. It was a government of "local" parties supported from outside by the four major multi-state parties generally hostile to the Congress, i.e., the SSP, the Jana Sangh, the CPI, and the PSP. The four multi-state parties did not directly join the Paswan government, presumably in view of the uncertainty about the stability of the government. The tacit understanding appeared to be that they might join the government later on the basis of a definite time-bound program.⁴¹

The fate of the Paswan ministry appeared to hang in the balance from the beginning. The smaller parties which

³⁹The Indian Nation, June 21, 1969.

⁴⁰Paswan, it would be recalled, was also the Chief Minister of the second S.V.D. government in March 22 - June 25, 1968.

⁴¹The Times of India, June 23 & 24, 1969.

directly participated in the government were all groups of defectors from one party or another with no coherent ideology and program and no stable membership. For the most part their members had a record of frequently changing sides if lured by office.

The process of fission which had brought about the fall of the last government soon surfaced in the Paswan government as well and very soon assumed serious proportions. The 11 - member Jharkhand Party "expelled" its two leaders who had joined the Paswan government as ministers and demanded their replacement in the ministry by its fresh nominees. The six-member Shoshit Dal split into two groups each of them demanding their separate representation in the ministry. The six-member BKD appeared heading for a split with two of its members refraining from supporting the Paswan government and two others joining it as ministers.

As these bargainings and wranglings continued within the coalition, the Congress opposition was trying every tactic to topple the government. In response, the Chief Minister was also busy trying to encourage defections from the Congress to the SVD. Two Muslim Congress MLAs who defected to the SVD were promptly sworn in as ministers. At about the same time, the seven-member Christian Adivasi Hul Jharkhand Party, after extracting an assurance from the Chief Minister for setting up a regional planning and development board for the Chota Nagpur and Santhal Praganas region, decided to join the government.

Both these developments were opposed by the Jana Sangh, one of the four multi-state parties supporting the coalition from outside. The Jana Sangh, in the first place, wanted one of the two Muslim defectors to be included in the cabinet, and, secondly, it did not approve of the "separatist" demand of the Hul Jharkhand for a separate regional planning and development board for Chota Nagpur and Santhal Praganas. The Chief Minister took no cognizance of the Jana Sangh's displeasure and, as a result, the Jana Sangh withdrew its support from the government, charging the Chief Minister with "lust for power" and with promoting defections which could only "harm parliamentary democracy in the long run."⁴²

With the withdrawal of Jana Sangh's support the ruling coalition was reduced to a minority. On July 1, 1969, ten days after assuming office, Chief Minister Paswan resigned accusing the Jana Sangh of adopting "pressure tactics" to reduce representation of the minority communities in the government.⁴³

PRESIDENT'S RULE AND CONGRESS SPLIT

After the fall of the Paswan government, the Governor rejected the claim of the Congress opposition to form an alternate government and reported to the President of India that in his "considered opinion about 50 members of the

⁴²Ibid., July 2, 1969; and The Statesman, July 2 & 3, 1969.

⁴³The Times of India, July 2, 1969.

Assembly with a strength of 318 were unpredictable" and that "under the present circumstances it is not possible to hope for a stable government". He therefore recommended for a brief spell of President's rule in Bihar with the reservation that the Vidhan Sabha be kept in suspended animation rather than dissolved in order to provide the political parties and groups in the legislature an opportunity to realign in some durable pattern to form a stable government.⁴⁴

For about seven and a half months Bihar remained under the President's rule. Throughout this interregnum negotiations and search for coalition partners went on among the various parties.

A significant new development which occurred during this period was the split in the Indian National Congress leadership in the fall of 1969, between the New Congress led by the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, and the oldguard "Syndicate" or the Old Congress.⁴⁵

The split in the national leadership of the party created confusion in the Bihar Congress and it took some time for the Bihar leaders and the rank and file to decide which way to shift their allegiance. By and large, the Big Three in the Bihar Congress - K. B. Sahay, M. P. Sinha, and S. N. Sinha - minus most of their lower caste followers threw their

⁴⁴The Indian Nation, July 27, 1969.

⁴⁵For details see Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Congress in India: Crisis and Split", Asian Survey, X (March 1970), pp. 256-262.

lot with the Old Congress. The young Turks and the majority of Brahmans and lower castes joined the New Congress.⁴⁶

Numerically, the Gandhi Congress emerged as the stronger of the two. Of the 114 Congress MLAs in the Bihar Vidhan Sabha prior to the split, 69 declared their allegiance to the New Congress. They unanimously "expelled" Harihar Singh from the Congress Legislature Party leadership for his support of the Old Congress and elected the Young Turk D. P. Rai to replace him.⁴⁷

THE RAI CONGRESS-LED COALITION GOVERNMENT

Following his election as the New Congress Legislature Party leader, D. P. Rai started negotiations with the CPI, the PSP, the Jharkhand Party, the Shoshit Dal, The BKD, the Janata Party, and the LCD for a new coalition government.⁴⁸ These negotiations resulted in agreement on a 32 - point program, and a new coalition government under the Chief Ministership of D. P. Rai was sworn in on February 16, 1970. The coalition had the support of 117 MLAs in a house of 318.

⁴⁶Mrs. Gandhi herself is a Kashmiri Brahman and the National President of the New Congress, Jagjiwan Ram, is in a scheduled caste.

⁴⁷The Times of India, January 12, 1970. Rai, as would be recalled was formerly a lieutenant of B. Jha, the former Brahman Chief Minister, who defected from the Congress to form LCD in March 1968. Rai belonged to the backward Yadava caste.

⁴⁸The CPI and the PSP, which had hitherto subscribed to the SSP's strategy of "non-Congressism", now proceeded to revise their policies regarding their attitude toward coalition with the Congress in the light of the Congress split. Finding the New Congress more amenable than the Old Congress to leftist pressures and pulls, they adopted a strategy of "selective support" to the former in coalition governments. See Ibid., January 21 and February 4, 1970.

During the ten months that the Rai ministry remained in office the same pattern of intense factionalism in the leading party, inter-party tensions, and fission and fragmentation of the smaller parties within the coalition, which had characterized all previous coalitions, recurred. Contrary to the expectation that the 1969 split might make each splinter Congress more cohesive than before, factional conflicts within both soon reappeared. Factionalism within the New Congress was sparked by the election of the new legislative party leader soon after the party split. Though D. P. Rai was declared "unanimously" elected the new party leader, it was a unanimous election only in name. "Unanimity" resulted from the initiative of an emissary of the New Congress High Command, who ascertained the preferences of the MLAs and then had the majority preference proclaimed as the consensus of the legislative party. (The names of other contenders were kept secret in the "interests of party unity.") Thus Rai, the leader who emerged from this 'consensus' had the support only of a majority and not all of the MLAs.

The differences, however, could not be concealed for long. They surfaced as soon as Rai formed his government. Some important dissident leaders, including the deputy leader of the Congress legislature party (who had presumably contested and lost the leadership to Rai), were carefully excluded from the cabinet.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Ibid., February 28, 1970.

Enraged by Rai's action, the dissidents charged him with petty personal motives of trying to take control of the party by imposing his own men.⁵⁰ A few months later the dissidents presented a memorandum to the party's High Command, demanding an immediate change in the leadership of the legislative wing of the party on the ground that Rai was indulging in corrupt practices, casteism, nepotism, and favoritism, which were, they said, tarnishing the image of the party.⁵¹ The dissidents also charged the Chief Minister with playing into the hands of the communists and the smaller parties in the coalition, which, they said, were holding the coalition government to ransom.⁵²

Faced with this challenge from the dissidents within his own party, the Chief Minister was forced to look for support elsewhere, notably among the communist partners in the coalition and the opposition legislators belonging to the lower castes in general and his own Yadava caste in particular. Thus substance was added to some of the charges of the dissidents.

The New Congress High Command tried to make the dissidents give up their opposition to Rai's leadership in the interest of party unity and governmental stability, but failed.⁵³ The dissidents, whose ranks were gradually swelling,

⁵⁰ Ibid., May 25, 1970.

⁵¹ Ibid., October 13, 1970.

⁵² Ibid., October 17, 1970.

⁵³ Ibid., November 7, 1970.

made it known to the High Command that the unity of the party and stability of the coalition government would be threatened if their demands were not met.⁵⁴

This internal dissension within the New Congress weakened the Chief Minister's position both within his own party and within the coalition. It hampered his ability to maintain the ruling coalition because it compelled the Chief Minister to rely upon the smaller parties in the coalition and pay a disproportionate price for their support. The rift within the leading party in the coalition emboldened the smaller parties to make unreasonable demands upon the Chief Minister, something they probably would not have done had the Chief Minister enjoyed solid support within his own party. The CPI, for example, tried to enhance its leftist populist image by publicly pressuring the Chief Minister into taking steps to abolish the "vestiges of the Zamindari" of the Tata Iron and Steel Company in Jamshedpur, to check the "tyranny" of two big landlords in Bhagalpur and Purnea districts, and to fulfill the demands of the engineering workers of Jamshedpur.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Ibid., October 23, 1970. The demands of the dissidents included: (1) change of party's leadership; (2) speedy implementation of party's programs; (3) inquiry into the charges of corruption against the Chief Minister and one of his colleagues; (4) redress of members' grievances relating to their constituencies; and (5) restoring the confidence of civil servants shaken by a recent utterance of a Shoshit Dal backward caste Minister that upper caste officials would be replaced by officers belonging to the backward classes.

⁵⁵Ibid., April 2 and June 23, 1970.

Likewise, the PSP, the LCD, the Jharkhand Party, the Hul Jharkhand Party, the BKD, the Shoshit Dal and their splinters continually held the coalition government to ransom in order to get as many of their members as possible appointed as ministers.

In view of the foregoing narration it becomes obvious that the collapse of the Congress-led coalition was only a matter of time. The end came on December 18 over a non-confidence motion carried by 164 votes to 146. During the voting the Janata Party, the Jharkhand Party, the BKD, a faction of the Shoshit Dal, a rebel subgroup within the PSP, a number of Hul Jharkhand members, and four New Congress dissidents defected from the ruling coalition to the opposition.⁵⁶

⁵⁶Ibid., December 19, 1970.

CHAPTER VI

PARTY COHESION, DEVIANCE, AND DEFECTION

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter I I examined the potential impact--positive and negative--of some system-level and party-structural factors on party cohesion, and I discussed the case of the Bihar Pradesh Congress to determine how it fits into the more general pattern outlined. In the present chapter I wish to move the analysis to the micro level and consider some important variables that have bearing on the deviance of party members from their party's position, and on their defections from the party. In the second part of this chapter, some of these variables are operationalized in an attempt to explain defections from the Bihar Pradesh Congress during 1967-1970.

DEVIANCE AND DEFECTION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

A number of psychological and sociological factors may influence the behavior of an individual party member in regard to his adherence to or deviation from positions established by his party. There are, for example, such relevant factors to be considered here as the member's psychological or motivational orientation; external factors that make the persuance of the goal dictated by motives more

or less attractive or feasible for him; the degree of his dependence on personal, non-party political resources or on party-resources; factors promoting or hampering the development of group norms within the party; and variables helping or hindering a member's satisfaction with his position within the party.

Individuals may join a party for a variety of motives. Some of them may join the party primarily for material and psychological rewards of income, power, and status that the party can help them get, i.e., the "careerists" or "climbers." Others may affiliate with the party for promoting sectional interests they seek to represent or promote, i.e., the "advocates." Still others may join the party to advance and achieve through it some ideological or policy cause to which they are intensely devoted, i.e., the "crusaders" or "zealots." In actual cases these motives may partly overlap, but it seems plausible to talk about the predominant motive of a party member.

How do these predominant motives of political actors relate to party cohesion? Reducing them to a more generic two-fold classification in terms of "program" incentives and "status" incentives,¹ James L. Payne suggests that members

¹The term "status" incentives is used by Payne to refer to a type of political actors who have a heightened need for status, power, prestige and the like; they involve themselves in politics and party activity in pursuance of these basic needs or incentives. The term "program" incentives, on the contrary, is used to describe another type of political actors whose predominant motivation in politics is said to be satisfactions inherent in working for some desired policy

with program incentives ought to be expected to be less likely to deviate, and particularly to defect, from the party than those with status incentives. He makes this prediction on the assumption that the former receive satisfactions from working on programs and see their party as a vehicle for effecting them, whereas the latter are basically interested in using the party as an instrument for gaining office and therefore feel less constrained in defecting from the party than the former, provided that opportunities for gaining office appear more promising outside the party.²

Nevertheless, not all who feel motivated to deviate or defect actually take recourse to that act. There are obviously external factors affecting the possibility that a member motivated to deviate or defect from the party will actually do so. For, while the external factors may not cause the motive itself, they may have a mediating effect on defection by making a goal more or less attractive in terms of the costs involved and the possibility of its realization.

An important external factor that any deviant or defector must carefully weigh, for instance, is: whether he can afford to do what he is motivated to do. If the behavior in question is deviance short of defection, then he must

objectives. See James L. Payne, Patterns of Conflict in Colombia (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), Ch. 1, pp. 3-24.

²Ibid., p. 21.

calculate whether he can get away with it, i.e., whether he can escape disciplinary action or purge by the authoritative party elite. In general, it would appear that the probability of a party member deviating and getting away with it is a function primarily of three factors.

First, deviance starts becoming a disturbing though tolerable dissent when it exists as a fairly widespread phenomenon. That is, a deviant stand within a party has greater likelihood of success and exoneration for its upholders if it is shared by a sizeable section of the party membership, for there is safety in numbers. In such a situation, the authoritative party elite is more likely to adopt an accommodative, rather than a strict disciplinary posture toward the deviants. For in an event of an outright purge the party stands to lose a sizeable number of leaders and members, who, in turn, thanks to their numbers, can easily bargain with other parties or even consider forming one of their own.

The second point is somewhat related to the first. It states that chances of a member's getting away with a deviant behavior vary positively with the extent to which he is perceived by the party to be "important" in terms of the resources he brings to it. That is, the greater the value of the party member as perceived by the party, the more would the party be reluctant to purge him.

Thirdly, the prospects for a tolerant attitude on the part of the authoritative party elite toward deviance or

dissent by a party member are affected by yet another factor, i.e., the past "record" of the member with the party. If the member's past record with the party is on the credit side, that is, if he has been a party loyalist in the past, he can be to a certain extent allowed some "idiosyncrasy credit."³

If, on the other hand, the behavior in question is the extreme step of defection, the party member must take stock of the whole situation in terms of the prospects for his "survival" as an effective political actor. That is, in case he happens to be a legislator he must consider whether he can win back his seat despite severance of his relations with the party. Two different factors must figure prominently in his stock-taking: (1) the socioeconomic and political characteristics of his environment or constituency; and (2) the degree of his dependence on political resources of the party for achieving his political objectives.

Broadly speaking, two models of constituency versus party cross-pressure on the legislator can be identified. The first is the American model, which though characterized by a high party identification both on the part of the legislator and his electorate, allows or leaves much leeway in the enforcement of party discipline with the result that the norm of party regularity or loyalty on the part of the legislators is not very well-entrenched in the United States.

³The term is E. P. Hollander's, cited by Gilsdorf, op.cit., p.

Under such a condition, in an event of conflicting pressures from the party and the constituency, the legislators may, more often than not, resolve the conflict in favor of the latter. As Lewis A. Froman, Jr., observes:

The cost of ignoring . . . constituency pressures (defeat at the polls) is much more severe than the cost of ignoring party, executive, institutional, or even personal pressures, at least for most Congressmen in most situations. Even when constituency pressures are relatively ambiguous, the cost of not paying them at least some heed may mean trouble in the next elections.⁴

Another model of constituency versus party cross-pressure is provided by the British experience; it is characterized by a strongly partisan alignment in Parliament, the constituencies, and, to a lesser extent, in the broader public, and a rather strict enforcement of party discipline in the Parliament so that the "contemporary British House of Commons has no place either for an independent (completely without formal party affiliation) or for an independent Laborite or an independent Conservative."⁵

It goes without saying that the American model provides a better facilitating condition for a party member predisposed toward defection to actually defect from the party than the British one, for in the latter case the costs involved would appear to be too high in terms of his future political

⁴Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 9.

⁵This is the theme of the works of Leon D. Epstein on the topic. See particularly his "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," op. cit.; and British Politics in the Suez Crisis (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964). The quote is from the former, p. 135.

career.

Another factor that a party defector must weigh is the extent of his dependence on his personal, non-party political resources or on those of his party. Political resources may include many things such as political charisma, control over economic resources, high social and political status outside the party, membership in a politically strategic social group, and so on. Now as to the distribution of political resources, we can here conceive of a continuum at the one end of which are party members who, by and large, derive their status and power by virtue of their membership or position within the party, and at the other end are those who, for the most part, enjoy these benefits by virtue of personal qualities of leadership, higher social status external to the party, and economic and political resources independent of the party. We are, then, speaking of a continuum along the dimension of "party-positional" power and status and extra-party, "personal" power and status of party members.

Whether a legislator's power and status is party-positional or personal may have significant effect on his behavior vis-a-vis defection. In general one ought to expect that if a member's status is party-positional he would be less likely to deviate or defect from the party than one with a local prestige and status of his own. Conversely the greater the dependence of the party member on his personal, non-party political resources, the higher the probability of

deviation and defection from the party line in case of conflict between the pressures coming from the party and those from other sources.⁶ This prediction is based on the theory that a member with little personal political resources will find himself in a position of greater dependence on party resources than one with considerable personal resources, and will therefore be more likely to conform and comply to the party than the latter.

A final set of factors affecting party cohesion I wish to consider here relates to the party itself. For analytic convenience these variables can be grouped under two broad headings: (1) those that promote or impede the development of norms favoring party regularity and party identification; and (2) those that lead to satisfactions or dissatisfactions of party members. To begin with the first category, two factors appear to be particularly relevant here, viz., the degree of a party member's interaction with other members and the rate of membership turnover within the party (particularly relevant in the context of the legislative wing of the party). The first variable enters into the hypothesis that a member's loyalty to his party should vary positively with the degree of his interaction with other members of the party. This proposition is based on the supposed psychological effects of participation in a group on the participants suggested by a number of sociopsychological studies of group

⁶Giltsdorf, op. cit., pp. 351-352.

phenomena. It has been found that when individuals interact in a group, such interactions lead to a group frame of reference or norm. The emergence of the group norm, in turn, leads to a selfperpetuating process of standardization of attitudes and behaviors of the individuals comprising the group. This pressure toward conformity to the group norm stems from the psychological need felt by most individuals to reduce the uneasiness of a "cognitive dissonance" between their veiws and the views of the group and thereby facilitates the testing of validity of their own views and their own acceptance and recognition by the group. This pressure to conform should be particularly more effective if the group holds a high degree of attractiveness for its members either as a source of power and prestige or as a vehicle for desired sociopolitical reform and change.⁷

So far as membership turnover within a group is concerned, it can be hypothesized that the lower the rate of turnover, the higher the prospects for development of norms favoring party loyalty and regularity. Two considerations lead to this proposition. First, as already indicated, high turnover is productive of a situation with no norms, or, at

⁷Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 22-45; Leon Festinger and Elliot Aronson, "Aroused Social Reduction of Dissonance in Social Contexts," in Dorwin Cartright and Alvin Zander (eds.), Group Dynamics (New York: Harper & Row, 1968, 3rd edition), pp. 125-136; and William W. Lambert and Wallace E. Lambert, Social Psychology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 86-104.

least, a high cost in terms of recruiting and socializing new members into the group folkways, for fluidity of membership "prevents the growth of mutual emotional investment."⁸

Second, membership regularity over a considerable length of time may, to a certain extent, indicate that the members in question have been either generally compliant to the group norms or only moderately deviant so that they either did not invite disciplinary action at all or could survive the sifting out of nonconformists. In any case, membership regularity for a longer period should carry better prospects for the member's socialization into the group folkways.

Of the intraparty factors affecting satisfactions or dissatisfactions of party members, two appear to be important here. First, in general, positions of high status and power within the party carry certain definite advantages, and therefore ought to be satisfying to the holders of such positions. As Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow aptly remark:

To state that high power members are more satisfied with their experience in the group is, in a sense, to summarize all that has been said about power to this point.⁹

However, a high status position within the party, particularly in its legislative wing, to be used as a measure

⁸Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 182.

⁹Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Process for Decision-Making (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 204.

of party members' satisfying association with the party must be used in combination with another factor, namely, members' seniority or length of service with the party. Otherwise it may lead to misleading conclusions. For example, a freshman legislator may be satisfied with the position of being a backbencher, but one with several terms of experience may not. A legislator having been appointed a junior minister for the first time in the government formed by his party may find the position satisfying, but one who has served as a junior minister for several terms may feel aggrieved if at an "appropriate" time he is not promoted to a higher rank in the ministry. The crucial thing here seems to be the perception of the legislator himself regarding the self and his position within the party. Put more simply, expectations of status increase over time.

Second, it should be expected that a member's satisfaction would vary positively with the degree of his participation in the decision-making processes within the party. To a certain extent, this proposition is a corollary of the first one in that the members with higher status and power would also be those who participate more in the decision-making processes within the party. This relationship is often explained by reference to the fact that member satisfaction is higher in groups with participatory and democratic decision-making processes than in groups with autocratic processes.¹⁰

¹⁰Verba, op. cit., chs. 9 and 10.

DEFLECTIONS FROM THE BIHAR CONGRESS,

1967 - 1970

In the present part of this chapter I propose to use some of the variables specified in the first part to explain defections from the Bihar Pradesh Congress. More specifically, I shall attempt to operationalize the following factors that seem likely to be positively or negatively associated with defection: (1) the degree of the member's dependence on personal, non-party political resources or on party-resources, operationalized by his electoral margin and his caste; (2) his greater or lesser socialization into group or party norms, operationalized by his legislative seniority; (3) his satisfaction or lack of it with his position within the party, operationalized by his cabinet status; and (4) a particular combination of these factors.¹¹

The universe of the legislators to be analysed here consists of the Congress Members of the Bihar Legislative Assembly (MLAs) during 1967 - 1970. There were two elections during this period, i.e., in 1967 and 1969. In the former year the Congress elected 128 MLAs. Only 40 of them survived

¹¹Given limitations on data, particularly on survey data, some of the variables specified in the preceding part could not be operationalized. While the possible effect on defection of these other variables not included or controlled by this study is recognized, the analysis that follows primarily seeks to explore and assess as to what degree the variables actually operationalized by this study are relevant factors for explaining defections from the Bihar Pradesh Congress.

through the 1969 nominations and elections, and they were reinforced with 78 new incumbents. There were, then, 128 Congress MLAs in the first period, 119 in the second, and 206 who served at some time during the entire period. There are thus, in effect, two groups of MLAs to be examined here: the pre-1969 ones and the post-1969 ones. Moreover, the analysis to be presented here concerns itself with the more general question of defection during the two periods rather than the specific defection patterns, i.e., defection in given cases.

Data on the MLAs included in this study have been collected from the various official and non-official documents, yearbooks, newspapers, personal data files of some American students of Indian politics, and some informants in Bihar through correspondence.

Party Versus Personal Political Resources and Defection

For reasons outlined in the preceding part of this chapter. I hypothesize that the Congress MLAs with a greater dependence on personal resources independent of the party would be more likely to defect from the party than those with a greater dependence on the party's political resources.

While there could be many indicators of party versus personal political resources, I intend to utilize higher electoral margin and upper caste status of an MLA as two indices of his personal political resources.

A few remarks regarding the appropriateness of electoral margin and caste as indicators of varying degrees of dependence on the party's resources are in order. The selection of higher electoral percentage obtained by the MLA in the preceding election as an index of his personal political resources indicates that I am assuming the existence of a great deal of "candidate-voting" in Bihar as opposed to "party-voting." The experience of some double-member constituencies in the elections of 1952 and 1957 seems to support my assumption. In quite a number of such constituencies the phenomena of split-ticket voting and of great differences between the votes cast for the candidates belonging to the same party were evident. Moreover, the voters, especially in the rural areas but even in some urban areas, seem to be influenced more by the personality and caste affiliation of the candidates than by their party labels, and "outside some urban areas there are few safe party seats in which any candidate with the "right" party label is virtually assured of success."¹² Furthermore, the parties in general prefer candidates who are capable of managing their own election expenses, as the party usually makes a very meagre contribution toward their campaign fund.¹³ For all these reasons most MLAs are generally not dependent on the party for getting elected. This can be

¹²See Myron Weiner and Rajni Kothari (eds.), Indian Voting Behavior: Studies of the 1962 General Elections (Calcutta: Firma K. S. Mukhopadhyay, 1965); and Forrester, op. cit., The quote is from the latter, p. 1085.

¹³Forrester, op. cit., p. 1087.

expected to considerably reduce party control over the legislators, at any rate in the case of those who can count upon their high vote-getting ability. These considerations clearly lead to the hypothesis that the MLAs having a larger electoral majority would be more likely to defect from the party than those with a smaller electoral margin.

The selection of an MLA's upper caste status as an index of his "personal political resources" is based on the fact that caste membership in India, particularly in a predominantly rural state like Bihar, is a great determinant of an individual's socioeconomic status. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the socioeconomic environment of Bihar is marked by a great degree of inequality in favor of the upper castes. My observations in that chapter would clearly support the argument that the lower castes are less likely to possess independent political resources than the upper castes. This is particularly true of the scheduled castes who happen to be at the lowest level of socioeconomic status. Indeed, had there not been constitutional provisions for reserved seats for them in the state and national legislatures they might well have remained a politically apathetic and inarticulate social groups for a long time to come.¹⁴ These considerations clearly suggest the hypothesis that the MLAs belonging to the lower castes, in general, and the scheduled castes, in particular, are likely to be considerably less "independent" as party members, and, therefore, less prone to defect from the party than those belonging to an upper caste.

¹⁴See on this point, Ibid., p. 1086.

When the hypothesis suggesting a positive association between higher electoral margin and defection is put to empirical test, we find some support for it, though at a rather low level of significance. Table VIII shows that defection tends to vary directly with electoral margin during the two periods analysed here, though the effect of the independent variable varies from almost negligible during 1967 - 1969 ($\text{Gamma} = .07$) to quite a bit during 1969 - 1970 ($\text{Gamma} = .34$).¹⁵ The associations during both the periods are, however, not sufficiently strong and are not shown to be statistically significant (See the Chi-Square values in the table).¹⁶

When the original relationship between electoral margin and defection during the first period is re-examined, controlling for legislative seniority, it remains largely unchanged and no significantly relevant pattern emerges. This indicates that legislative seniority has no significant effect on the association between electoral margin and the 1967 - 1969 defections, and that the association between the latter two variables originally found is probably sound, at any rate

¹⁵Gamma can be interpreted as a proportional reduction in error in estimating order on one variable from order on another. The computation of Gamma and its interpretation is reported in John H. Muller *et al.*, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970, 2nd ed.), pp. 279-292.

¹⁶For computation and interpretation of Chi-Square, see Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), Ch. 15.

TABLE VIII

Defection by Electoral Margin in Preceding Election

		% Vote in Preceding Election ^a		
		High	Medium-High	Medium-Low
				Low
% Defecting 1967-69 ^b		27.6	17.6	17.6
N =		(29)	(34)	(34)
$\chi^2 = 1.26$; 3df, N. S.				
Gamma = .07				
% Defecting 1969-70 ^c		9.8	0.0	6.9
N =		(41)	(41)	(21)
$\chi^2 = 4.71$; 3df, N. S.				
Gamma = .34				

a For each of the elections, 1967 and 1969, the MLAs were divided as evenly as possible into quartiles.

b Only defections from 1967-1969 and Congress MLAs actually in the Assembly were considered here.

c Only defections from 1969-1970 and Congress MLAs in the Assembly during that period are considered.

uncontaminated by this control.

When one stratifies the original association between electoral margin and defections during the second period by the same test factor as above, i.e., legislative seniority, one finds that the original association is slightly strengthened among the freshmen legislators ($\text{Gamma} = .55$), and is made to almost disappear among those with legislative seniority of one term, while no defections whatsoever occurred among those having legislative seniority of two or three terms. This suggests that the original association between electoral margin and the 1960 - 1970 defections, besides being weak, is also deficient otherwise, if not spurious. As will be later seen, much more light is cast on the subject by the control factor itself.

Now coming to the hypothesis positing a positive association between caste and defection, the findings seem to support it, though the relationship is not uniformly strong across the two patterns of defections analysed here. The association is shown to be statistically significant in regard to the 1967 - 1969 defections, but nonsignificant in regard to the 1969 - 1970 defection patterns (Table IX).

The relationship between caste and defection during the first period, when controlled for electoral margin in the preceding election, is increased among the high and low vote-getters ($\text{Gamma} = 1.0$ in each case), and considerably reduced or made to almost disappear at the mid-levels of electoral margin. Thus caste and electoral margin interact

TABLE IX

Defection by Caste

Defection Pattern	<u>Caste</u>	
	Upper Castes	Lower Castes
% Defecting 1967-69	32.1	14.3
N =	(53)	(28)
	$\chi^2 = 7.03; 2 \text{ df, significant, } p < .05$	
	Gamma = .54	
% Defecting 1969-70	4.0	0.0
N =	(50)	(27)
	$\chi^2 = 1.55; 2\text{df, N. S.}$	
	Gamma = .05	

a Since the Muslims and the scheduled tribes do not form parts of the Hindu caste system, Congress MLAs belonging to these groups have been excluded from the present analysis. Defections among these communities are briefly noted in a footnote below.

as reinforcing variables, each exercising some independent influence of its own on defection. But whereas the association between caste and defection is linear, that between electoral margin and defection is curvilinear. That is, the legislators at the highest and the lowest levels of electoral margins were more likely to defect than those at the mid-levels. While the greater likelihood of defection at the highest levels of electoral margin is, of course, expected in the light of our earlier hypothesis relating electoral margin and defection, the same finding in the case of the lowest level of electoral margin is baffling and inconsistent with the said hypothesis. This finding obviously underlines the limitations of the said hypothesis and the need for an alternative explanation of this baffling result. Presumably, both the highest and the lowest levels of electoral margin should lead to increased probability of defection, but for different reasons. Among the high vote-getters the feeling of greater confidence in their ability to win back their seats and greater subjective reliance on personal political resources independent of the party should increase the probability of defection. The same result may, however, follow from a different psychological path among the lowest vote-getters; it may well be that uncertainty regarding the chances of their being returned to the legislature may induce them to make the best out of their current legislative career in terms of managing to get for themselves high status positions within the legislature, if they can. Since all

Congress defectors were promised and most of them actually given ministerial positions in the rival non-Congress coalition government this line of reasoning appears quite plausible.

During the second period, the test factor of electoral margin makes a pattern of relationship between caste and defection to emerge where there was an almost negligible one in the uncontrolled table. Thus a strong positive association between caste and defection is found among the high vote-getters ($\text{Gamma} = 1.0$) and a strong negative one among the medium-low vote getters ($\text{Gamma} = -1.0$), while no defections at all occurred under the rest of the control conditions. That is, upper caste status and higher electoral margin seem to interact together as reinforcing variables in producing defection, at least in the case of those with the highest level of electoral margin.¹⁷

Legislative Seniority and Defection

For reasons considered in the first part of this chapter, I hypothesize that the longer the legislative seniority of the MLA (measured by the number of terms served in the legislature), the less the likelihood of his defection from the party.

¹⁷As already mentioned, the Muslim and Scheduled tribe MLAs were not included in the above analysis because these groups do not form a part of the Hindu caste hierarchy. The rate of defection among these groups and the Hindu castes taken together are presented in Table X below.

TABLE X

Defection by Community

Community	Defection Pattern	
	1967-1969	1969-1970
Hindu Castes	21.7%	3.3%
N =	(106)	(92)
Muslims	12.5	23.1
N =	(8)	(13)
Scheduled Tribes	21.4	0.0
N =	(14)	(6)

The findings do not provide a consistent support for the above hypothesis. Table XI shows that the two patterns of defections analysed here yield conflicting results. Whereas the 1967-1969 patterns of defection clearly vitiate the hypothesis by showing a relationship opposite to that posited therein ($\text{Gamma} = .28$), the 1969 - 1970 patterns lend some support to it ($\text{Gamma} = -.47$). Both the relationships are, however, weak and statistically nonsignificant.

When the relationship between legislative seniority and the 1967 - 1969 defections is reconsidered, controlling for electoral margin in the preceding election, the original association is largely maintained and no significantly relevant variations are found.

TABLE XI

Defection by Legislative Seniority

Defection Pattern	LEGISLATIVE SENIORITY		
	2 or 3 Terms	1 Term	Freshmen
§ Defecting 1967-69 N =	27.0 (37) $\chi^2 = 2.88; 2df, N. S.$ Gamma = .28	24.4 (45)	13.0 (46)
§ Defecting 1969-70 N =	0.0 (31) $\chi^2 = 2.23; 2df, N. S.$ Gamma = -.47	6.7 (30)	6.7 (58)

As regards the 1969 - 1970 defection patterns, the original inverse relationship between legislative seniority and defection, when controlled for electoral margin, is more or less maintained under each control condition, thus confirming the observed relationship in the source table.

The inconsistent findings for the two periods pertaining to the above hypothesis make one wonder whether the factor that influences an individual to become a defector in one period may act upon others in another period to produce loyalists. Perhaps different independent variables may distinguish better between the defectors and regulars in each period. Perhaps our reasoning regarding legislative seniority leading to socialization into group norms or party loyalty is untenable or, at any rate, tenuous. Our findings certainly question the logical deduction that longevity of party membership or legislative seniority will necessarily lead to socialization into party loyalty or affective commitment to it. The pre-1969 defection pattern directs our attention to the alternative explanation that probably the longer legislative experience was not necessarily socializing the MLAs into group norms or party loyalty. Instead, longevity of service might well have represented or led to building of personal political resources in terms of political acumen, personal contacts, and publicity and fame. The defectors had probably gone along with the party previously for expedient reasons, and were essentially opportunists who, when their loyalty to the party came under strain, thought that they

had enough resources and political pulls to leave the Congress without gravely endangering their political career.

Cabinet Status and Defection

In the first part of this chapter, I suggested the hypothesis that, other things being equal, the high status members within the party ought to be expected to be more conforming, i.e., less prone to defect, than those who do not hold such positions.

The high status intraparty position could be operationalized in a number of ways. It could be measured, for example, in terms of a party member's holding of executive committee membership of the parliamentary and/or organizational wings of the party. It could be measured also in terms of his membership in the government formed by the party, if and when it happened to be in power.

For lack of complete data on other indicators of intraparty status positions, I base my analysis here solely on an MLA's position in the Congress ministries either in the past or during the period under study.

Table XII, which displays the relationship between cabinet status and defection, does not provide consistent support for the above hypothesis. The negative association between high cabinet status and defections predicted by the hypothesis holds for the 1969 - 1970 defection patterns, though it remains statistically nonsignificant. However, the 1967 - 1969 defections disconfirm the hypothesis at a level of significance between .10 and .05.

TABLE XII

Defection by Cabinet Status

Defection Pattern	Minister	CABINET STATUS	
		Junior Minister	Backbencher
% Defecting 1967-69	43.8	18.8	17.7
N =	(16)	(16)	(96)
$\chi^2 = 5.65; 2 \text{ df, Significant, } .107 > .05$ Gamma = .37			
% Defecting 1969-70	0.0	0.0	5.7
N =	(5)	(9)	(105)
$\chi^2 = 0.84; 2 \text{ df, N. S.}$ Gamma = -1.0			

The relationships between cabinet status and defection during both periods, when legislative seniority is held constant, are more or less maintained and no significant variations are found.¹⁸

This discrepant finding, like the similar inconsistent finding regarding the "legislative seniority" hypothesis examined earlier, seems to question our assumptions and reasonings leading to the hypothesis being considered here. The argument regarding the status positions being given to party members as rewards for their loyalty and longevity of service might not, indeed, have always held during the period preceding the 1967 - 1969 term. Probably status was something passed out for reasons of resources, electoral support, etc., the MLA brought to the party. It was probably also given out to appease the dissidents and keep the party cohesive. After the unprecedented electoral defeat of the party in 1967, MLAs with such positions hastened to find positions elsewhere. They were also attracted to other parties and groups for the positions they were not getting in the Congress. The fact that most of the Congress defectors found themselves immediately sworn in as ministers or junior ministers with indications of such positions for more of them in the non-Congress SVD governments does suggest that defection offered

¹⁸ The reversal of the original relationship for the 1967 - 1969 period among the freshmen legislators should be discounted, for, in general, the likelihood of holding of cabinet status by people within this subgroup is very slim.

to the Congress dissidents immediate opportunities for holding ministerial positions outside the party.

To summarize the discussion to this point, during the first term the most important independent variable influencing defection appears to be caste, which affords 54 percent reduction in the error involved in predicting defection from the knowledge of caste of the MLAs (Table XIII). Next to caste come cabinet status and legislative seniority (Gamma = .37 and .28, respectively), while electoral margin seems to have little, if any, effect on defection (Gamma = .07).

The patterns of influence exercised by the four variables on defection during the second period changes quite a bit from that found during the first period (Table XII). The first notable change to be observed is that whereas cabinet status and legislative seniority were positively associated with defection during the first term, it tends to vary inversely with them during the second period (Gamma = -1.0 and -.34, respectively). In addition, they become the most potent independent factors among the ones included in this analysis. Moreover, caste, which was strongly associated with defection during the first term, declines to a negligible level (Gamma = .05), and electoral margin, which had little effect on defection during the first term, comes to exercise considerable influence on it (Gamma = .34).

TABLE XIII
Summary of Associations Between Defection and Independent Variables,
1967 - 69 and 1969 - 70

Independent Variable	1967 - 69 (Gamma Value)	1969 - 70 (Gamma Value)
Electoral Margin	.07	.34
Caste	.54	.05
Legislative Seniority	.28	-.47
Cabinet Status	.37	-1.0

Combinations of Independent Variables and Defection

In this concluding section, I propose to analyse the effect of particular combinations of independent variables on defection patterns during the two periods. Table XIV shows that the cells representing the high caste status, low legislative seniority, and high cabinet status, irrespective of electoral margin, seem to provide the most potent combination of factors during the first term. Moreover, in general, a high score on each successive variable seems to progressively increase the probability of defection, whereas the reverse tends to happen with a low score on each successive variable. Thus the rate of defection among those scoring high on caste is 32.1 percent; among those scoring high on both caste and legislative seniority 35.0 percent; among those scoring high on cabinet status as well, in addition to the two earlier variables, 35.7 percent; and among those with high scores on all variables 37.5. Similarly, the proportion of defectors among those low on caste is 13.2 percent; among those low on both caste and legislative seniority 10.3 percent; among those low on caste, legislative seniority, and cabinet status 11.4 percent; and among those low on all the four variables 9.7 percent.

During the second period no clear and consistent pattern emerges when one examines the effects of the various combinations of independent variables on defection, presumably because the number of defectors is so small. The variations are so marginal and interspersed that any inference from them

TABLE XIV

Defection by Caste, Legislative Seniority, Cabinet Status, and

Electoral Margin, 1967 - 1969

1967 - 1969 MLAs^a

CASTE ^b & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW	
	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW
	32.1 (53)										13.2 (53)	
LEGISLATIVE SENIORITY ^c & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW	
	35.0 (20)		30.3 (33)		21.4 (14)						10.3 (39)	
CABINET STATUS ^d & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW	
	35.7 (14)	33.3 (6)	100.0 (3)	23.2 (30)	25.0 (8)	16.7 (6)	0.0 (4)	11.4 (35)				
ELECTORAL MARGIN ^e & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW	
	37.5 (8)	33.3 (6)	33.3 (0)	4.6 (6)	40.0 (3)	25.0 (2)	25.0 (4)	0.0 (4)	25.0 (4)	0.0 (4)	25.0 (4)	9.7 (31)

a Since the Muslims and the Scheduled tribes do not constitute parts of the Hindu caste system, 22 cases belonging to these categories were excluded from analysis.

b The category Low here includes both the scheduled and non-scheduled lower castes.

c High = 2 or 3 terms. Low = one term and freshmen.

d High = Minister and Junior Minister. Low = Backbencher.

e High = 50% vote or above. Low = Lowest to 49.9% vote.

TABLE XV

Defection by Caste, Legislative Seniority, Cabinet Status, and

Electoral Margin, 1969 - 1970

1969 - 1970 MLAs ^a													
CASTE ^b & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		
	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	
	8.2 (49)										2.4 (42)		
LEGISLATIVE SENIORITY ^c & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		
	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	
	6.3 (16)		6.1 (33)		0.0 (11)		0.0 (11)				3.2 (31)		
CABINET STATUS ^d & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		
	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	
	0.0 (5)	0.0 (11)		6.1 (33)	0.0 (6)		0.0 (6)		0.0 (5)	0.0 (2)		3.5 (29)	
ELECTORAL MARGIN ^e & Defecting N =	HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		
	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	
	0.0 (1)	0.0 (4)	0.0 (3)	0.0 (8)	- (0)	14.3 (7)	3.9 (26)	0.0 (1)	0.0 (5)	0.0 (2)	0.0 (3)	3.9 (26)	

^a Since the Muslims and the Scheduled tribes do not constitute parts of the Hindu caste system 19 MLAs belonging to these groups were excluded. So were 8 cases of Hindu MLAs whose caste could not be ascertained.

^b The category Low here includes both the scheduled and non-scheduled castes.

^c High = 2 or 3 terms. Low = 1 term and Freshmen.

^d High = Ministers and Junior Ministers. Low = Backbenchers.

^e High = 50% vote or above. Low = Lowest to 49.9% vote.

does not seem to be free from misleading interpretations (Table XV).

While the present study of Congress defectors does increase our understanding of the phenomena of deviance and defection from the party, it does not obviously systematically exhaust the explanatory potential of a host of other factors than the four here employed. As already mentioned, the data at hand did not permit the inclusion of all factors that theoretically recommended themselves as relevant in explaining the phenomena of deviance and defection. Moreover, one should also allow the possibility that probably some other indicators of the factors than those actually employed in our analysis would prove to be better predictors of defection. The findings presented here thus underline the need for a more inclusive explanatory nexus employing a wider configuration of environmental and individual--specific attitudinal and behavioral factors.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, this study analysed the problem of party cohesion in the Bihar Pradesh Congress. Defining the Congress against a wide range of conceptual and theoretical models, the study delineated its principal characteristics as a party, putting it within the context of its sociopolitical milieu and examining its adaptive response to its environment. The Congress emerged from the analysis as a highly adaptive, pragmatic, catch-all, dominant, and branch-type mass party with a fairly articulated organization and stratarchical or segmentary authority structure. It originated and developed as a national movement for independence in conditions of relative non-clandestinity and under a leadership committed to democracy, and since India's independence within the framework of a parliamentary and federal constitutional setup operating through a plurality electoral system. One dimension of the environmental context common to both these periods of party growth was, of course, the social structure and political culture of its locale, Bihar, characterized by an essentially heterogeneous and agglomerative character.

The historical circumstances under which the Congress grew and the sociopolitical milieu in which it operated significantly influenced its character as a party. The

historical experience of leading a grand coalitional national independence movement, for example, turned it into a dominant party and imparted to it the features of a success-oriented, catch-all party, thus obviating, if not fully vitiating, the effects of the societal cleavages on the one-party dominant system of Bihar of which it formed the centerpiece.¹

Moreover, the fact that as a national movement the Congress developed under conditions of relative non-clandestinity did not necessitate the creation of an organization based on cell or militia, which the national movements developing under some sort of authoritarian and professional revolutionary leadership in clandestine conditions did tend to create.²

The heterogeneity of the sociocultural environment in which the party operates and the evidence of its maximal adaptation to it in the sense of its acquiring a support structure and leadership recruitment base cutting across all conceivable social and regional cleavages indicated that the prospects of conflicts and tensions within the party would be maximized. For promiscuous accommodation of diverse social groups leads to tension between the party's twin goals of

¹For a good discussion of the various conditions for the appearance of one-party dominant systems, see Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), ch. 4, "One-Party Dominance: A Model," pp. 63-71. Note that social homogeneity is not found to be a necessary condition for such a system.

²See Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), Ch. 14; Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), ch. 1; and Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties" in Weiner and LaPalombara (eds.), op. cit., pp. 31-32.

adaptation with its external environment and maintenance of internal organizational cohesion. Parties based on narrower and more intense solidarities such as the early socialist parties, the communist parties, and the fascist parties have fewer reasons that are likely to put their members' loyalty to the party under strain. For, in addition to being based on class or narrow communal consciousness, such parties also make use of more effective organizational and procedural techniques specifically geared to keep party unity and discipline at a high level. These include centralized authority structure, organizational structure based on cells or militia, restrictive recruitment systems, gradual or phased exposure of the neophyte to the party's "esoteric" image, and large-scale occasional purges.³

The Congress, of course, functioned without many of these admitted psychological and organizational advantages in relation to party cohesion available to the working class and fascist parties. But it did have the benefit of some other factors conducive to party cohesion. It has, for example, a considerably articulated organization, with its basic units integrated through vertical rather than horizontal linkages, similar to the British Labor Party, which would appear to increase the likelihood of the party's cohesive performance.⁴

³Duverger, op. cit., chs. 1-2; and Gabriel A. Almond, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), chs. 1-3.

⁴See Duverger, op. cit., pp. 40-60; Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics," op. cit., pp. 43-45; and Duncan MacRae, Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946-1958 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 55-57.

Moreover, the Congress competes with other parties under a plurality electoral system and employs a centralized procedure of candidate selection giving the final say in the matter to the party's national leadership, which would seem to enhance the prospects of cohesion within the party.⁵ Finally and probably most importantly, the party operates within the framework of the parliamentary form of government, which has been found to produce cohesive legislative parties, regardless of the number of parties in the system, in varying circumstances in terms of time and locale. Underlying this relationship is the greater functional need for stabilizing the executive under the parliamentary system as compared to the presidential one based on the separation of powers.⁶ All these factors would appear to enhance the prospects for cohesive performance by the Congress party.

⁵See May, op. cit., p. 228; and Austin Ranney, Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain (Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), pp. 271-272. The same result may, however, be obtained, as Ranney's own data about the two major British parties indicate, even by a candidate selection process that formally vests power in the constituency associations with only supervisory powers of the national organization. This results from the local activists' insistence that "their candidates give the national leaders loyal support both on the hustings and in the House" (p. 271).

⁶The most elaborate and persuasive statement of the theory is found in Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, op. cit., ch. 12, where an impressive array of evidence is adduced in support of it in a comprehensive comparative analysis of a vast number of political systems. The only deviant case found is France under the Third and the Fourth Republics which is more or less treated as an exception proving the rule.

Our expectations seem indeed to be fulfilled, at any rate during the first two decades of the working of parliamentary government in Bihar. Thus, despite the proliferation of factions within the Congress, it displayed, at least upto 1967, a remarkable cohesion within the legislature. Forming a government, to be sure, involved a great deal of interfactional bargaining and compromises over its composition, almost invariably inviting intervention and mediation from the party's national executive or the High Command. But once a government was established, cohesion in support of it was always forthcoming. No measure of the government was ever defeated because of rebellious voting of the Congress MLAs and no Congress government was ever defeated on that account until after the 1967 elections. Moreover, in spite of factional conflicts, the Congress managed to cope fairly well with the critical test of interfactional succession or transfer of power three times during the period. On each such occasion the organizational coherence of the party was maintained, as the major factions, including those losing the contest, continued to cooperate and compete among themselves within the organizational framework of the party rather than defect from it.

However, the situation changed radically after the 1967 general elections in which the Congress lost its majority. For the first time since independence dissidence within the party over pre-election selection of candidates and over post-election competition for the Congress Legislature Party

leadership tended to express itself in the form of defection from the party. Despite its plurality the party was decisively prevented from forming a coalition government under its leadership on account of the uncooperative attitude of the dissident factions, and later, when it did form coalition governments, either with its indirect support or under its direct leadership, they were ultimately toppled on account of defections from the party.

The post-1967 party system of Bihar thus seems to add another deviant case, alongside the Third and Fourth French Republics, to Leon D. Epstein's theory that the parliamentary system of government provides a sufficient condition for the development of cohesive legislative parties. Of course, one should make allowance for the possibility that probably this lapse in the cohesive performance of the Congress and other parties in Bihar is only a temporary phase characteristic of a period of realignment occasioned by the transformation of the party system of the state from a one-party dominant to a multiparty system. But however short this deviant phase may be, it does reduce the strength of the seemingly determining relationship between the parliamentary form of government and cohesive legislative parties.

Moreover, the case of the Congress also casts some doubt on the durability of an independence movement as a catalyst for party loyalty and commitment. It suggests that even if such eclectic mass movements transform themselves into political parties, the dictates of maximization of support

continue to receive priority over maintenance of cohesion. In other words, the quantity of members or supporters still counts more than their quality, giving credence to the assumption that excessive accommodation is a characteristic concomitant of excessive permissiveness. When such a mass movement accedes to the position of the ruling party after the attainment of independence, it tends, in fact, to become even more composite and broad-based, as even those elements traditionally opposed to it are commonly drawn into it. Riding the bandwagon, an increasing number of political entrepreneurs are drawn into such a movement-turned party, as the risks of participation disappear and rewards become more tangible. Many of those whose commitment to its policies and organization are facile and suspect come to join it, with the result that once the party seems to be losing its dominance in competitive elections, the chances of defection and fragmentation are enhanced. For the party is no longer perceived as the sole dispenser of rewards and deprivations.⁷

However, the general explanation of increased chances of the lack of cohesion in the Congress, and particularly defection from it, suggested above, leaves much to be explained.

⁷For a similar trend in parties originating in national independence movements elsewhere, see Zolberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23; contributions of Lucina W. Pye, Myron Weiner, James S. Coleman and Dunkwart Rustow to Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Lucian W. Pye, Southeast Asia's Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), ch. 6.

It does not, for example, take account of the fact that only certain party members defected and not others. An attempt at providing a more specific and systematic explanation of the defections led us into a discussion of several factors thought to be logically involved in the phenomena of party deviance and defection. In particular, the theoretical relevance of such factors as the member's incentive system; the extent of his dependence on personal non-party or party political resources; his political participation and organizational involvement within the party; his intraparty and extraparty status; his length of party membership and legislative seniority; and the nature of his socioeconomic environment were explored.

For lack of systematic and complete data on all the variables mentioned above, only a selected number of them were included in the empirical analysis. With the data at hand, the defections of the Congress MLAs during 1967 - 1970 were examined in the light of the four following independent variables: (1) the MLA's electoral margin in the preceding election; (2) his caste; (3) his legislative seniority; and (4) his cabinet status.

Using the first two variables--electoral margin and caste--as indicators of a single concept, namely, an MLA's greater or lesser reliance on personal political resources independent of the party (or on the party's political resources), it was hypothesized that a higher score on both these variables should increase the likelihood of a member's defection from

the party. The assumption on which the above hypothesis is based is that a party member reliant for the most part on personal political resources independent of the party will feel less constrained in defecting than one largely dependent on the party's political resources, because the latter's career aspirations are made more vulnerable than the former's after separating from the party.

Legislative seniority and cabinet status were, on the other hand, hypothesized to exercise a constraining effect on defection. Two considerations led to the hypothesis positing a negative association between legislative seniority and defection. First, it was reasoned that the members who had attained higher levels of legislative seniority indicated, among other things, that they had survived the process of sifting out of nonconformists through disciplinary action in the past by virtue of being largely compliant to the party policy and leadership. Second, higher levels of legislative seniority were thought more likely to carry better prospects for the member's socialization into party norms.

The consideration underlying the hypothesized negative relationship between cabinet status and defection was that the former was likely to increase a member's satisfaction by virtue of his high status position within the party.

The findings supported the general hypothesis that the greater the degree of dependence of a party MLA on his personal political resources independent of the party, the greater the likelihood of his defection from the party. We

found supportive evidence for both the specific hypotheses using higher electoral margin and upper caste status as indicators of the general concept of personal political resources independent of the party, though the strength of the relationships was not uniformly maintained through the two periods of defections analysed here. In the case of defection by electoral margin the degree of association varied from very low in 1967 - 1969 to considerably higher in 1969 - 1971 (Gamma = .10 and .34, respectively).

The effect of caste on defection was found to be stronger still than that of electoral margin during the 1967 - 1969 term (Gamma = .54), though it fell down to a very low level during the 1969 - 1970 period (Gamma = .05).

The hypothesized negative effect of legislative seniority on defection was not confirmed by the 1967 - 1969 defection patterns (Gamma = .28), but it was strongly supported by the 1969 - 1970 patterns (Gamma = -.47). A similar inconsistent result was found in regard to the effect of cabinet status on defection; the findings disconfirmed the hypothesized relationship in the first term (Gamma = .37), but strongly confirmed it in the second term (Gamma = -1.0).

The inconsistent findings for the two periods pertaining to the above two hypotheses make one wonder whether the same factors may have different effects in different periods depending on prevailing circumstances. The 1967 - 1969 term seemed, for example, a peculiarly "abnormal" period for the Congress in terms of its losing its monopoly of power in Bihar

after a long period of dominance. The party appeared to be undergoing the trauma of its first defeat since independence, which seemed to loosen the constraints that had so far operated to keep the dissidents within the party despite their occasional frustrations over intraparty power-politics. For before 1967 the effective route to a significant political career lay within the framework of the Congress party and the idea of defection from it carried the implications of going into the political wilderness. Thus, in the past, the dissidents' strategy of fighting their battle from within the dominant party itself had allowed them to gain both legislative seniority as well as a limited share in cabinet positions, largely through the good offices of the party's High Command. However, once this important constraint imposed by the dominant position of the party was removed, the dissidents preferred to defect from the party, particularly at a time when they were being wooed by the anti-Congress parties to defect and join hands with them in the formation or maintenance of non-Congress coalition governments by offering them important cabinet positions, including even chief Ministership. It was presumably, for these reasons that the 1967 - 1969 defectors tended to have among them a greater proportion of those with higher legislative seniority and higher cabinet status in the past.

Or perhaps our whole reasoning regarding legislative seniority necessarily carrying better prospects for members' socialization into group norms or party loyalty, and cabinet

status being given out to members as reward for loyalty to the party is tenuous. Our findings pertaining to the 1967 - 1969 defections certainly make the above assumption problematic, at any rate, under certain circumstances. May be that instead of socializing the members into group norms and party loyalty, longer legislative experience was helping them build up personal political resources independent of the party. Similarly, instead of being distributed as a reward for loyalty to and length of service with the party, status was presumably being given out for reasons of the political resources the member brought with him to the party and for appeasing the dissidents. Probably the defectors had previously adhered to the party for reasons of expediency, and, once these reasons ceased to be expedient after the party lost its monopoly of power, they fell out, hastening to find status and position elsewhere.

In terms of the relative degree of effect of the four independent variables on defections during the two periods, caste appeared to have the strongest direct effect on defection during the 1967 - 1969 term ($\text{Gamma} = .54$), followed--in that order--by cabinet status ($\text{Gamma} = .37$), legislative seniority ($\text{Gamma} = .28$), and electoral margin ($\text{Gamma} = .10$).

During the 1969 - 1970 period, however, not only was the rank order of the independent variables in terms of the strength of their association with the dependent variable disturbed, but in the case of two of them the direction of the relationship was also reversed. Thus cabinet status and

legislative seniority emerged as the two variables having strongest negative relationship with defection (Gamma = -1.0 and -.47, respectively), while caste and electoral margin continued to be positively associated with it but not without a change in the degrees of their association as compared to that in the first term (Gamma = .34 and .05, respectively).

An examination of the effect of the variables in various combinations showed that during the 1967 - 1969 term defections consistently increased with the independent effect of each additional variable combined. Indeed, the proportion of defectors among the MLAs who were high on all the variables was almost the polar opposite of the proportion of defectors among the MLAs who were low on all. Above 90 percent of the MLAs in the latter category remained loyal as against 63 percent of the MLAs in the former category. With high scores on each additional variable, the likelihood of defection tended to increase: it was 32.1 percent among those scoring high on caste, 35 percent among those scoring high also on cabinet status, 35.7 percent among those scoring high also on legislative seniority, and 37.5 percent among those scoring high also on electoral margin. Conversely, with low scores on each additional variable, the likelihood of defection tended to decrease. This pattern should indeed be expected in the light of our finding that all the four factors are directly associated with defection.

A less clear picture emerged when we examined the combined effect of the four independent variables on the 1969 - 1970 defections, presumably because the number of

defectors is very small resulting in very marginal differences among the cells. It did, however, indicate that with high scores on each additional variable positively associated with defection, the proportion of defection tended to increase, whereas with high scores on each additional variable negatively associated with defection the incidence of defection tended to decrease.

Research by other scholars tends to support some of the findings reported here. For example, John E. Schwartz and Geoffrey Lambert in their study of the major rebellions in the British Conservative Party between 1959 - 1968 find, that among other things, potential career vulnerability and career enhancement aspirations have a marked effect on the loyalty and dissidence of the backbench MPs.⁸ That is, those whose future political career was more vulnerable and those whose career enhancement aspiration level was higher were less likely to defect than their counterparts in the opposite categories. Similarly, Leon D. Epstein's study of the "Suez rebels" and Jorgen S. Rasmussen's analysis of the "Profumo rebels," both within the British Conservative Party, revealed that the MPs representing safe constituencies were less likely to violate party unity because their local constituency party associations could more easily replace them without losing

⁸John E. Schwarz and Geoffrey Lambert, "Career Objectives, Group Feeling, and Legislative Party Cohesion: The British Conservatives, 1959-68," Journal of Politics, (May, 1971), 399-418.

the seat.⁹

Similar findings have been reported from locales widely different from Britain in terms of partisan attitude and "discipline" of the electorate. American and French electorates, which are less receptive to party activity and less "disciplined" than their British counterpart, do not commonly make possible the electoral destruction of a deviant legislator as the British electorate frequently does.¹⁰ Though party identification among the American voters is higher than among the French,¹¹ aggregate American election data show quite a high incidence of split-ballot voting.¹² Yet studies have found that even in the United States and France such factors as marginality or close competitiveness of the constituency and the placing of independently powerful personnel in the parliament by a party influence cohesion and discipline within the party. The more marginal the constituency the less the party voting, and the more the legislators with

⁹Epstein, British Politics in the Suez Crisis, op. cit., pp. 95-138; and Jorgen S. Rasmussen, The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with their Local Parties (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1966), pp. 33-45.

¹⁰Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Parties: Party Units," in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, and London: Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 431.

¹¹Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (Spring, 1962), 1-23.

¹²Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, op. cit., pp. 83-84; and Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U.S. House and the President, 1920-1964 (New York: Free Press, 1966), ch. 2.

local prestige of their own in a party's parliamentary contingent, the more the likelihood of desertion and disloyalty.¹³

No claim is, of course, being made here that the variables actually operationalized by this study are the only relevant factors involved in the maintenance of party cohesion. Indeed, as already mentioned, not all factors that appeared to be logically related to party cohesion were empirically operationalized by this study. However, the foregoing discussion does indicate that the factors included in this study are at least in part relevant to explaining party cohesion or lack of it.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study could very well be replicated using a more efficient research design and taking a somewhat wider sample or finite population of party deviants and defectors and incorporating a larger number of independent variables. A more comprehensive and systematic analysis of party deviants and defectors must, in addition to a close examination of the various party-specific and system-level variables include at least three broad clusters of variables: (1) factors having to do with party members' SES and attitudes and motives;

¹³Samuel C. Patterson, "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western Political Quarterly, 15 (June, 1961), 460-473; Thomas R. Dye, "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, 15 (June, 1961), 473-481; and MacRae, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

(2) factors concerned with their behavioral patterns; and
 (3) factors relating to their environment or constituency.
 Then the positive or negative effect of these factors on
 defection or loyalty should be logically deduced and empirically
 tested. For variables whose theoretical association with
 party loyalty is not immediately obvious or is found to be
 conflicting in the literature, we may approach the investigation
 with what Robert K. Merton calls the "serendipity" strategy,
 that "involves the unanticipated, anomalous and strategic
 datum which exerts pressure upon the investigator for a new
 direction of inquiry which extends theory."¹⁴

The statistical technique of discriminant analysis
 may be used in order to determine whether the factors included
 in the study are reliable discriminators between the party
 loyalists and defectors.¹⁵ Basically, discriminant analysis
 serves as a tool of "predicting" an individual's membership
 in two or more categories, party loyalists and defectors in
 this case. A special feature of this technique, which particularly
 recommends its use in a study of this kind, is that it can
 be applied in a research design where the dependent variable
 is categorical and the independent variables are either
 continuous or categorical. In short it will make possible
 the prediction of the legislator's membership either in the

¹⁴Robert K. Merton, On Theoretical Sociology (New
 York: Free Press, 1967), p. 159.

¹⁵The discriminant analysis is described in William
 W. Cooley and Paul R. Lohnes, Multi-Variate Procedures for
 Behavioral Sciences (New York: John Wiley, 1962).

loyalist or the defector category on the basis of their individual, behavioral, and environmental attributes, shared in common to a greater or lesser degree. The findings will facilitate interpretative statements regarding the effects of the various independent variables on party loyalty or deviance with precise strength or weakness of such effects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY DOCUMENTS AND YEARBOOKS

All-India Congress Committee, Chunav Ghoshana Patra 1967.
New Delhi: AICC, n.d.

Government of Bihar, Finance Department, Estimates of State Income 1948-49 to 1964-65. Patna: Secretariat Branch Press, 1967.

Government of India, Census of India, 1931, Vol. VII, Bihar and Orissa. By W. G. Lacey. Patna: Government Printing, Bihar and Orissa, 1933.

Government of India, Census of India, 1941, Vol. VII, Bihar. By W. G. Archer. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1942.

Government of India, Census of India, 1951, Vol V, Bihar. By Ranchor Prasad. Patna: Secretariat Press, 1953.

Government of India, States' Reorganization Commission, The States' Reorganization Commission Report. New Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1956.

Government of India, Election Commission, Report on the Second General Elections in India, 1957. 2 Vols. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1959.

Government of India, Election Commission, Report on the First General Elections in India, 1951-52. 2 Vols. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1959.

Government of India, Report of the Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities. New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1960.

Government of India, Election Commission, Report on the Third General Elections in India, 1962, 2 Vols. New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1963 and 1966.

Government of India, Census of India, 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar. By S. D. Prasad. Patna: Secretariat Press, 1963-1968.

Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Principles and Policy. New Delhi: Jana Sangh, n.d.

Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Jana Sangh: Election Manifesto. New Delhi: Jana Sangh, 1967.

Praja Socialist Party, Policy Statement: A Praja Socialist Publication. New Delhi: Praja Socialist Party, 1956, reprinted 1967.

Prasad, Jagdeo, Shoshit Dal: Bihar. Patna: Shoshit Dal Office, 1967.

Samyukta Socialist Party, Sidhanta, Vaktavya, aur Karyakrama. New Delhi: Samyukta Socialist Party, n.d.

Samyukta Socialist Party, Election Manifesto 1967. Delhi: Ram Sewak Yadava, n.d.

The Times of India, Directory and Yearbook. Bombay: The Times of India Press, 1952 through 1971.

BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS

Ahmad, Enayat, Bihar: A Physical, Economic, and Regional Geography. Ranchi: Ranchi University, 1965.

Alker, Hayward, R., Mathematics and Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Almond, Gabriel A., The Appeals of Communism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954.

Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Almond, Gabriel A., and B. G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little Brown, 1966.

Austin, Granville, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959.

Barber, James D., The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaption to Legislative Life. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965.

Baxter, Craig, The Jana Sangh: The Biography of an Indian Political Party. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969.

Baxter, Craig, District Voting Trends in India: A Research Tool. New York: Southern Asian Institute, School of International Affairs, Columbia, 1969.

- Blalock Hubert M., Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960.
- Brass, Paul R. Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.
- Burger, Angela S., Opposition in a Dominant Party System. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
- Campbell, Angus et al., (eds.), Elections and Political Order. New York: John Wiley, 1966.
- Cartright, Dorwin, and Alwin Zander (eds.), Group Dynamics. New York: Harper and Row, 1968, 3rd ed.
- Chaudhury, Vijay Chandra Prasad, The Creation of Modern Bihar. Khirhar (Darbhanga, Bihar): Yugeshwar Prakashan, 1964.
- Chandidas, R., et al. (eds.), India Votes: A Source Book on Indian Elections. New York: Humanities Press, 1968.
- Collins, Barry E., and Harold Guetzkow, A Social Psychology of Group Process for Decision-Making. New York: John Wiley, 1964.
- Cummings, Milton C., Jr., Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U.S. House and the President, 1920-1964. New York: Free Press, 1966.
- Curran, J. A., Jr., Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics: A Study of the R.S.S. New York: Institute of Public Relations, 1951.
- Das Gupta, J. Language Conflict and National Language Politics in India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
- Datta, K. K., History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar. 3 vols. Patna: Government of Bihar, 1957 and 1958.
- Datta, K. K. (ed.), Unrest Against British Rule in Bihar, 1831-1859. Patna: Secretariat Press, 1957.
- Datta, K. K. (ed.), Writings and Speeches of Mahatma Gandhi Relating to Bihar, 1917-1947. Patna: Government of Bihar, 1960.
- Diwakar, R. R. (ed.), Bihar Through the Ages. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959.

- Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. Trans. by Barbara and Robert North. New York: John Wiley, 1963.
- Easton, David, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley, 1965.
- Eldersveld, Samuel J., Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.
- Epstein, Leon D., British Politics in the Suez Crisis. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964.
- Epstein, Leon D., Political Parties in Western Democracies. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
- Erdman, Howard L., The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967.
- Etzioni, Amitai, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates. New York: Free Press, 1961.
- Froman, Lewis A., Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.
- George, T. J. S., Revolt in Bihar: A Study of the August 1965 Uprising. New Delhi: Perspective Publications, 1965.
- Gopal, Ram, Indian Muslims: A Political History (1858-1947). Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959 (reprinted 1964).
- Greenstein, Fred I., The American Party System and the American People. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 2nd edition.
- Gross, L. Z., (ed.), Symposium on Sociological Theory. Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1958.
- Halpern, Manfred, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
- Harrison, Selig, India: The Most Dangerous Decades. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960.
- Houlton, Sir John, Bihar: The Heart of India. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1949.
- Hermenes, Ferdinand A., The Representative Republic. Notredame University of Notredame Press, 1958.

- Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Jackson, Robert J., Rebels and Whips: An Analysis of Dissension, Discipline and Cohesion in British Political Parties. London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.
- Janda Kenneth, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970.
- Jhangiani, Motilal A., Jana Sangh and Swatantra: A Profile of the Rightist Parties in India. Bombay: Manaktalas, 1967.
- Kashyap, Subhash, The Politics of Defection. Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969.
- Kaushik, P. D., The Congress Ideology and Programme 1920-1947: Ideological Foundations of Indian Nationalism. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964.
- Key, V. O., Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.
- Key, V. O., Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. 5th ed. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964.
- Kochanek, Stanley, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Kornberg, Allan, Canadian Legislative Behavior: A Study of the 25th Parliament. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.
- Kothari, Rajni, (ed.), Party System and Election Studies. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967.
- Kothari, Rajni, Politics in India, Boston: Little Brown, 1970.
- Lambert, William W., and Wallace E. Lambert, Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Lewis, Oscar, Village Life in Northern India. New York: Vintage Books, a Division of the Random House, 1958.
- Lipset, S. M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York: Doubleday, 1960.
- Lipset, S. M., and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press, 1967.

- Lockard, Duane, New England State Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- MacRae, Duncan, Jr., Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946-1958. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.
- Matthews, Donald R., U. S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960.
- Menon, V. P., The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. New York: Macmillan Company, 1956.
- Merton, Robert K., On Theoretical Sociology. New York: Free Press, 1967.
- Michels, Robert, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Dover Publications, 1959.
- Muller, John H. et al., Statistical Reasoning in Sociology. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970, 2nd ed.
- Narian, Iqbal, et al., (eds.), State Politics in India. Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1967.
- National Council of Applied Economic Research, India, Distribution of National Income by States 1960-61. Occasional Papers No. 6. New Delhi: National Council of Applied Research, n. d.
- Neumann, Sigmund, (ed.), Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
- O'Malley, L.S.S., Indian Caste Customs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932.
- Orans, Martin, The Santal: A Tribe in Search of a Great Tradition. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965.
- Overstreet, Gene D., and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959.
- Ozbudun, Ergun, Party Cohesion in Western Democracies: A Causal Analysis. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970.
- Palumbo, Dennis J., Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969.

- Payne, James L., Patterns of Conflict in Colombia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Philips, C. H. (ed.), Politics and Society in India. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963.
- Pinard, Maurice, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1971.
- Prasad, Kedarnath, The Economics of a Backward Region in a Backward Economy: A Case Study of Bihar in Relation to Other States of India. 2 Vols. Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1967 and 1968.
- Prasad, Narmadeshwar, Land and People in Tribal Bihar. Ranchi: Bihar Tribal Research Institute, 1961.
- Prasad, Rajendra, Autobiography. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961.
- Pye, Lucian W., Southeast Asia's Political Systems. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967.
- Rae, Douglas W., The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Rajan, M. S. (ed.), Studies in Politics: National and International. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971.
- Rokkan, Stein, et al., Citizens, Elections, Parties. New York: David McKay Company, 1970.
- Ranney, Austin, The Doctrine of Responsible Government. Urbana: University of Urbana Press, 1962.
- Ranney, Austin, Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Madison and Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965.
- Rasmussen, Jorgen S., The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1966.
- Rudolph, Lloyd, and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Sachchidananda, Culture Change in Tribal Bihar: Munda and Oraon. Calcutta: Bookland Private, 1964.
- Sachchidananda, Profiles of Tribal Culture in Bihar. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1965.

- Scalapino, Robert A., (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Acievements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, 2nd edition.
- Sindler, Allan P., Political Parties in the United States. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.
- Sinha, Anugrah Narayan, Mere Samsmaran Patna: Kusum Prakashan, 1961.
- Smith, Donald Eugene, India as a Secular State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Spatte, O. H. K., and A. T. A. Learmonth, India and Pakistan: A General and Regional Geography. London: Mithuen, 1957.
- Srinivas, M. N., Caste in Modern India and other Essays. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962.
- Srinivas, M. N., Social Change in Modern India. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
- Verba, Sidney, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Anil Bhatt, Caste, Race, and Politics: A Comparative Study of India and the United States. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1971.
- Wahlke, John C., and Hainz Eulau (eds.), Legislative Behavior. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959.
- Weiner, Myron, Party Politics in India: Development of a Multi-Party System. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Weiner, Myron, Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Weiner, Myron, The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Weiner, Myron, (ed.), State Politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Weiner, Myron, and Rajni Kothari (eds.), Indian Voting Behavior: Studies of the 1962 General Elections. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhayay, 1965.
- Weiner, Myron, and Joseph LaPalombara (eds.), Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

- Verba, Sidney, Small Groups and Political Behavior: A Study of Leadership. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Young, Roland (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962.
- Zolberg, Aristide R., Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

ARTICLES AND UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

- Blair, Harry W., Caste, Politics, and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The Elections of 1967. Duke University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1969.
- Blair, Harry W., "Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India: Caste as a Differential Mobilizer in Bihar." unpublished paper, 1970.
- Brass, Paul R., "Coalition Politics in North India," American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1174-1191.
- Converse, Philip E., and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 1-23.
- Dye, Thomas R., "A Comparison of Constituency Influences in Upper and Lower Chambers of a State Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, XV (June, 1961), 473-481.
- Eckstein, Harry, "Political Parties: Party Systems," in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 11. New York: Free Press, and London: Macmillan Company, 1968, pp. 436-453.
- Forrester, Duncan B., "Electoral Politics and Social Change," The Economic and Political Weekly (July, 1968), 1075-1094.
- Gilsdorf, Robert Raymond, Factionalism in the Italian Christian Democratic Party, 1958 - 1963. Yale University, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1970.
- Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr., "The Congress in India: Crisis and Split," Asian Survey, X (March, 1970), 256-262.
- Jha, Chetkar, and Shree Nagesh Jha, "Some Aspects of Bihar Politics," India Quarterly, XX (July-September, 1964), 312-329.
- Jha, Sashishekhar, "Tribal Leadership in Bihar," Economic and Political Weekly, III (April 13, 1968), 603-608.

- Jha, Sashishekhar, "Factionalism," Seminar, 107 (July, 1968), 36-38.
- Kothari, Rajni and Shah, Ghanshyam, "Caste Orientation of Political Factions" The Economic Weekly (July, 1963), Special Number.
- May, John D., "Democracy, Party, Evolution," Duverger," Comparative Political Studies, II (July, 1969), 216-248.
- Morris-Jones, W. H., "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System," Government and Opposition, I (August, 1966), 451-466.
- Morris-Jones, W. H., "From Monopoly to Competition in India's Politics," Asian Review, I (November, 1967), 1-12.
- Morris-Jones, W. H., "The Indian Congress Party: A Dilemma of Dominance," Modern Asian Studies, I (April, 1967), 109-132.
- Navneeth, "Congress Debacle in Bihar: Voting Patterns in 1967," The Economic and Political Weekly, III (August 25, 1968), 1311-1317.
- Patterson, Samuel C., "The Role of the Deviant in the State Legislative System: The Wisconsin Assembly," Western Political Quarterly, XV (June, 1961), 460-473.
- Prasad, R. C. "The Fourth General Elections in Bihar." Unpublished Paper, September, 1967.
- Prasad, R. C., "Educational Development [in Bihar]," Seminar (July, 1968).
- Prasad, R. C., "Politics of Leaderlessness in Bihar," The Searchlight, January 9 and 11, 1969, p. 4.
- Prasad, R. C., "The Mid-Term Poll in Bihar," Unpublished Paper, June, 1969.
- Roy, Ramashray, "Bihar," Seminar, 95 (July, 1967, 35-41.
- Roy, Ramashray, "Factionalism and 'stratarchy': The Experience of the Congress Party," Asian Survey, VII (December, 1967), 896-908.
- Roy, Ramashray, "Election Studies: Selection of Congress Candidates," The Economic and Political Weekly, I and II (December 31, 1966-February 18, 1967), 833-840, 17-24, 61-76, 371-376, 407-416 (a five part series).

- Roy, Ramashray, "Dynamics of One-Party Dominance in an Indian State," Asian Survey, VIII, 7 (July, 1968), 553-575.
- Roy, Ramashray, "Two Patterns of India's Mid-Term Elections" Asian Review, II (July, 1969).
- Schlesinger, Joseph A., "Political Parties: Party Units," in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Vol. 11. New York: Free Press, and London: Macmillan Company, 1968, pp. 428-436.
- Schoenfeld, Benjamin, "The Birth of India's Samyukta Socialist Party," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (Fall and Winter 1965-66), 245-268.
- Schwarz, John E., and Geoffrey Lambert, "Career Objectives, Group Feeling, and Legislative Party Cohesion: The British Conservatives, 1959-68," Journal of Politics, XXXIII (May, 1971), 399-418.
- Shils, Edward, "Opposition in the New States of Asia and Africa," Government and Opposition, I (February, 1966), 175-204.
- Sinha, S. C., et al., "The Concept of Diku Among the Tribes of Chota Nagpur," Man in India, XXXIX (April-June, 1969), 121-138.
- Zariski, Raphael, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics," Midwest Journal of Political Science, IV (February, 1960), 27-51.
- Zariski, Raphael, "Intraparty Conflict in a Dominant Party: The Experience of Italian Christian Democracy," Journal of Politics, XXVII (February, 1965), 3-34.

NEWSPAPERS

- The Indian Nation (Patna)
- The Searchlight (Patna)
- The Statesman (Calcutta)
- The Times of India (Bombay)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Bihar Legislative Assembly Elections

Results, 1937 and 1946

Parties and Groups	Elections	
	1937	1946
Congress Party	95	98
Muslim League	-	34
Adivasi Mahasabha	-	3
Independent Muslims	15	-
Non-Party	27	-
Europeans	4	-
Momins	-	5
Landholders	-	4
Special Constituencies	-	8
Total	141	152

SOURCE: Keesing's Contemporary Archives, (1934-1937), 2503, and (1946-1948), 7848.

APPENDIX II


Bihar Vidhan Sabha Election Results, 1972.

Party	No. of Seats	% of Vote
Congress (New)	167	34.1
Congress (Old)	30	13.9
CPI	35	7.0
Socialist	33	16.1
Jana Sangh	26	12.1
Swatantra	2	0.8
Other Parties	13	5.4
Independents	12	10.6
	<hr/> 318	

SOURCE: India News, XI, (April 21, 1972), 2.

APPENDIX III

Indian National Congress ;
organizational chart



APPENDIX IV

Important Caste Groups in Bihar

Category and Caste Group	% of Total Population
<u>Dwija Castes or Upper Castes</u>	
Brahman	4.7
Bhumihar Brahman	2.9
Rajput	4.2
Kayastha	1.2
Bania	0.6
<u>Shudras or Lower Castes</u>	
Yadava	11.0
Kurmi	3.6
Koiri	4.1
Barhi	1.0

(APPENDIX IV Continued)

Category and Caste Group	% of Total Population
Dhanuk	1.8
Kahar	1.7
Kandu	1.6
Kumhar	1.3
Lohar	1.3
Mallah	1.5
Nai	1.6
Tatwa	2.8
Teli	

Category and Caste Group	% of Total Population
Others (Less than 1 percent each)	16.0
<u>Lower Shudras</u>	
Harijans	14.1
Adivasis ^a	9.1
Muslims ^b	12.5

^a Not strictly a part of the Hindu Caste system.

^b Not a part of the Hindu Caste system but may be considered like any other Hindu Caste group in the politics of the state.

SOURCE: Data on Muslims, Harijans (Scheduled castes) and Adivasis (Scheduled tribes), Government of India, Census of India 1961, Vol. IV, Bihar, Part II-C, Social and Cultural Tables, by S. D. Prasad (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1961), and Part V-A, Special Tables for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, by S. D. Prasad (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1965). For other Caste groups, Census of India, 1931, Vol. VII, Bihar and Orissa, Part II. Tables by W. G. Lacy (Patna: Superintendent, Government Printing, 1932).

APPENDIX V

Caste and Agricultural Occupations 1951

	Brahman	Rajput or	Vaishya	Upper Shudras or Backward Castes	Harijans or Scheduled Castes	Adivasis or Scheduled Castes	Others
No. of families	491	429	372	3639	2210	207	2195
% of Total							
No. of families	5.1	4.5	3.9	38.1	23.2	2.2	23.0
Landowners	81.0	8.2	1.1	1.1	3.5	-	-
Tenants	-	78.6	31.7	44.0	15.4	-	-
Agricultural workers		6.3	18.0	35.2	66.6	-	-
Non-Agricultural workers	19.0	6.9	49.2	19.5	14.5	-	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.0	-	-

N.B. Different categories of agricultural workers in the case of Brahmins are not supplied by the A.I.A. L.E. as also the relevant figures in the case of "Adivasis" and "Others".

SOURCE: All India Agriculture Labour Enquiry, Rural Man-power and Occupational Structure, pp. 55, 57.

B30034